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Since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), the 
international community has launched several policy initiatives to address complex 
environmental problems, in particular illegal logging. One such initiative is the European Union 
(EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan and its Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements (VPAs). The scholarship on FLEGT has overwhelmingly focused on 
technical and governance aspects, drawing largely from a single institutional analysis theory. 
However, there is scant empirical research on a range of theories to understand FLEGT efficacy 
from a multi-scalar governance perspective. My dissertation research contributes to a multi-
scalar forest governance analysis approach to FLEGT efficacy by using two strands of 
concepts—namely policy coherence and institutional capacity for good governance—to answer 
three of the most critical and under-researched questions: (a) How do the New York Declaration 
on Forests (NYDF) and the United Nations Strategic Plan on Forests (UNSPF) interlink with the 
FLEGT Action Plan at policy objective and policy instrument levels? (b) What are the potential 
and realized capacities of VPA processes for advancing principles of good forest governance and 
implementation of a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) in Cameroon, Central African 
Republic (CAR), Republic of the Congo (Congo), Ghana, and Liberia? (c) What are the different 
stakeholders’ perspectives on good governance as applied to VPA in Ghana?  
 v 
My dissertation is comprised of three interlinked studies with different methodological 
designs. An in-depth comparative analysis was employed to examine interlinkages among 
FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF (Chapter 2) and institutional capacity of the VPA process in 
Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia (Chapter 3) using a review of policy documents. 
The review of policy documents was complemented with focal point interactions and meta-
analysis of VPA cases for Chapter 3. Q methodology was used to examine stakeholder 
perspectives on good forest governance in Ghana (Chapter 4).  
 The results show that FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF share inherent interlinkages of policy 
instruments such as information sharing, strategic plans, financial resources, and technical 
capacity support. The presence of common strategic agendas on finance for forests and good 
forest governance in FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF demonstrate cross-institutional coordination 
through the prioritization of policy instruments (Chapter 2). Managing interlinkages within the 
larger climate change governance architecture requires inter-institutional learning and 
international cooperation in the light of identified strategic agendas. The results also show that 
potential capacities exist for advancing governance and implementing TLAS, but that complex 
socio-political and technical challenges limit the realization of their capacities. These challenges 
have constrained the effective implementation of the VPA process. Political will and capacity 
building can impact on the realization of capacities (Chapter 3). Furthermore, the results reveal 
three distinct perspectives among stakeholders within Ghana’s VPA process, highlighting areas 
of disagreement or tension among key stakeholders. Engaging with and shaping these 
perspectives is an instrumentally and normatively appropriate governance action to advance the 
VPA in Ghana (Chapter 4). The results point to the fundamental conclusion that additional 
institutional efforts are needed to advance FLEGT globally and to achieve the VPA in Africa and 
 vi 
beyond. This dissertation is available in open access at AURA, http://aura.antioch.edu/ and 
OhioLINK ETD Center, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/etd. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The destruction of the world's primary forests is a recognized byproduct of the 
development of modern society (Brack, 2003). The underlying causes of destructive forest uses 
include, but are not limited to, poor governance (e.g., corruption), technological issues (e.g., 
weak enforcement and monitoring capacities), sociocultural issues (e.g., population growth and 
Neolithic modes of subsistence, namely cultivation and cattle herding), and economic issues 
(e.g., global demand for forest and agricultural commodities) that undervalue forests and the 
actual cost of damages associated with unsustainable forest activities (Duguma et al., 2019; 
Gupta et al., 2013; Pokorny et al., 2016, Siiriäinen, 2000).  
Many of the underlying drivers of deforestation mentioned above “lie outside” the forest 
sector and are deeply rooted in wider socioeconomic issues that bring higher and more rapid 
financial returns (United Nations Forum on Forests—UNFF, 2017a; van Dam, 2019). These 
underlying causes—such as the conversion of forest lands to planned infrastructure development, 
agriculture (oil palm and cash crops), and mining—result in forest degradation (Humphreys et 
al., 2019; Maguire, 2013). Thus, it is becoming increasingly crucial to synchronize global forest 
initiatives and other sectors, such as agriculture, mining, and infrastructural development, in 
order to effectively govern the world’s forests (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations—FAO, 2018). 
The above challenges, in particular deforestation and illegal logging, have led to a 
plethora of international interventions, such as the European Union (EU) Forest Law 
Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT), the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF), 




and the nature of illegal logging call for policy coherence1 among global forest-related policies to 
achieve the larger goal of sustainable forestry (Cashore & Nathan, forthcoming).  
To contribute toward this larger goal, my overall research aim was (a) to better 
understand the interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF at the global level, (b) to assess 
a set of five Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA2) countries in sub-Saharan Africa regarding 
their critical capacity deficits that must be dealt with if implementation progress is to be made at 
the regional level, and (c) to examine at a country-specific level how the principles of good 
governance are applied to Ghana’s VPA process. Thus, the approach I took was to critically 
examine FLEGT efficacy from a multi-scalar governance perspective so as to address the 
following under-researched questions, using a case study approach: 
1. How do the NYDF and UNSPF interlink with the FLEGT Action Plan at two 
critical policy levels, namely policy objective and policy instrument? 
2.  Focusing on priorities set out in the VPAs, what are the potential and realized 
capacities of VPA partner countries for advancing principles of good governance 
and implementing a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) in Cameroon, 
Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Liberia, and Republic of the Congo 
(Congo)?  
                                               
1 As discussed in Chapter 2, throughout this dissertation, policy coherence is associated with 
“interlinkages” of policy objectives and policy instruments of overlapping international regimes. “Interlinkages” 
denotes logical consistency among overlapping or related international forest regimes, based on their mere existence 
(et al., 2018). 
2 VPAs are a key component of the FLEGT Action Plan to address illegal logging and foster good forest 
governance (EU FLEGT Facility, 2020a). Each VPA is a bilateral trade agreement between the EU and a timber-
exporting country (hereinafter VPA partner country) involved in timber production and exportation to the EU, 
within the framework of the FLEGT Action Plan (EU FLEGT Facility, 2020a). A VPA TLAS ensures that timber 
and timber products imported into the EU from a partner country, comply with the national government laws (EU 




3. What are the different stakeholders’ perspectives on good governance as applied 
to the VPA in Ghana? 
Background and Context  
In 2015, the world had almost 4 billion hectares of forest (FAO, 2018). Even though this 
forest area has decreased over the last 25 years, the rate of forest area net loss declined by 50% 
between 2010 and 2015 (FAO, 2018). Of this total forest area, natural forests account for 93% or 
3.7 billion hectares (FAO, 2018). In the past four decades, the area of planted forests has 
increased by 105 million hectares (FAO, 2018).  
A recent review by Chatham House indicated that average annual tropical forest loss 
accelerated by 44% between 2014 and 2018 (Glover, 2020). The vast majority of forest loss is 
occurring in the tropics—about 15.8 million hectares annually (Tegegne, 2016; Weisse & 
Goldman, 2018). Of relevance to this section is that the failure of institutional structures and 
governance processes (e.g., weak rule of law and enforcement, unsecured property rights) is 
linked to deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (Gupta et al., 2013; 
Maguire, 2013). Furthermore, the increasing per capita demand for timber in the developing 
world is another leading driver of deforestation and forest degradation (Damette & Delacote, 
2011).  
Globally, studies agree that another major cause of the loss and degradation of tropical 
forests is illegal logging (Hoare, 2015; Glover, 2020), in which timber is “harvested, transported, 
processed, bought, or sold in violation of national, [and] international laws (Vandenhaute et al., 
2014, p. 10). Illegal logging extends to non-compliance with national laws and related 




Consequently, the world’s forests remain under serious threat from illegal logging and 
other illegal forest activities (Hoare, 2015). For instance, forests in the Amazon Basin, Central 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Russian Federation are significantly threatened by illegal logging 
and related trade (Brack, 2003; Bojang, 2012; Pokorny et al., 2016). Like deforestation, the 
problem of illegal logging across these regions is directly related to inadequate law enforcement 
capacity, a lack of economic incentives for legal compliance, a lack of political will, and deep-
rooted corruption (Pokorny et al., 2016; Tacconi, 2012).  
The Amazon Basin in South and Central America has the largest continuous tropical 
forest on Earth and as such has global significance in terms of biodiversity and climate change 
mitigation (Gupta et al., 2013). However, the region also has the highest rates of illegal logging 
(Nellemann, 2012; Tacconi, 2012), followed by Africa (Bojang, 2012). Regarding Africa, 
evidence suggests that approximately 70–90% of all harvested timber on that continent is illegal 
(Blaser & Zabel, 2015; Turner et al., 2007). The perpetrators and major beneficiaries of illegal 
logging and related activities—such as chainsaw operators and multinational corporations—are 
accountable and liable for illegal transactions (Acheampong & Maryudi, 2020; Glück et al., 
2010; Pokorny et al., 2016). According to Ramcilovic-Suominen and Hansen (2012), such non-
compliance behavior is influenced by numerous normative factors—for example, societal values, 
principles, and norms—and instrumental factors, for instance the perceived fairness of rules. 
These sources of non-compliance, in particular weak governance capacity, are important reasons 
for the large amount of illegal logging in developing regions such as Africa (Nellemann, 2012; 
Pepke et al., 2016; Tacconi, 2012; Pokorny et al., 2016; Ramcilovic-Suominen & Epstein, 2012).  
With respect to the scale of illegal logging in the Congo Basin, which is the world’s 




Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has the highest volume of illegally harvested timber: 
About 90% of all logging is illegal or informal (Lawson, 2014a). In the Republic of Congo, 
approximately 70% of all harvested and exported timber was found to be illegal or informal 
(Lawson, 2014b). Magrath et al. (2010) estimated that about 50% of the timber harvested in 
Cameroon is illegally harvested. Hansen and Treue (2008) indicated that in Ghana between 1996 
and 2005, the amount of timber illegally harvested by around 100,000 chainsaw operators 
amounted to approximately 70% of the total. Most of the timber (about 84%) is destined for the 
domestic market or exported overland to neighboring countries (Marfo & Acheampong, 2011). 
In Cameroon, DRC, and Congo, the volume of illegally produced timber increased between 2000 
and 2012, while it remained steady in Ghana (Hoare, 2015; Cerruti et al., 2020). While these 
figures are contested considering the lack of clear legal timber definitions, the illicit nature of the 
act, and the subjective estimation of volumes regarding illegally harvested wood, the 
implications of illegal logging across scales are unsustainable (Tacconi, 2007).  
Scholars have highlighted the far-reaching implications of illegal logging (Hoare, 2015; 
Nellemann, 2012; Pokorny et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2003). Illegal logging may cause forest 
degradation (Gupta et al., 2013; Kissinger et al., 2012), which reduces forest biodiversity and 
leads to overharvesting and the extinction of endangered tree species (Elias, 2012; Nasi et al., 
2012; Van Hensbergen, 2016). In terms of global climate change, Hoare (2015) calculated, based 
on round-wood equivalent, that more than 80 million cubic meters of timber illegally produced 
in just nine producer countries in 2013 released at least 190 million tons of carbon dioxide into 
the atmosphere. 
In terms of poor governance, systemic corruption undermines institutions to enforce 




forest-rich regions (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002; Pokorny et al., 2016). For instance, many 
timber companies in Africa have colluded with government representatives to extract timber 
illegally and have evaded taxes by misrepresenting production figures in their reports to the 
government (Altman et al., 2012; Global Witness, 2002). Economically, governments lose 
estimated assets and revenues of more than US$ 10–15 billion per annum due to illegal logging 
on public lands (Contreras-Hermosilla, 2002). Even though this figure is expected to be less 
because of recent targeted global interventions, a recent study by Humphreys et al. (2019) 
indicates that the current estimate is almost eight times the total official development assistance 




The FLEGT Action Plan was adopted in 2003 to reduce illegal logging and the related 
trade (European Commission—EC, 2003a). It sets out seven measures3 that together “prevent the 
import of illegal timber into the EU, improve the supply of legal timber, and increase demand for 
timber from responsibly managed forests” (EU FLEGT Facility, 2019; 
http://www.euflegt.efi.int/es/flegt-action-plan). The seven measures embedded in the FLEGT 
Action Plan include (EC, 2003a): (a) technical and financial support for timber-producing 
countries; (b) trade in timber with VPA partner countries; (c) safeguards for financing and 
investment; (d) support for private sector initiatives; (e) use of existing legislative instruments to 
support the FLEGT Action Plan; and (f) action to address the problem of “conflict timber.” 
One of the assumptions of the Action Plan is that national development agendas reflect 
the three pillars of sustainable forest management, namely economic viability, social equity, and 
                                               
3 While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to cover the seven measures in the FLEGT Action, I focus 




environmental sustainability (Pfeil et al., 2007). As a result, the EU ‘experiments’ with 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements, in which the governments of timber-producing countries 
agree to implement a range of measures to tackle illegal logging and the related trade, foster 
forest sector growth and economic development, and improve “good forest governance”4 
(Cashore & Nathan, forthcoming).  
The EU legal framework for the voluntary scheme, which ensures that only legally 
harvested timber and timber products are imported into the EU, is the EU Timber Regulation 
(EUTR)5. A legally binding VPA is underpinned by a strong Timber Legality Assurance System 
(hereinafter TLAS) for implementing its requirements in a timber-producing country. The TLAS 
ensures that timber is legally sourced, produced, transported, and exported to the EU in 
accordance with national and EU regulations through a FLEGT licensing scheme. To issue a 
FLEGT license, a partner country must implement a TLAS as specified in the agreement (EC, 
2020). Once operational, a TLAS must be “both robust and credible, as it includes effective 
supply chain controls and mechanisms for verifying compliance, and is subject to independent 
audits” (EC, 2020, Environment section). Together, these measures encourage better forest law 
enforcement and provide a credible system for verifying timber exported to the EU (Gupta et al., 
2013).  
The EU FLEGT Action Plan and its flagship VPA focuses on three key forest-rich 
regions and countries that are home to almost 60% of the world’s forests and produce the 
                                               
4 Good forest governance in this context “implies, among other aspects, respect for the rule of law in forest 
activities, transparent resource management, participatory rights in decision-making, equitable and secure land 
tenure, the control of corruption, and local levels of use and management” (NYDF, 2019; p. 11). 
5 EUTR consists of supply side and demand side measures. On the supply side, the EU Regulation No. 
2173/2005 endorsed a FLEGT licensing scheme for timber importation from countries entering into bilateral VPA 
with the EU (EC, 2008). On the demand side, the EU Timber Regulation no. 995/2010 imposes obligations on EU 
wood importers to exercise ‘due diligence’ in sourcing timber and timber products from suppliers, and to document 




majority of timber that is traded internationally (Pfeil et al., 2007). These regions are Central 
Africa, tropical South America, and Southeast Asia. Currently (May 2020), only Indonesia is 
able to issue FLEGT licenses. Five other countries in Africa—Cameroon, Central African 
Republic (CAR), Congo, Ghana, and Liberia—are currently implementing VPAs, while VPAs 
have been agreed in Guyana, Honduras, and Vietnam but have not yet been signed or ratified 
(EU FLEGT Facility, 2020b). Six other countries—Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Gabon, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand—are still in the negotiation phase (EU FLEGT 
Facility, 2020b). 
The NYDF and UNSPF  
 
In recent years, several other global-scale developments have been established to halt 
tropical forest loss, in particular the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) and the United 
Nations Strategic Plan for Forests (UNSPF) 2017–2030. In September 2014, the NYDF, a 
non-legally binding declaration, arose out of a political dialogue among governments, 
companies, civil society, and indigenous peoples’ organizations (UN, 2014; 2018). Underlying 
this declaration is the shared understanding that halting tropical forest loss is essential to “keep 
temperature increases below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels” (NYDF, 2019, p. 3). 
Around 200 endorsers adopted this ambitious declaration, which consists of 10 goals. By 
pledging to these 10 goals, the 200 endorsers agreed to work toward halving tropical forests 
globally by 2020 and stemming it by 2030 (NYDF, 2019). In addition, the NYDF calls for the 
ecological restoration of 150 million hectares of degraded landscapes and forestlands by 2020, 
and of 350 million hectares by 2030 (NYDF, 2018; 2019). 
Similarly, the UNSPF—which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2017—




and trees outside forests and halt deforestation and forest degradation” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 1). The 
UNSPF also provides a framework for forest-related contributions to the implementation of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the UN Forest Instrument, and other international 
forest-related commitments (UNFF, 2017a). At the core of the UNSPF is a set of six Global 
Forest Goals and 26 related targets to be achieved by 2030. The goals are intended to guide 
national forest strategies worldwide, and are also being taken up by other national and global 
organizations that are keen to assert control over tropical forest loss (UNFF, 2017a). 
Both NYDF and UNSPF represent ambitious global forest goals for the international 
community, but much of their potential for sustainable forest management (SFM) depends on 
how these goals are linked to other international forest-related instruments to enhance 
international arrangements on forests. As stated in the 2018 FAO report, the key to unlocking the 
door to progress in some of these recent global-level policy developments is to explore the extent 
to which they are interlinked and understand “the golden threads that tie multiple goals and 
targets together” (FAO, 2018; p. iv). 
Emerging Scholarship Gaps and the Need for Research 
Reflecting on the governance issues discussed above, experience of FLEGT 
implementation suggests that it is crucial to explore coherence logics (Tegegne, 2016; Tegegne 
et al., 2018) and address governance gaps in forest-related policies in a manner that is consistent 
with good forest governance principles (Kanowski et al., 2011; NYDF, 2019). First, the literature 
generally points to the urgent need for coherence in global-scale policy developments, which is 
dependent upon “interlinkages” of policy objectives and instruments, facilitated by a common 
strategic agenda such as climate change (Tegegne, Cramm, Köhl et al., 2018; Scobie, 2015). 




therefore require a better understanding of policy coherence in order to ensure that climate 
governance proceeds along a sustainable trajectory. In the face of complicity in global forest 
governance, a lack of coherence analysis could lead to ineffective policy design and 
implementation, and consequently result in adverse governance impacts (Tegegne, Cramm, Köhl 
et al., 2018).  
Policy coherence among international forest regimes has been the subject of many 
scholarly works in the last few decades (Humphreys, 1999; Glück et al., 2010; Mitchell, 2003). 
While there is growing research on policy coherence, these studies focused on either FLEGT and 
the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (hereinafter REDD+) 
initiative at the national level (Broekhoven & Wit, 2014; Tegegene, 2016; Ochieng et al., 2013); 
however, the interlinkages among FLEGT, REDD+, and sustainable forest management (SFM) 
at the global level have often not been examined (Duguma et al., 2014; Tegegne, Cramm, & 
Brusselen, 2018). More importantly, the specific policy objectives and instruments of FLEGT, 
NYDF, and UNSPF have not been researched or analyzed, although scholars have looked into 
the importance of interlinkages among global forest-related policies in pursuance of Dutch 
international forest policy (van Dam, 2019) or the international forest regime complex 
(Fernández-Blanco, Burns, & Giessen, 2019). Moreover, these scholarly works did not explicitly 
examine the implications for managing the interlinkages among FLEGT, NYYDF, and UNSPF 
at the national level where regime implementation occurs.  
As Tegegne, Cramm, and Brusselen (2018) point out, the outcomes of global-level forest 
policy give strategic management direction and momentum to the design and implementation of 
regional and national forest strategies. NYDF and UNSPF are considered prominent global forest 




speak to shared international commitments to a number of critical policy outcomes around 
reducing deforestation, increasing forest restoration, international agreements and finance, and 
good forest governance (NYDF, 2018; UNFF, 2017a). Understanding whether, how, and what 
strategic agendas are covered or jointly addressed in FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF, is important 
from a forest policy coherence learning perspective. In this dissertation, I examine interlinkages 
among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF at two critical policy levels: (a) policy objectives, namely 
specific targets or goals in the policy, and (b) policy instruments for implementation, that is, 
tools and strategies for translating policy objectives into operational programs in the context of 
international forest regimes. This research is highly important, as the scale and nature of the 
problems require a coherent international response (Hoare, 2015). 
Most developing countries are at various stages of these international forest regimes. 
Scholars, however, have argued that the “institutional capacity” for implementing these recent 
regimes should be subject to critical forest governance assessment by the scientific community, 
because practical knowledge of how these good forest governance principles are best translated 
to improve the outcomes of forest conservation and management remains limited (Adams et al., 
2020; Cashore, 2009; Kanowski et al., 2011). This assessment is particularly important, because 
attempts to deal with weak forest governance will not be successful unless the institutions and 
processes influencing the management of forests are also improved to bring about transformation 
when and where necessary (Ameyaw et al., 2016; Minang et al., 2017). In the FLEGT context, 
the current knowledge gap concerns the capacity assessment of those in charge of implementing 
and enforcing the VPA at a country level, especially in African VPA countries (Adams et al., 
2016; Adams et al., 2020; European Forest Institute—EFI, 2013). More importantly, how 




concern or define solutions within the forest sector has received limited attention. Against this 
common background, there is a need to fill these knowledge gaps concerning the policy 
coherence and capacity of the FLEGT VPA in achieving the larger goal of legal and sustainably 
managed forests at the global level.  
Conceptual and Methodological Considerations 
This brief conceptual and methodological exploration is important to understand the 
conceptual underpinning of this dissertation and maintain an implicit and more concise narrative 
that is interesting and does not contain many redundancies. Using a multi-scalar forest 
governance approach, I highlight the ways in which policy interventions are interlinked to 
support more coherent policymaking at the international level and more effective policy 
implementation at the regional and national levels, based on existing applied policy frameworks. 
In brief, I present this set of frameworks for institutional analysis (policy coherence, institutional 
capacity, and good governance) that provides the groundwork for my research.  
My frameworks are two strands of conceptual consideration: policy coherence—that is, 
interlinkages between different global-level forest policies—and institutional capacity for good 
forest governance, namely the overall ability to apply the principles of good governance. First, 
drawing on policy design approach allowed me to deconstruct FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF 
outputs into a set of policy attributes and to assess the interlinkages between different global-
level forest policies of the said regimes (Glück et al., 2010). The policy attributes of international 
forest regimes include (Glück et al., 2010, p. 40):  
1. policy objectives (specific targets or goals or strategic agendas in the policy);  
2. policy instruments (tools and strategies for implementation or to achieve the desired 




3. “the preferences and behaviors of internal target groups”—state and non-state actors 
responsible for successfully implementing and adjusting the policy instruments; 
4. “the preferences and behaviors of external target groups”—key actors whose behavior 
the policy instruments intend to influence directly or indirectly (e.g. consumers of 
forest products in the global North); and 
5.  policy rationales—the primary reasons for the choice of policy goals and policy 
tools, including the policy assumptions that underline the policy goals. 
By reviewing the policy attributes of the core components of FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF, it is possible for me “to determine the extent to which the policy objectives of each 
component are not only internally coherent; the policy tools chosen to achieve the overarching 
policy goals are consistent with each other; and the policy instruments themselves conform to the 
general preferences of the international target groups” (Glück et al., 2010, p. 40). For analytical 
traction and for the purposes of this dissertation, I focused primarily on the first two policy 
attributes of international forest regimes, namely policy objectives and policy instruments. 
A key factor influencing the specific ways in which policy instruments might be enforced 
is the extent to which all governance institutions have the capacity to implement their substantive 
policies (Cashore, 2009). Here, my attention is focused on institutional capacity as a means for 
developing substantive policies and enhancing such policy calibrations within the FLEGT 
context, particularly the implementation of good forest governance principles.  
To develop an analytical framework for assessing institutional capacity, I used the good 
forest governance framework of the Program on Forests/United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (PROFOR/FAO, 2011). This framework articulates six key principles of good 




participation, and (f) transparency. These six principles interlace with three core pillars of forest 
governance:  
1. Policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks;  
2. Planning and decision-making processes; and  
3. Implementation, enforcement, and compliance.  
Accordingly, I identified two distinct, but interrelated, dimensions of institutional 
capacity to assess good forest governance: potential capacity—which relates to having 
impressive regulations (here, good forest governance requirements in VPAs)—and realized 
capacity, which refers to how principles of good forest governance in said VPAs are translated 
into concrete operational programs, including the development of TLAS. When TLAS is taken in 
conjunction with broader good forest governance requirements (e.g., participation and 
transparency) as noted in the VPAs, scholars argue that implementing TLAS to address non-
compliance along the global supply chain is absolutely instrumental in promoting good forest 
governance (Adams et al., 2020; Cahore & Nathan, forthcoming). 
Overall, I used the concept of multi-scale governance perspective in the FLEGT context 
as being a means for strengthening forest policy coherence and improving capacities for effective 
collective action to address forest governance problems (FAO, 2020). This governance approach 
is problem-driven, context-specific, and stakeholder-centered as it seeks to clarify the nature of 
key challenges governing forests, identify the fundamental issues, and engage all relevant 
stakeholders in defining solutions (FAO, 2020). These frameworks provided the basis for a 
systematic analysis of FLEGT efficacy to tackle illegal logging at three spatial governance 
levels: (a) the global level, (b) a continent level (i.e., sub-Saharan Africa), and (c) a 




I unpack policy coherence as a critical strategy for strengthening forest policy coherence 
at the global level. At the continental level (sub-Saharan Africa), my “institutional capacity for 
advancing good governance” framework seeks to better understand how institutional capacity 
affects the implementation of the VPA process. At a country level (Ghana), my expanded “good 
governance” lens looks beyond purely capacity issues, to highlight how key stakeholders and 
state authorities interact to influence VPA policy outcomes. Table 1.1 below summarizes the 
critical focus areas of each framework. 
Table 1.1  
Categorizing Institutional Analysis Theories and their Key Focus Areas  
Framework Key focus area Unit of analysis 
Policy coherence Interlinkages between different 
policies at the international level 
Policy objective 
Policy instrument  
 
   
Institutional capacity for good 
forest governance 
The overall ability (i.e., potential 
and realized capacities) to 









Methodologically, I employed an exploratory case study design (Simons, 2009; Yin, 
2003) to examine FLEGT efficacy from a multi-scalar governance perspective. Simons (2009) 
defines case study research as “an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the 
complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, program or system in a 
real-life context” (p. 21). This case study research revealed “multiple perspectives” and 
investigated “contested viewpoints” that demonstrate the influence of and interactions between 
stakeholders in [VPA] policy evaluation (Simons, 2009, p. 23). Through a case study analysis of 




understand the FLEGT phenomenon and good forest practices aimed at tackling illegal logging 
through the lens of policy coherence and institutional capacity. Below, I outline how such case 
study research was carried out, building on the conceptual discussion above. 
I began the FLEGT efficacy case study with a qualitative exploration (Creswell & 
Creswell, 2018), based on a broader analysis of literature and both primary and secondary 
materials related to FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF to assess their interlinkages within global forest 
governance realities (research question 1). Here, I argue that a case study of recent global-level 
policy developments and the extent to which they have contributed to important strategic 
agendas in terms of SFM, forms a focus of analysis. To understand the institutional capacity of 
the VPA process, I used content analysis of VPA-related documents, meta-analysis of cases in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and interaction with VPA focal persons in the assessment. In the current 
VPA process, cases in five sub-Saharan African countries (Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and 
Liberia) were compared in order reveal the potential of VPA processes for advancing good 
governance and implementing TLAS/WTS, as well as current challenges limiting realization 
capacities (research question 2). The case study countries were selected in order to compare, at 
the implementation phase, across African countries—a regional block that has been the target of 
many international interventions in connection with deforestation and forest degradation, and 
that is linked to climate change and biodiversity loss (Bernstein & Cashore, 2012). In these 
countries, good forest governance practices have been advocated and promoted as potential legal 
and sustainable forestry solutions to illegal logging and related issues.  
Consequently, I used Q methodology to assess stakeholder perspectives and understand 




closely associated with human subjectivity, which is self-referent (Brown, 1980). Designing and 
conducting a Q study is an involved process that comprises five steps:  
1. Developing a concourse of statements (i.e., principles of good forest governance);  
2. Selecting theoretically and pragmatically appropriate Q participants (in this case, 
multiple stakeholders in Ghana’s forest sector, namely government forestry 
agencies, local communities, FLEGT Facilitator/EU delegation in Ghana, non-
governmental organizations and civil society groups, the private timber industry, 
and research and educational institutions, but no local communities);  
3. Administering the Q sort;  
4. Conducting post-Q sort semi-structured interviews; and  
5. Analyzing the Q sort and interpreting the factor groups to identify social 
perspectives and areas of agreement and disagreement.  
Carefully applying separate exploratory qualitative methods for research questions 1 and 
2, as well as a mixed-methods approach to research question 3, allowed a more robust and 
synergistic utilization of rigorous procedures in collecting data than single qualitative and 
quantitative research design, data collection, and analysis. Q methodology fits into complex 
mixed-methods designs (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). By “complex,” Creswell and Creswell 
(2018) meant that “the designs involve more steps and procedures than are embodied in the three 
core designs [convergent, explanatory sequential, and exploratory sequential, which are the 
foundation of a good mixed-methods research]” (p. 226). In a Q study context, the exploratory 
sequential is added to Q methodology. It involves three-phase procedures. I first collected 
qualitative data on principles of good forest governance and analyzed them using content 




stakeholder's subjective viewpoints). I finally tested the quantitative feature by conducting a 
factor analysis using R computational software with an R Q sort package (version 3.5.3) and 
interpreted the qualitative meaning of the factor structure (R Core Team, 2018; Stevenson, 
2015).  
At a general level, I employed Q methodology because of its ability to effectively 
combine qualitative and quantitative dimensions into a robust mixed-methods design (McKeown 
& Thomas, 2013). At a practical level, it fits into a good governance conceptual framework and 
provides a complex approach that appeals to those at the forefront of forest governance research 
(Nijnik et al., 2018). At a procedure level, it was a useful strategy to have a complete 
understanding of the forest governance research problems and research questions within the 
FLEGT context. 
Ethical Considerations 
Before entering the field for my data collection, I received institutional review board 
(IRB) approval from Antioch University New England. Following this approval, I fully informed 
the research participants what my research was about, why it was important to conduct good 
forest governance research, which sponsors were involved, how my research would be 
published, and the potential implications for the respondents (Somuah, 2018). Throughout the 
research process, I ensured trustworthiness by building relationships with my research 
participants. 
As recommended by Rossman and Rallis (2017), I approached the relevant organizational 
heads acting as ‘gatekeepers’ and spent time developing interpersonal trust, collaborations, and 
relationships with them. In this context, the term ‘gatekeepers’ refers to relevant organizational 




VPA operational programs. I maintained this ethical standard with the help of organizational 
gatekeepers of state institutions as well as departmental heads, who usually knew the agencies’ 
codes of conduct. I also respected the institutional integrity of all organizations I contacted by 
ensuring due diligence in sourcing and by using verifiable research information and materials 
during my research process.  
Additionally, I ensured the confidentiality of the participants and their information by 
using password-protected files to secure data and audio-recorded interviews. As an essential part 
of my study, I used no attributions when writing this dissertation. However, I will draw on the 
assembled data for a period of five years to efficiently utilize the resources at my disposal, for 
example, aimed at cross-referencing materials. After five years have elapsed, I will destroy the 
hard and the soft copies of data. 
A feasible research study must be politically acceptable and sensitive, since the process 
of collecting data inevitably has implications for policy processes. To practice conscientiousness 
over the political implications of what information and findings the research revealed, I obtained 
informed consent for the interviews and emphasized the issue of confidential policy documents. 
In line with this, I disclosed my research intent to Ghana’s Ministry of Lands and Natural 
Resources, which is the executive arm with oversight responsibility for forestry sector 
development; I therefore paid attention to their interests and perspectives. In addition to the 
strategies described above, I sought feedback from relevant organizations in an interactive and 
continuous process, and shared my reflections with them after every Q sort exercise. As 
recommended by Bardach and Patashnik (2015), I opened up dialogue and infused it with reason 




leverage, such as asking relevant and explicit questions to sustain open and meaningful dialogues 
and to examine critical issues I raised during the interviews. 
The issue of power dynamics as a control of knowledge production in research 
interactions is inevitable, especially in localized contexts (Van der Riet & Boettiger, 2009). Since 
the categories of stakeholders in the Ghanaian forestry sector are not homogenous, a range of 
power differentials may exist among them. Power dynamics in heterogeneous groups, like the 
stakeholders in the Ghana forest sector, are likely to favor the more powerful but less important 
stakeholders. I redressed this possible power imbalance by selecting less powerful stakeholders 
as well as powerful stakeholders to ensure that the views of the full range of stakeholders in the 
forest sector of Ghana were incorporated in the Q study.  
Positioning Myself in this Dissertation 
Ghana, like many developing countries, is faced with sustainable development 
challenges. Of particular interest to me are those that relate to environmental governance, such as 
forests and climate change, forest management and forest policy development, and the extent to 
which key stakeholders are engaged in forest policy development. Over the years, Ghana’s 
forests have experienced setbacks such as deforestation, illegal logging, illegal mining, forest 
fires, and wildlife poaching, which constitute a major development challenge to the forestry 
sector in Ghana. If they are not checked they might contribute to serious long-term 
environmental consequences, such as climate change impacts and loss of biodiversity. 
Consequently, if left unresolved, such problems could militate against the attainment of SDG 15: 
Life on Land (“Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 





biodiversity loss”, and other international ambitions and commitments to conserve forests as 
stipulated in the Conference of Parties, COP 21 (UN, undated, Sustainable Development Goals 
section). 
These environmental problems in Ghana are much of our own making. It is the value we 
place on our forests as a country, and also the relationship between us all and our endowed 
natural resources, that is at the core of these issues. Based on my personal observations, and 
supported by the literature (Hansen et al., 2018; Rutt et al., 2018), the problems in the forest 
sector of Ghana are related to how we quickly adopt global policies and endlessly discuss them 
at the national level, but are not able to pursue or implement them effectively to improve forest 
management outcomes. Over the years, this has profoundly undermined national efforts to 
address forest management challenges. In my view, it is this policy implementation at all levels 
that has to be a full part of any natural resources governance solution to the problems that Ghana 
currently faces.  
 The above ‘wicked’ problems—complex interconnected problems that exhibit unique 
characteristics in a real-life context (Rittel & Webber, 1973)—have had a profound influence on 
my academic and professional development over the last decade. They became the guiding 
principles of my choice of academic programs. Having majored in natural resources management 
at the University for Development Studies in Ghana, I concentrated on environmental resources 
management for my Master’s program at Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and 
Technology (KNUST) in Ghana. To contribute toward solving these wicked problems, during 
my Master’s at KNUST, I examined more closely forest governance issues by looking at 
stakeholder participation in forest management in Ghana at four levels (i.e., planning, 




This study provided recommendations to support decision-making in the policy and practice of 
Ghana’s forest sector.  
Along with my past training as a forest manager and a prosecutor of forest and wildlife 
crimes at the Forestry Commission of Ghana, I worked on forest law enforcement to address 
forest management challenges in Ghana. Working as a forestry practitioner at the grassroots level 
from 2010 to 2016 gave me the exposure that allowed me to reflect more deeply about 
sustainable forest management strategies that can be explored to strengthen the institutions that 
deal with wicked problems in the forest sector. This professional drive to improve the 
achievements of sustainable forestry goals, motivated me to undertake a technical exchange 
program on forest and wildlife crimes, including the Climate Change and Natural Resources 
Management Program in mid-2016, with the United States Department of Agriculture Forest 
Service International Programs (USFS IP) in Washington, D.C., and University of California, 
Davis. As a US Government Exchange Scholar of Forest and Wildlife Crimes with the USFS IP, 
we exchanged ideas that can be applied in our respective countries to address pressing 
environmental issues. Previous practice-based programs that have also shaped my research 
interest in forest governance include the International Training on Participatory Rural 
Development at the National Institute of Rural Development and Panchayariraj, Hyerabad, India, 
Climate Change Governance and Natural Resources Management in 2015, at Wageningen 
University, Centre for Development Innovation, the Netherlands, and working with Moosewood 
Ecological Services in the northeastern part of the United States. 
In pursuing my personal–societal relevancy by combining scholarship with real-world 
experience at Antioch University New England (AUNE) in the United States, I demonstrate my 




policy practitioner, but also through my current research in forest policy and governance at 
AUNE. In essence, this dissertation is a result of my commitment to environmental and social 
justice, the principles of good forest governance, and social innovations. 
Dissertation Outline  
This dissertation is structured and formatted as multiple chapters, each of which has been 
submitted or published as a stand-alone peer-reviewed journal article. The dissertation has three 
empirical chapters, and each has its own abstract, introduction, theoretical or conceptual 
approach, methods, results, discussion, and conclusion sections. I provide a list of all references 
for the five individual chapters in a separate section at the end of this dissertation, where I also 
provide six appendices.  
 Chapter 2 presents the first empirical study, “FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF strategic 
agendas in a comparative perspective: Toward managing interlinkages.” The chapter discusses 
the interlinkages among the three prominent global-scale policy developments that collectively 
make up the present approach to SFM within the international forestry regimes. The aim of the 
research presented in this chapter was to answer the first research question: How do the NYDF 
and UNSPF interlink with the FLEGT Action Plan at two critical policy levels: policy objective 
and policy instrument? The research drew on a conceptual framework of policy coherence to 
develop an analytical framework, and also used a content analysis of forest-related policy 
documents and interviews to explore interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF 2017-
2030.  
Chapter 3 presents the second empirical study: “A comparative analysis of the 
institutional capacity of FLEGT VPA in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Ghana, 




“Focusing on priorities set out in the VPAs, to what are the potential and realized capacities of 
VPA processes for advancing principles of good governance and implementation of TLAS and 
the WTS in Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia?” Using the theoretically derived 
framework from the extant literature on institutional capacity for good governance, the research 
assessed the potential and realized capacities of VPA processes for advancing principles of good 
governance and implementation of TLAS/WTS in Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia. 
It reviewed the progress made toward the achievement of the FLEGT licensing as well as the 
challenges that hinder the implementation of VPAs, based on VPA literature, a meta-analysis of 
cases in sub-Saharan Africa, and interaction with focal points.  
 Chapter 4 presents the third empirical study: “Good Governance Practices in Ghana’s 
FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreements Process: An Application of Q Methodology.” The 
research engaged the third research question: “What are the different stakeholders’ perspectives 
on good governance as applied to VPA in Ghana?” To answer this question, the research 
expanded on the good governance framework in Chapter 3 and employed Q methodology to 
benchmark the principles of good governance as applied to VPA in Ghana from different 
stakeholder perspectives.  
Chapter 5 presents the comparative synthesis and conclusions arising from the major 
findings presented in the three empirical chapters. The chapter is concluded with an outline of 
the theoretical, methodological, and policy implications of the present research, and 
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Chapter 2: FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF strategic agendas in a comparative perspective: 
Toward managing interlinkages 
 
Abstract 
The quest to effectively govern forest resources has led to a proliferation of international forest 
regimes, agreements, and conventions. This in itself calls for a robust understanding of how 
interlinkages can be managed or of new ways of doing so. Yet the focus of many empirical 
studies has been on interlinkages that are not instrumental to the global context, especially how 
the core attributes of regimes pursue different strategic agendas. Using content analysis, the 
present research filled this research gap by undertaking a practical assessment of the 
interlinkages among European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade 
(FLEGT), the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF), and the United Nations Strategic Plan 
for Forests 2017–2030 (UNSPF) at the global level, given their shared competences. The results 
show that FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF share similar policy instruments, such as information 
sharing, strategic plans, financial resources, and technical capacity support. This finding could 
contribute to achieving the common strategic agendas on good forest governance, finance for 
forests, forest loss, and climate change in FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF simultaneously, through 
the prioritization of policy instruments, particularly information sharing. Information sharing, 
thus, becomes a key factor for continuous inter-institutional learning, as global policy processes 
reveal incoherencies within the current global forest governance architecture. This paper 
contributes to forest policy coherence learning at the level of theory and analytical 
understanding. It also shows how to both effectively manage the potential interlinkages at the 
global level and strengthen the long-term effectiveness of international forest regimes at the 











Global forest governance continues to undergo a remarkable policy change, that is, 
alterations in a wide range of legally binding instruments and non-legally binding instruments on 
all types of forests (Humphreys, 1999). In 2003, the European Union (EU) launched the Forest 
Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan to tackle illegal logging and the 
related trade in many tropical forest countries within the framework of the G8 Action Program 
on Forests (European Commission—EC, 2003a). A Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)6 is 
a central element of the FLEGT Action Plan in the fight against illegal logging and the 
associated trade (EC, 2007). VPAs are intended to guarantee that timber and timber products 
imported into the EU from partner countries (i.e., countries that have entered into partnership 
agreements with the EU) come from legal sources, thus help exporting countries tackle illegal 
logging by improving regulations and governance (EC, 2007).  
 Similarly, as awareness grew of the contribution of illegal logging and deforestation to 
climate change, a network of actors working under the umbrella of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) proposed the Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism, and to include “the role of 
conservation, the sustainable management of forests, and the enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries” in a post-2012 climate change agreement, upon the expiration of 
the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2007, paragraph 1b-iii). REDD+ is based on the concept of 
compensating developing countries for their efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation or to create new carbon sinks (forests) at the landscape level (EFI, 2013). 
Since 2012, a number of new policy initiatives aimed at protecting and restoring forests as a 
                                               




strategy for climate change mitigation have continued to emerge. Such related policy events at 
the global level include the New York Declaration on Forests and the adoption of the UNSPF in 
2017. As such, there is now a need for a coherent policy approach to the management and 
conservation of all types of forests, and to the promotion of partnerships and stakeholder 
engagement in forests (Food and Agriculture Organization—FAO, 2018). This concern has 
largely been emphasized in the UNSPF and the NYDF, where coherence, coordination, and 
cooperation to promote sustainable forest management (SFM; see conceptual framework section 
for the definition) and reverse the loss of forest cover worldwide, is highlighted as being a 
significant goal and target (UN Forum on Forests, 2017).  
Since FLEGT was established before the NYDF and the UNSPF were agreed in 2014 and 
2017, respectively, special attention is needed when explicitly linking their substantive policy 
objectives and instruments. Although all the international forest policies mentioned above have 
an explicit goal of reducing global forest loss, the fundamental question is to what extent are the 
NYDF and the UNSPF complementary or in competition with the global efforts of the FLEGT 
Action Plan to reduce forest loss. Essentially, to put “policy coherence” to further use in support 
of international commitments to halt forest loss by 2030, we need to thoroughly understand the 
interlinkages between the different global forest-related policies. Such an understanding is 
imperative for “enabling policymakers to strike the right balance in actions, investments, 
partnerships directed toward ecological conservation, and ultimately, to find pathways to 
sustainable development” (FAO, 2018, p. x). However, the approach to enable policymakers to 




would undermine the effectiveness of international forest regimes,7 is still not well understood 
(Gupta et al., 2016; Tegegne, Cramm & Brusselen, 2018). Rather than allowing the global forest 
initiatives to develop in isolation from each other without interlinkages, it is worthwhile to 
explore ways to strengthen their effectiveness through better coordination (EFI, 2013). This 
underscores the need to undertake a practical assessment that examines policy interlinkages at 
two critical policy levels: (a) policy objectives; and (b) policy instruments for effective policy 
implementation that can strengthen on-the-ground forest policy coherence and ensure positive 
outcomes.  
Without carefully nurturing the potential interlinkages among the different policy 
objectives and instruments, policy incoherencies are likely to persist and undermine effective 
forest management. As a result, a number of scholars have made efforts to improve the 
conceptual and analytical approach to assessing interlinkages (Dohlman, 2014; Howlett & 
Rayner, 2013; Kalaba et al., 2014; Koch, 2018; Tegegne, Cramm & Brusselen, 2018). This 
scholarship has spurred a number of empirical papers on interlinkages, particularly in the field of 
the environment and forests. In general, scholars have explored the EU Forest Strategy and its 
linkages to EU forest-related policies (Aggestam & Pülzl, 2018) and assessed international forest 
regimes (Fernández-Blanco et al., 2019; Glück et al., 2010; McDermott et al., 2007; Mitchell, 
2003; Tarasofsky, 1999; van Dam, 2019) and interlinkages between REDD+ and the Sustainable 
Development Goals (Bastos Lima et al., 2017).  
The academic literature on interlinkages between FLEGT and REDD+ has been 
dominated by policy studies at a country level (Ochieng et al., 2013; Tegegne et al., 2014; 
                                               
7 A regime in this paper context is a single international forestry agreement or convention or declaration or international agenda on 
forests. Therefore, each of the different international forest regimes—FLEGT, NYDF and UNSPF 2017-2030 can be considered as separate and 




Tegegne et al., 2017). However, interlinkages studies have paid scant attention to recent global-
level policies, for example, interlinkages among SFM, FLEGT, and REDD+ (Tegegne, Cramm, 
& Brusselen, 2018). To tackle the current global forest policy issues, more in-depth knowledge 
about the implications of interlinkages is needed to strengthen forest policy coherence from a 
global-scale perspective (Duguma et al., 2014; Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). When 
attention is not paid to the interlinkages between global-level policy developments, it is often 
assumed that a particular policy solution is suitable for policy implementation and conflicts are 
likely to result. Importantly, interlinkages at the global level are particularly critical to achieving 
practicable and actionable outcomes consistent with global-scale sustainability issues, such as 
climate change (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017). Therefore, the present research set out to: 
1. Examine the interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF at two critical levels, 
namely policy objective and policy instrument; and  
2. Consider the policy implications of managing the potential interlinkages in a mutually 
reinforcing manner that best promotes the strategic agendas of SFM. 
By addressing these objectives, the research filled a major gap in the literature. This is 
because the analysis of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF appears particularly important in the light 
of the international forest community’s quest to achieve the global goals and targets of reducing 
forest loss by 2030.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the context for 
the theoretical foundation and analytical framework underlying the present research. Section 3 
introduces the methodological approach. Section 4 presents the findings, while section 5 





Theoretical Foundation for Developing an Analytical Framework 
In recent years, the definition and characteristics of policy coherence have inspired 
scholarly works in the context of global environmental governance. For example, some scholars 
have theorized that “policy coherence” means consistency between different policies (Hertog & 
Stroß, 2011; Matthews, 2012). Other scholars disagree that policy coherence and policy 
consistency are identical policy characteristics (Howlett & Rayner, 2007; Mickwitz et al., 2009). 
Despite the increasing amount of policy coherence research, the concept remains vaguely 
defined, given that it is often used interchangeably with “policy consistency,” “policy 
complementarity,” and “policy coordination” (Cejudo & Michel, 2017; Howlett & Rayner, 
2013). Accordingly, some scholars use the term “policy coherence” to mean promoting synergies 
(Missiroli, 2001), while the term “policy consistency” is interpreted as the absence of 
contradiction (Gauttier, 2004). A key insight from this growing literature is the lack of a shared 
understanding of and clarity with respect to the conceptualization of policy coherence. This 
makes it challenging to operationalize policy coherence in international regime assessment. 
Considering that it is difficult to clearly define policy coherence, it is analytically 
important to adopt a definition for the strategic analysis of the interlinkages within and across 
sectorial policies as well as across forest governance scales (Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development—OECD, 2018). Therefore, I adopted the term interlinkages, 
which denotes logical consistency among overlapping or related international forest regimes, 
based on their mere existence (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). Overlapping in this study 
means “when the functional scope of one regime protrudes into the functional scope of others” 
(Glück et al., 2010, p. 13). Overall, policy coherence works when policymakers provide a 




overlapping global-level policies that allow for clear responsibilities where their implementations 
occur.  
Scholars in the field of international environmental regimes have developed a number of 
frameworks and typologies that facilitate the analysis of interlinkages between international 
forest regimes (Biermann et al., 2009; Gehring & Oberthür, 2009; OECD, 2018; Picciotto et al., 
2004; Young, 1994; Zelli & van Asselt, 2013). Drawing on a similar typology of policy 
coherence used in examining interlinkages among regimes (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 
2018), it is essential to identify a set of policy design criteria with which to evaluate interlinkages 
(Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017; Glück et al., 2010). To that end, policy objectives (specific targets or 
goals or strategic agendas in the policy) and policy instruments (tools and strategies for 
implementation or to achieve the desired policy goals or strategic agendas) indicated what to 
look for, with particular attention paid to the interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF. 
This evaluation approach fit the focus of this research on the targeted interventions at the global 
level, rather than policy implementation at the landscape level (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 
2018).  
In this research context and in my analytical framework (see Table 2.1), policy objectives 
interlink when they are consistent without major contradictions. They are, however, not 
interlinked if there are contradictions during the policymaking processes. Consistency of policy 
objectives necessitates contradiction-free objectives, creating mutual reinforcement of policy 
instruments and ensuring that interlinkages among regimes can be achieved (Kern & Howlett, 
2009). These policy objectives and instruments may be proactively pursued depending on 
specific cases of global strategic agendas. Overall, policy instrument interlinkage is a step toward 




interlinkage of two or more policies may make their policy instruments more effective or 
ineffective (Kern & Howlett, 2009).  
SFM forms an important agenda of international forest regimes because it has been 
adopted as the overreaching goal for global forest management (Maguire, 2013). Here, SFM is 
defined as “[a] dynamic and evolving concept, [which] aims to maintain and enhance the 
economic, social, and environmental values of all types of forests, for the benefit of present and 
future generations” (UNFF, 2007, p. 3). I adopted the initial strategic agendas developed by van 
Dam (2019) for 17 international policy developments that directly or indirectly affect sustainable 
forest management and conservation. In this context, an “agenda” is defined as specific 
international policy developments and processes related to a major topical issue or policy 
objective/goal that is addressed by a broad network of transnational actors and agencies (van 
Dam, 2019). I focused in depth on six of the 17 strategic agendas presented by van Dam (2019), 
and reformulated the six strategic agendas to the context of the research. The six strategic 
agendas that are seen as the most crucial global forest issues—namely forest loss, climate change 
mitigation and adaptation, forest biodiversity, finance for forests, forest governance, and forest 
technology transfer—represent the common strategic agendas in FLEGT, NDYF, and UNSPF. 
This selection is neither exhaustive nor definitive. Appendix A presents the detailed definitions 
of the strategic agenda and the topics covered. To ensure analytical brevity, I omitted the 
following strategic agendas: soil, water, energy access, bio-economy, bioenergy, food security 
and consumption, sustainable agriculture, responsible infrastructure and mining, health, 






Table 2.1  
An Analytical Framework for Assessing Interlinkages  











Are there any shared policy objectives/ 
strategic agendas among FLEGT, 
NYDF, and UNSPF? 
 
What contribution can FLEGT, NYDF, 
and UNSPF make to the achievement of 
a given strategic agenda for promoting 
SFM? 
If so, are there strong interlinkages and potential 
contributions to the strategic agendas for 
promoting SFM? 
 
FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF policy instruments 
may make direct or indirect contributions, and 





To limit my analytical bias, I used a two-step evaluation process: (a) identify policy 
documents for scoping and inventorying, and (b) screen and analyze interlinkages in the FLEGT, 
NYDF, and UNSPF regimes. 
Identifying Policy Documents for Scoping and Inventorying 
Given the global nature of the scope of the evaluation, the sources chosen also focus on 
the targeted global forest-related policies or strategies. This research built on existing 
information on legally and non-legally binding instruments that define FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF. An extensive literature review was conducted to identify policy documents relevant to 
the general architecture of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF (see Table 2.2). While this was not a 
systematic review, it included reports, strategic policy documents, and other documentation 
relevant to the said regimes.  
The selection of the data sources was based on two criteria—principally a policy 
document’s applicability to the abovementioned three regimes. First, information with a direct 
link and immediate relevance to specific policy issues or policy domains in FLEGT, NYDF, or 
UNSPF was considered. Second, information with specific relevance for the FLEGT Action Plan 




2003a), the research covered only two priority measures—namely support to timber-producing 
countries and trade in timber—as the basis for identifying contributions to answering the two 
research questions.  
Overall, I cross-referenced these policy documents with past work done on the analysis of 
the abovementioned regimes (e.g., van Dam, 2019) focusing on a review of 17 international 
forest policies. The overview of international forest policies by van Dam (2019) was based on 
data collected from published literature and the websites of international institutions, as well as 
in-depth interviews with key experts in the period May–July 2018 and with outcomes from the 
“Strategic Agenda promoting sustainable forest management workshop in September 2018” (van 
Dam, 2019, p. 12). Based on the literature reviews, interviews, and the workshop, van Dam 
(2019) highlighted the strategic agendas where the Dutch government is strongly promoting the 
conservation and sustainable management of forests. 
The overall aim of the present research was to conduct a comparative in-depth analysis of 
FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF strategic agendas. Each of the regimes included more than one 
referenced policy document (see Table 2.2). The identified key policy documents relevant to 
FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF are presented in Table 2.2. By reviewing the policy objectives and 
policy instruments of the regimes, it was possible to determine the extent to which their strategic 
agendas are interlinked and how the policy tools chosen to implement the agendas overlap each 
other.  
Table 2.2  
Overview of Key Policy Documents Reviewed 
Document  Prepared by Publication Year Source of Policy Document 
FLEGT-related policy documents 
Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade, 
proposal for an Action Plan 




Council conclusions on Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) 
Council conclusions on Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) 
European Council 2003 EC 2003b 
NYDF-related policy documents 
New York Declaration on Forests: Action 
Statements and Action Plans 
United Nations 2014 UN 2014a 
New York Declaration on Forests: Declaration and 
Action Agenda 
United Nations 2014 (list of 
endorsers revised 
in July 2017) 
UN, 2014b 
UNSPF 2017-2030 related policy documents 
United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests 2017–
2030. General Assembly Resolution 71/285: 
United Nations Strategic Plan for Forests 2017–
2030 A/RES/71/285. 
United Nations 2017 UNFF 2017a 
Report of the United Nations Forum on Forests on 
its 2017 special session, New York, 20 January 
2017, United Nations strategic plan for forests 
2017-2030 and quadrennial program of work of the 
United Nations Forum on Forests for the period 
2017-2020 
United Nations 2017 UNFF 2017b 
 
Screening and Analyzing Interlinkages in Identified Regimes 
I adopted a process-based approach (Picciotto, 2005) to analyze the interlinkages among 
international forest regimes at the global level, because such an approach addresses the actual 
sources rather than the symptoms of incoherencies, where the main focus is on the regime setup 
to attain policy coherence at the policymaking level (Foster & Stokke, 1999). The adoption of a 
process-based approach compelled me to split the studied regimes into policy objectives and 
policy instruments, as well as relevance for SFM. I carefully examined the said regimes and the 
context in which they are used. The content of the policies was analyzed by examining and 
qualitatively comparing the prevailing policy features, such as policy objectives, policy 
instruments, relevance to sustainably managed forests, and strategic agendas in relevant policy 
documents. This approach is the main method used for analyzing textual data (Creswell, 2007), 
which usually involves examining the prevailing narratives in relevant policy documents.  
In retrieving the data, I focused on substantive policy objectives and policy instruments to 




searches corresponding to each regime studied. Direct and implicit linkages to common 
keywords in the regimes were noted. I considered these data to be an adequate representation of 
coherent policy objectives, policy instruments (tools and strategies), relevant strategic agendas, 
and contributions to SFM espoused in FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF policy documents. This 
content analysis was not intended to provide insights into on-the-ground policy implementation, 
but to show how far global forest policy objectives and policy instruments are recognized or not 
in international regime strategic agendas. A weak interlinkage constitutes a primary lack of 
shared objectives and instruments in the context of strategic agenda consideration in the said 
forest regime, and the regime may indirectly contribute to that strategic agenda. A strong 
interlinkage, in contrast, means that international forest-related policy is highly considered 
within the context of strategic agendas through policy design, and the regime can directly 
contribute to the given strategic agenda under the wider framework agreement. 
Based on the general evaluation criteria in my analytical framework, I adapted a 
three-point Likert scale to determine and interpret the degree of interlinkages and potential 
contributions by FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF to strategic agendas for promoting SFM as follows 
(Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018, p. 7): 
(i) Strong interlinkages: a given topical issue is explicitly considered in the form of 
goals, objectives, or targets that contribute directly to the strategic agenda; 
(ii) Weak interlinkages: a given topical issue is not explicitly considered in a given 





(iii) No interlinkages: a given topical issue is not explicitly considered in a given regime, 
and its goals, objectives, or targets cannot be expected to contribute to the strategic 
agenda. 
Results 
This section presents the main contributions of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF to the 
strategic agendas for promoting SFM and the possible interlinkages among the three regimes. An 
inventory of policy objectives, policy instruments, and strategic agendas in FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF is presented in Appendix B.  
Interlinkages Among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF  
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the various contributions of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF 
to the strategic agendas for promoting SFM, all of which are discussed in more detail below. 
Table 2.3  
Contributions of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF to the Strategic Agendas for Promoting SFM 
 
Strategic agenda 
For promoting SFM 
FLEGT NYDF UNSPF 
Forest loss Indirect contribution: FLEGT 
can prevent forest 
degradation—the loss of 
forests’ capacity to produce 
essential goods and services—
through enhanced forest law 
enforcement. 
Direct contribution: NYDF 
goal 1 is to halt natural forest 
loss. 
Direct contribution: UNSPF 
aims to reverse the loss of 
forest cover or prevent forest 
degradation worldwide through 
SFM.  
Climate change mitigation & 
adaptation 
Indirect contribution: Not a 
key topical issue in FLEGT, 
but ensures legality in the 
forest sector, which is linked to 
the maintenance and 
enhancement of forests and 
their contribution to the global 
carbon cycles. 
Direct contribution: The aim of 
NYDF is to reduce emissions 
from deforestation and forest 
degradation as part of a post-
2020 global climate agreement. 
 
Direct contribution: UNSPF 
highlights global efforts to 
prevent forest degradation and 
contribute to the global effort 
of addressing climate change. 
Forest biodiversity  Indirect contribution: Illegal 
logging affects forest 
biodiversity with regard to tree 
species, and substantial actions 
under FLEGT attempt to 
address this issue. 
Indirect contribution: NYDF 
goal 5 is to restore degraded 
landscapes and forestlands. 
Indirect contribution: UNSPF 
aims to increase significantly 
the area of protected forests 
worldwide and other areas of 
sustainably managed forests. 
Finance for forests Indirect contribution: The 
means of implementation in a 
form of finance received due 
attention in FLEGT, especially 
capacity building and TLAS 
developments. 
Direct contribution: 
Mobilization of finance for 
forests constitutes a primary 
goal and target of the NYDF 
Direct contribution: UNSPF 
goals and targets have covered 
new and additional financial 
resources from all sources for 




Good forest governance Direct contribution: FLEGT 
addresses legality and contains 
mechanisms related multi-
stakeholder participation, 
information transparency, and 
accountability in the forest 
sector. 
Direct contribution: NYDF 
goal 10 is to strengthen forest 
governance.  
Direct contribution: UNSPF 
goal 5 emphasizes the 
promotion of governance 
frameworks to implement 
SFM, including through the 
UN Forest Instrument. 
Forest technology transfer Indirect contribution: A VPA 
TLAS is built around a wood 
tracking system for effective 
supply chain control as a 
mechanism for verifying 
compliance. 
No contribution: Forest 
technology is not explicitly 
considered in the NYDF. 
Direct contribution: 
Technological innovations in 
the forestry sector are 
significantly promoted in the 
UNSPF through international 
cooperation. 
Sources: EC, 2003a, b; NYDF, 2018; Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018; UN, 2014a, b; UNFF, 
2017a, b, 
 
Table 2.3 shows the profound interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF and their 
potential to contribute across the multiple strategic agendas discussed below. 
Forest Loss 
 FLEGT makes an indirect contribution to forest loss: It seeks to achieve its policy 
objectives by addressing illegal logging and the related trade, thereby contributing to reducing 
forest loss (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). A VPA, under FLEGT, deals with the 
underlying causes of forest degradation, for example, weak forest governance and inconsistent 
legal and institutional frameworks (Ochieng et al., 2013; Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018).  
The NYDF makes a direct contribution to forest loss: It essentially aims to at least halve 
the rate of loss of tropical forests globally by 2020 and strives to halt natural forest loss by 2030 
(UN, 2014a). Additionally, the declaration included the goal to restore 150 million hectares of 
degraded landscapes and forestlands by 2020, and an additional 200 million hectares of 
deforested and degraded forestlands by 2030 (NYDF, 2018; 2019). However, progress toward 
achieving this goal is mixed (NYDF, 2019). For instance, only about 27 million hectares of land 
have been restored (NYDF, 2019). Moreover, high rates of land cover change may reverse gains, 
as one third of the countries committed to the Bonn Challenge have experienced forest loss and 




The UNSPF makes a direct contribution to forest loss: Its strategic plan provides a 
framework for the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 15, namely the 
sustainable management of forests. As outlined in the strategic plan, the most relevant global 
forest goal and associated target are 1 and 1.3, respectively, and they require that by 2020, 
countries worldwide should “promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types 
of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests, and substantially increase afforestation 
and reforestation” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 3).  
Climate Change Mitigation & Adaptation 
 FLEGT makes an indirect contribution to climate change mitigation & adaptation: The 
implementation of FLEGT VPA can indirectly support the climate change agenda by, for 
example, promoting and enhancing compliance with reduced-impact logging (Tegegne, Cramm, 
& Brusselen, 2018). Generally, VPA countries have focused on undertaking measures such as 
the implementation of forest management plans that provide environmental benefits and address 
compliance monitoring of forestry operations that could alter carbon sinks. 
The NYDF makes a direct contribution to climate change and mitigation: As indicated in 
Appendix B, at least goals 1, 7, and 8 are strongly linked to the climate change agenda (UN, 
2014a, b). These goals are further translated into quantified emission reduction. According to the 
NYDF, achieving the goals in the policy document could reduce the global emissions of 
greenhouse gases by 4.5–8.8 metric tons per year (NYDF, 2018). To put this into perspective, 
that figure is equivalent to the United States’ total annual greenhouse gas emissions.  
The UNSPF makes a direct contribution to climate change and mitigation: Its global 
forest goal 1 and its targets reinforce NYDF goals 1, 7, and 8, which contributes to the 




(UNFF, 2017a). UNSPF goal 1 and its targets specify that afforestation and reforestation may be 
used to meet emission reductions, and thereby contribute to the global effort to address climate 
change (UNFF, 2017a). Thus, it can be concluded that the goal of UNSPF directly covers the 
mitigation of greenhouse gases and the adaptation of ecosystems to climate change.  
Forest Biodiversity  
FLEGT makes an indirect contribution to forest biodiversity: FLEGT’s goal is to combat 
illegal logging and the associated illegal timber trade (EC, 2003a). In doing so, FLEGT may help 
protect some tree species threatened with extinction due to overexploitation through rules 
governing the harvesting of species (Glück et al., 2010). In addition, improving and enforcing 
national laws catalyzed by the FLEGT VPA process could ensure both the development of forest 
management plans to determine yield and regulate timber harvesting, and the compliance with 
their requirements. This management plan also guides the conservation of forest resources by 
prescribing silvicultural and monitoring schedules (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). 
The NYDF makes a direct contribution to forest biodiversity: Its goal 6—namely 
“ambitious, quantitative forest conservation and restoration targets for 2030 in the post-2015 
global development framework”—is explicitly linked to forest biodiversity conservation (UN, 
2014a; NYDF, 2019, p. 21). Other goals, for example, NYDF goal 1 aimed at stemming tropical 
forest loss, are linked to global efforts to halt biodiversity loss (UN, 2014a).  
The UNSPF makes a direct contribution to forest biodiversity: Its goals are directly 
related to forest biodiversity conservation; for example, UNSPF goal 3 and related target 3.2, 
aim to increase significantly the area of forest under long-term forest management plans (UNFF, 




which is encapsulated in the two most comprehensive international treaties on forest biological 
conservation: The Convention on Biological Diversity and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets  
2011–2030 (UNFF, 2017a, b). 
Finance for Forests 
 FLEGT makes an indirect contribution to finance for forests: Its Action Plan seeks to 
promote market security to ensure that only legally produced timber and timber products are 
imported into the EU (EC, 2003a; Glück et al., 2010). As suggested by Glück et al. (2010), the 
VPA process is expected to incentivize legal timber trade by encouraging timber suppliers and 
consumers to bear the actual cost of timber production as stated in the national laws, rather than 
seeking only to minimize prices. This incentive (through domestic and international trade, 
including the payment of fees and taxes) is likely to enhance the contribution of tropical forests 
to national economies. In VPA countries, the EU provides direct and indirect financial 
investment to support the VPA process with respect to implementation activities related to the 
2013 EU TR—Timber Regulation (EC, 2016).  
The NYDF makes a direct contribution to finance for forests: Its most significant goals 
address the specific commitments with regard to mobilizing finance for forests. NYDF goals 8 
and 9 respectively “support the development and implementation of strategies to reduce forest 
emissions” and “reward countries that by acting, reduce forest emissions—particularly through 
public policies to scale up payments for verified emission reductions and private-sector sourcing 
of commodities” (NYDF, 2019, p. 21). The declaration specifically calls for political 
endorsement for verified forest-related carbon emission reductions and the provision of financial 




The UNSPF makes a direct contribution to finance for forest: It supports the overall 
mechanism for reversing the decline in mainstream developmental assistance to SFM, mobilizing 
new and additional financial resources for implementing SFM (e.g., payment for ecosystem 
services), and creating monetary value for the carbon stored in forests (UNFF, 2017a, b). This 
global policy supports national-level strategies to “increase the access of small-scale forest 
enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable 
credit, and their integration into value chains and markets” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 4). Other relevant 
goals include mobilizing “significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance 
sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to 
advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 5). 
Good Forest Governance  
FLEGT makes a direct contribution to good forest governance: The main goal of its 
Action Plan is to promote good governance and enable a legal framework for strengthening SFM 
in VPA countries by ensuring that EU firms import from producing countries that comply with 
additional legal and sustainable forest management requirements stipulated in their national 
forest laws (Glück et al., 2010; Gupta et al., 2013). In doing so, FLEGT builds on and supports 
the development and implementation of legal, policy, and institutional frameworks for 
addressing weak forest governance at the national level (Tegegne, Cramm, Köhl et al., 2018; 
Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). The VPA process also promotes multi-stakeholder 
platforms composed of key sectors in forest use, management, and policymaking, as well as 
increased access to information that can support local democracies in developing countries 




managing cross-sectorial coordination and overcoming barriers in planning, implementation, and 
accountability arrangements (Tegegne, Cramm, Köhl et al., 2018). 
The NYDF makes a direct contribution to good forest governance: Its goal 10 seeks to 
contribute to good forest governance (UN, 2014a). NYDF Goal 10 is intended to “strengthen 
forest governance, transparency, and the rule of law, while also empowering communities and 
recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples, especially those pertaining to their lands and 
resources” (NYDF, 2019; p. 21). The underlying rationale is to ensure the existence of equitable 
rights and the rule of law in the forest sector. 
The UNSPF makes a direct contribution to good forest governance: Its goal 5 and related 
target 5.2 support the enhancement of forest law enforcement and governance by “strengthening 
national and subnational forest authorities, and significantly reducing illegal logging and the 
associated trade worldwide” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 5). Target 5.3 further requires that “national and 
subnational forest-related policies and programs be coherent, coordinated, and complementary 
across ministries, departments, and authorities, [be] consistent with national laws, and engage 
relevant stakeholders, local communities, and indigenous peoples” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 5). This 
target recognizes the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People and the 2011 UN 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (van Dam, 2019), which is also subject of matter of 
global policy platforms (e.g., the UN Permanent Forum Indigenous issues) around human rights 
and secure tenure rights at regional, national, and local levels (UNFF, 2017a).  
Technology Transfer  
FLEGT makes an indirect contribution to forest technology transfer: Although a forest 
technology transfer agenda is not explicitly captured in FLEGT, a VPA TLAS improves 




country's legality assurance system to differentiate legal from illegal timber and timber products 
or exclude controversial sources, and to issue FLEGT licenses to legal timber and timber product 
exports (EC, 2007). The timber verification system is essential for forest inventory/survey, 
mapping, and stock monitoring (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018).  
The NYDF makes no contribution to forest technology transfer: Although there is no 
explicit indication of forest technology transfer in the NYDF, the declaration received the 
endorsement of signatory governments, as well as business and civil society organizations, to 
contribute to the improvement of technological innovation in the forest sector (UN, 2014a).  
The UNSPF makes a direct contribution to forest technology transfer: At its heart are 
goal 4 and targets 4.3 and 4.5, related to innovation and forests (UNFF, 2017a). Specifically, 
strategic target 4.3 promotes “North–South, South–South, North–North, and triangular 
cooperation and public–private partnerships on science, technology, and innovation in the forest 
sector” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 3). In addition, target 4.5 promotes improvements in “the collection, 
availability, and accessibility of forest-related information through, for example, scientific 
assessments” (UNFF, 2017a, p. 5). 
In order to achieve the above strategic agendas, the regimes articulate a mix of 
regulatory, financial, and technical capacity support, and information policy tools with a distinct 
focus on different policy goals, such as SFM, tackling illegal logging and corruption, and the 
mitigation of climate change through forest management, and the sustainable development of 
forests and people. FLEGT focused on the VPA and EU implementing regulations as appropriate 
policy tools (Glück et al. 2010; Gupta et al. 2013). Although FLEGT is focused on implementing 
VPA for the overall improvement of the forest governance system, it ultimately includes the 




safeguards, independent audit, and multi-stakeholder structures to achieve its policy goals largely 
in VPA countries (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). As policy tools, the EU Timber 
Regulations (international timber trade instruments) target operators along the production and 
market supply chain with the aim of improving legal and sustainable forest management. To do 
this, a VPA sets standards for the social and environmental impacts of timber harvesting 
operations and processing, and obliges EU timber importers to exercise due diligence, as well as 
keep records of suppliers and consumers (Gupta et al., 2013).  
The NYDF set the goal to end forest loss by 2030. To achieve this, a mix of voluntary 
instruments are used, focusing on, among other policy tools, political commitments and pledges, 
codes of conducts and guidelines for information sharing, and financial resources to support 
national governments and civil society organizations (UN, 2014a, b). The overarching strategic 
agendas of the UNSPF are further defined by specific targets, as set out in the strategic plan. 
They include “a global framework for action at all levels to sustainably manage all types of 
forests and trees outside forests, and to halt deforestation and forest degradation” (UNFF, 2017a, 
p. 1). In general, the main policy tools for implementation are global strategic actions and 
programs, funding, information, and education; forest-carbon offsetting; reporting; and capacity 
and technological transfer in the forest sector (UNFF 2017a). The UNSPF proposes strategic 
actions; responsibility for implementation rests largely with public and private institutions 
facilitated by global-level coordination mechanisms such as the UNFF. 
To sum up: 
1. There are strong interlinkages between FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF strategic 
agendas of good forest governance through the prioritization of shared policy 




forest governance is a cross-cutting strategic agenda that overlaps completely 
within the three studied regimes.  
2. Thematic financial incentives are recognized as a joint strategic agenda by the 
NYDF and the UNSPF (but not by FLEGT, which indirectly contributes to finance 
for forests’ agenda) and could trigger strong interlinkages for SFM.  
3. There are also strong interlinkages between NYDF and UNSPF strategic agendas 
on forest loss and climate change mitigation & adaptation. With regard to the 
mitigation approach and adaptation strategies, there are interlinkages between 
NYDF goal 7 and UNSPF goal 1. Thus, finance for forests, climate change & 
mitigation, and forest loss are also identified as prospective cross-cutting strategic 
agendas among the regimes.  
4. There are weak interlinkages between biodiversity strategic agendas in FLEGT, 
NYDF, and UNSPF. The interlinkage between the FLEGT and the UNSPF forest 
technological innovation agenda is weak. The development of cross-cutting 
strategic agendas is a good inter-institutional learning strategy for global forest 
governance because they create a focus for a unified international forest policy 
(Maguire, 2013).  
5. While FLEGT is necessarily more legality mechanism-centered than the NYDF and 
the UNSPF, the latter policy tools are synergic, with similar overarching policy 
objectives. However, there are strong interlinkages among the policy instruments 
of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF regarding financing mechanisms, capacity 




6. Furthermore, there are weak interlinkages between the policy instruments of 
FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF related to political support, forest law enforcement, 
forest restoration activities, coordination mechanisms, and carbon offsetting.  
Discussion and Emerging Issues 
In this section, I discuss the possible interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF, as 
well as the implications for managing interlinkages resulting from strategic agendas.  
Interlinkages 
Interlinkages usually arise at all governance levels in connection with specific issues or 
strategic agendas (Gomar et al., 2014). My analysis revealed that FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF 
could contribute to similar strategic agendas of SFM, namely forest loss, climate change, good 
forest governance, and finance for forests. Of particular relevance to international organizations, 
policymakers, and practitioners is the development of cross-cutting strategic agendas, such as 
good forest governance and finance for forests. For example, FLEGT (through policy, legal, and 
institutional reforms in VPA countries), the NYDF (political will from a broad network of 
transnational actors), and the UNSPF (through enhanced cooperation, coordination, and 
synergies of forest-related polices at all levels) have strong links with good forest governance. 
Therefore, promoting good forest governance anywhere requires paying greater attention to 
avoiding duplications and conflicting regimes not only across international institutions, but also 
within the same regimes for effective policy implementation in domestic settings (Cashore, 
2009).  
Finance for forests constitutes an important aspect of many umbrella initiatives at the 
global level, simply due to their general relevance to SFM (Humphreys et al., 2019; Locatelli et 




2019). For example, the target of increasing funding to address SDG 2 (“End hunger, achieve 
food security and improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture,” see UN, n.d., 
Sustainable Development Goals section) often promotes the conversion of forests to agriculture 
development (Humphreys et al., 2019). In some specific national contexts, it may be necessary to 
stimulate an inter-sectoral dialogue on what constitutes sustainable and unstainable finances for 
forests. The implication is that attention should be paid to the larger international financing 
regimes, in particular the agro–forestry interface, with an emphasis on sustainable agricultures—
a prerequisite for achieving zero net deforestation (Humphreys et al., 2019). While the generic 
targets of the UNSPF and the NYDF with respect to the finance for forests agenda may be too 
vague to guide policy implementation at the national level, the key seems to be a systematic and 
coordinated approach to the harmonized implementation of all fulfilled financial pledges for 
SFM.  
In general, as these policy objectives become wider to cover a larger number of elements, 
they interlink or appear to mutually reinforce the need to globally manage forests according to 
SFM principles. My observations about existing interlinkages provide convincing reasoning that 
the overarching objectives of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF focus on or relate to much broader 
aspects of SFM, such as ‘the totality of principles and procedures’ expressed within the 
international forest regime. This finding also confirms that the net contribution of international 
forest policies to improving SFM remains their common objective, even though the policies do 
not always overlap (Braatz, 2002; Ledoux et al., 2000; Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). 
Thus, the FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF key policy objectives are aligned with SFM in addressing 
sustainability. Such objectives are generally supported by all actors with a stake in the forest 




creating a climate of mutual understanding (Glück et al. 2010; Haug & Gupta 2013). 
However, while the key objective of FLEGT is focused on timber legality verification 
and international trade (EC, 2003a), it reveals some potential contradictions with NYDF and 
UNSPF goals to halt tropical forest loss (UN, 2014a, b; UNFF, 2017a). For example, my 
findings revealed that FLEGT’s main policy objective is to promote the demand for verified 
legal timber, which may not ultimately or directly contribute to halting forest degradation or 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. Thus, FLEGT’s focus on legal 
timber may run counter to halting global forest loss or achieving a quantified emissions reduction 
or sustainability without strong compliance and environmental safeguards. This should not raise 
any question as to which policy objective should be overriding, since promoting the legal timber 
trade under the FLEGT process does not prevent it from promoting sustainability. Arguably, 
there is no more critical aspect to managing interlinkages than the adjustment of policy tools and 
strategies for achieving both legality and sustainability, or internalizing good forest governance 
in order to achieve appropriate policy implementation in many domestic settings (Cashore, 
2009). To design new or adjust existing policy tools, it is important not only to engage in 
dialogue with experts at the global level, but also to engage key stakeholders at the national level 
for policy feedback.	 
SFM remains a crucial element in relation to global environmental issues, for example, 
the fight against forest loss, carbon emission reduction, and climate change mitigation (Cerutti et 
al., 2020). Consistent with my analysis, the blueprint for FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF further 
underlines a number of strategic agendas for SFM, wherein the three regimes advocate an 
integrated approach to biodiversity conservation and climate change mitigation. This integrated 




development of forest sector technology, such as timber legality verification systems, remote 
sensing, and terrestrial laser scanners in various national forests for monitoring and land-use 
change tasks. One of the critical technological applications would be to ensure timber legality 
verification and technical support to improve the monitoring, verifying, and reporting of global 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. This advancement is expected to help create 
incentives to ensure legal timber trade and the accurate measurement of emission reduction, 
while maintaining and improving forest ecosystem services. For instance, the goal of the NYDF 
and the UNSPF related to climate change agendas sets targets and timelines for halting 
deforestation and achieving emission reductions. 
While such valuable tools can serve this acute purpose in the forest sector, their 
implementation requires human resources and agencies with the appropriate technological 
capabilities to perform the required functions, all of which is lacking in developing countries 
(Hetemäki et al., 2010). Thus, in order to achieve the strategic agendas of FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF for SFM, the technological and related critical capacity deficits in developing countries 
contexts need to be addressed. This is in line with the position of the UNFF (2017a), namely that 
the effective implementation of SFM is critically dependent upon the transfer of environmentally 
sound technologies, capacity development for their implementation, and the mobilization of 
financial resources for developing countries. Hence, technology and related resources must be a 
key consideration in solving the challenges we face in managing forests, improving information 
transparency, and increasing the efficiency forest governance in developing countries and 
beyond (Carodenuto, 2019; Hetemäki et al. 2010).  
The Bigger Challenges: Managing the Interlinkages  




NYDF, and UNSPF. In this research, I propose three approaches to harness their interlinkages. 
First, my inventory (see Appendix B) provides insights to guide the EU and the UN interest in 
combining different instruments that generate synergistic systemic effects in an interactive way. 
It follows that the UNFF and the EU, as network actors engaging in and disseminating 
information on SFM at the global level, should organize their systemic effect strategies in a way 
that promotes forest policy coherence based on the identified strategic agendas (McDermott et 
al., 2010).  
It is important to note that the Collaborative Partnership on Forests (CPF) has already 
taken measures to ensure a coordinated and harmonized approach to SFM, by introducing 
coordination mechanisms in member organizations (McDermott et al., 2010; van Dam, 2019). 
Using the CPF as a reference point, policymakers can build on the early gains to further enhance 
policy coordination among the international forest regimes. This should serve as a springboard to 
leverage policy coordination with all the other international forest regimes. I expect that 
interlinkages at the international level will be achieved if policy feedback through a dialogue 
platform is effectively pursued to better understand the important strategic agendas of 
international forest regimes. This policy feedback can make policy actors more knowledgeable 
of the interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF, particularly at the national and 
subnational levels. The basis of such dialogue platforms should stem from inter-institutional 
learning. As argued by Gehring and Oberthür (2009), such inter-institutional learning can only 
take place where institutional policy objectives and instruments are complementary to similar 
strategic agendas, as in FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF. In order to address relevant issues of this 
policy setting, parliaments at the national level should mainstream the global-level policies, with 




Second, taking the twin strategic imperatives together helped me to explain why 
interlinkages could also be managed at the operational level. Interlinkages can be better managed 
at the operational level by clarifying the potential relevance of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF in 
political, economic, fiscal, and ecological contexts, and how they could be supportive of the 
implementation of national forest strategies and plans. Alternatively, I argue from a top-down 
pathway of influence perspective (for details, see Bernstein & Cashore 2012) that interlinkages 
among the said regimes can be nationally driven, by combining international and national rules, 
resources, competencies, and skills to support the implementation of other programs. This is 
particularly important in an international regime context where global-level policy processes and 
outputs at the national level influence each other.  
It is suggested, however, that feedback loops between such governance levels must be 
strong enough to interlink international regimes and national forest policies (Gomar et al., 2014). 
As such, policymakers at both the international and the national level should explore further 
information sharing and reporting systems as one of the most preferable policy instruments 
found in this research. This can support an inter-sectorial coordinated approach to designing 
coherent forest policy with realistic expectations and the mechanisms necessary for its 
implementation at the national level. However, “leveraging interlinkages [further] requires true 
political leadership, with better policy coherence and coordination as a means to achieve overall 
objectives focused on outcomes rather than processes” (UN High-Level Political Forum (HLPF) 
on Sustainable Development, 2017, p. 11). Therefore, in order to manage interlinkages at the 
international and national levels, representation from and interaction between policymakers, 
implementers, and political actors is imperative. It is thus essential that policymakers pay careful 




most international regimes are implemented. 
 In addition to understanding some of these key country-specific political, social, 
economic, fiscal, and ecological priorities, how other global forest policy instruments might 
support these national strategic plans needs to be clarified. This may involve the development of 
additional and innovative financial resources needed by national governments for 
implementation, especially in developing countries. Also, such innovative financial mechanisms 
are still the subject of ongoing discussion (Singer, 2016) and a challenge, as tropical forests 
continue to receive only low levels of sustainable private investment (Humphreys et al., 2019). 
Further, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and other forest-related partnership offer some 
opportunities for developing countries. For example, with nearly US$ 500 million from diverse 
funding sources (GEF, 2015), the GEF announced a program to eliminate deforestation from 
global commodity supply chains (Humphreys et al., 2019). 
What is needed to enhance such innovative means is strong institutional commitments to 
expand formal funding legally and efforts to bridge the gaps between international pledges and 
disbursed funds (Humphreys et al., 2019). Here, there is a crucial need to align or harmonize 
fulfilled financial pledges for policymakers to manage interlinkages and further strengthen policy 
coherence at all governance levels. In realizing successful means of implementation around 
SFM, developing countries need capacity support to formulate the right mix of policy 
instruments in order to benefit from financial mechanisms at the global level. In addition, forest 
investment programs (e.g., payments for ecosystem services) are likely to be forthcoming if there 
are enabling institutional conditions: countervailing policy, transparency, accountability, and the 
participation of stakeholders and their institutions (Castrén et al., 2014). This calls for innovative 




thwarts potential capacity for mobilizing domestic forest taxes, requires equal attention.  
Overall, my discussion highlights the profound interlinkages among and the potential 
contributions of FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF to the larger goal of SFM. These interlinkages lie 
particularly at the level of policy goals and targets (e.g., NYDF and UNSPF), where there are 
overlaps between policy objectives, which appear to be strongly linked to almost all strategic 
agendas, in particular finance for forest and good forest governance agendas. Managing 
interlinkages effectively is essential to the promotion of sustainably managed forests, and 
strategies for SFM should consider interlinkages among these global-level policy developments 
and other international commitments (e.g., SDGs). Finance for forests and good forest 
governance could enable the global partnerships for SFM as a preferred avenue to coordinate the 
remaining strategic agendas in a mutually supportive manner for implementation at the national 
level. Notwithstanding the interlinked nature of the regimes studied and their potential 
contributions to critical global forest strategic agendas, the NYDF and UNSPF were consistently 
noted as mutually reinforcing and they should be implemented in a complementary manner. This 
is critical to policy implementation at subnational and national levels.  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The present research examined interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF at the 
global level at two critical policy levels, namely policy objectives and policy instruments. A 
process-based approach was used to deconstruct and match the core attributes of the three 
regimes studied with their policy objectives/strategic agendas and policy instruments. The results 
highlighted that interlinkages can be found in the policy objectives of the three regimes, as they 
target cross-cutting strategic agendas for promoting SFM—a fundamental requirement of 




FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF policy instruments. In particular, FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF 
share inherent interlinkages of policy instruments, such as information sharing, strategic plans, 
and financial and capacity support.  
Many of the policy objectives and instruments studied make either direct or indirect 
contributions to the six identified strategic agendas. The interlinkages among these policy 
instruments could produce synergies in the pursuance of several strategic agendas, namely forest 
loss, climate change mitigation & adaptation, forest biodiversity, finance for forests, good forest 
governance, and forest technology transfer. Surprisingly, the issue of interlinkages has not been 
filtered into important strategic agendas such as forest technology transfer. For example, the 
NYDF does not yet play a substantial role in technology transfer in the forest sector, but it is 
explicitly recognized in FLEGT and the UNSPF as enhancing sustainable forest management 
benefits. To be utilized to find solutions for ensuring the identified strategic agendas, forest 
technology transfer must be brought to bear on national- and global-level forest strategies, with 
capacity support made accessible to all, particularly in developing countries.  
The only strategic agendas that have been widely recognized as underpinning all the 
conservation and forest management discussed in this dissertation are the four cross-cutting 
strategic agendas, that is, good forest governance, finance for forests, climate change mitigation 
& adaptation, and forest loss. This finding has implications for managing interlinkages and for 
efforts to realize policy coherence at the international level. The main reason is that, for example, 
finance for forests and good forest governance norms are seen as enabling conditions for SFM, 
and they are cross-cutting issues that can potentially advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development. 




global and national levels. Therefore, I recommend the following measures at the international 
institutional level to further manage the potential interlinkages: 
1. Promoting inter-institutional learning (including policy transfers and innovations) and 
leveraging interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF within the current 
climate change governance framework. This inter-institutional learning should 
include precise strategic guidelines to support international stakeholder forums on 
how to work with each other to foster national level interlinkages. Effective inter-
institutional learning requires dialogue and coordinated actions, with a focus on 
achieving cross-cutting strategic agendas (e.g., finance for forests and good forest 
governance) and benefiting from interlinkages rather than a single global-level policy 
development. The cross-cutting strategic agendas are fundamental issues that all 
forest governance institutions at all levels should work to improve. 
2. Building political commitment and strengthening legitimacy in international 
cooperation via the CPF is crucial, especially in the light of cross-cutting strategic 
agendas for forest policy coherence learning. Interlinkages among international forest 
regimes would be enhanced if political support attributed to the CPF were further 
strengthened. This is expected to bolster capital and political leverages, as well as the 
means of implementation. 
3. Managing interlinkages also critically depends on capacity to boost the achievement 
of synergistic policy outcomes in the long term. Therefore, more focused capacity 
building support is required within FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF. A high priority 
should be given to the knowledge and know-how required to understand the 





4. Aligning finance and pledges for forests is critical for managing interlinkages. This 
alignment includes analyzing the effectiveness of measures in leveraging sustainable 
investments, building effective private–public partnerships for the development of the 
forest sector, and developing coherent measures to support forest governance goals. 
A limitation of this analysis is that it was limited to only global-level policies while 
excluding national policy. It is therefore imperative to note that my findings are not conclusive 
on policy implementation because of my focus on global-level forest policies. Furthermore, I did 
not examine whether the interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF extend to the domain 
of national forest policies. Also, the NYDF and the UNSPF contain a wide range of goals and 
targets, and it is a challenging task to analyze them all in detail. However, in terms of 
strengthening forest policy coherence at the global level, I provide important subtleties around 
interlinkages among the policy objectives and policy instruments of FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF. I do so because: (a) The overarching goals of such global forest policy guides 
national-level forest strategies, and (b) realizing interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF policy instruments (capacity, information sharing, and reporting) and cross-cutting 
strategic agendas, are important means for strengthening national forest strategies 
implementation.  
In addition, given that the criteria of interlinkages are constantly changing and evolving, 
it follows that my findings are not generalizable across time. However, researchers could follow 
the methodological approach of Magliocca et al. (2018) to generalize a similar qualitative 
review. Consistent with my analytical framework, their approach highlights a set of comparison 




how global level governance influence national-level policies, and vice versa. Such an approach 
suggests future research outlooks: What determines the effectiveness of strategies for managing 
interlinkages, and when are such strategies desirable? This paper only presented results based on 
qualitative research, which implies some level of subjectivity in my content analysis and 




Chapter 3: A Comparative Analysis of the Institutional Capacity of FLEGT VPA in 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ghana, Liberia, and the Republic of the Congo 
 
Abstract 
Illegal logging has received international attention in recent years. For instance, the aim of the 
European Union Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Action Plan 
(FLEGT) and its Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) is to combat illegal logging and foster 
good governance and trade in legal wood products. Using a theoretically framework derived 
from literature on institutional capacity for “good forest governance,” I conducted a comparative 
analysis of the potential and realized capacities of VPA processes for advancing principles of 
good forest governance and the implementation of the Timber Legality Assurance System 
(TLAS) in Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Liberia, and the Republic of the 
Congo (Congo), as well as the challenges that hinder the implementation of VPAs. Based on 
information gathered from multiple sources, I found that VPA processes do have potential 
capacities for advancing information transparency, multi-stakeholder participation, and TLAS. 
Important progress is, however, constrained by complex political and technical issues. Unlike in 
Ghana, Liberia, and Congo, where progress and realized capacities are more pronounced, the 
realized capacities of VPAs in Cameroon and the CAR are limited. While there are prospects for 
making progress in these latter countries, such challenges as weak and inconsistent legal 
frameworks, insufficient financial resources, and long-term conflicts have slowed down the 
implementation of VPAs. Modest investment in capacity building and enhanced political will 
could have a significant effect on the realized capacities.  
 






Since the 1990s, the international community has launched several policy interventions to 
address illegal logging and promote sustainable forestry. For instance, the World Bank 
introduced the Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) initiatives to tackle illegal 
logging. These initiatives included a series of regional Ministerial Conferences in Africa, Asia, 
and Eastern Europe, which created political space for and consensus on the need to address the 
problems of illegal logging (Eba’a Atyi, 2018). While FLEG initiatives have been one of the 
most important actions in these regions, efforts to strengthen timber legality compliance and 
trade controls along the global supply chain remain limited (Cashore & Stone, 2012). The FLEG 
initiative in Africa, for example, has been weakened while the quantity of illegally harvested 
timber is still growing rapidly in national and intra-African markets (Eba’a Atyi, 2018). This 
situation creates a strain on forest conservation and forest-dependent livelihoods in sub-Saharan 
Africa (Eba’a Atyi, 2018). 
At the general level, the FLEG appears to be similar to the EU Action Plan FLEGT. The 
Action Plan is the EU’s response to the problem of illegal logging and associated trade in timber 
and timber products (EU FLEGT Facility, 2018a). The FLEGT Action Plan includes actions to 
engage the EU in joint work with timber exporting countries with a view to improving forest 
governance and reducing the trade in illegal timber and timber products. In this article, I focus on 
the FLEGT, which arose out of the FLEG decision in 2003 to strengthen legality verification and 
promote good forest governance. Unlike the FLEG initiatives, the FLEGT has a strong focus on 
strengthening legal trade between the demand-side countries in the EU and supporting supply-





A central component of the Action Plan is the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA), 
which is a legally binding bilateral trade agreement between the EU and a timber-exporting 
country outside the EU (hereinafter ‘VPA country’). The aim of a VPA is to ensure that timber 
and timber products imported into the EU from a partner country comply with the laws of that 
country. Among key elements of a VPA include (a) the Timber Legality Assurance System 
(TLAS), which verifies legality throughout the value chain—from tree felling to export of the 
finished products—and issues verified legal timber products with ‘FLEGT’ licenses, and (b) 
commitments to public disclosure of information and other improvements to forest governance. 
Yet, without capacity building in VPA countries, the quest for negotiations on and the 
implementation of VPAs is a fruitless goal pursuit (Tegegne, 2016; Carodenuto & Cashore; 
2018; Cashore et al., 2016). The FLEGT Action Plan recognizes the importance of capacity 
development in meeting its measures, and therefore promotes capacity building for the public 
forestry sector, civil society, and the private sector in VPA countries (EC, 2003a). As a 
consequence, VPA countries have received significant EU funds and other international financial 
support for capacity development to support the negotiation and implementation of VPAs (EC, 
2016). Despite the financial investment, the legality verification systems are yet to be finalized 
and operationalized in several African countries (Karsenty, 2019). At the moment (May 2020), 
only Indonesia is able to issue FLEGT licenses. Five other countries—Cameroon, CAR, Congo, 
Ghana, and Liberia—are currently implementing VPAs, while VPAs have been agreed in 
Guyana, Honduras, and Vietnam but not yet signed or ratified (EU FLEGT Facility, 2020b). Six 
other countries—Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Laos, Malaysia, and 




Why Does Institutional Capacity Assessment Matter? 
Influencing policy areas with different sets of capacities and institutional arrangements is 
perhaps the biggest challenge of international commitments to regulate the forestry sector 
(Cashore, 2019; Maguire, 2013; Minang et al., 2017; Tegegne, 2016). Progress in the negotiation 
and implementation of VPA processes requires an adequate level of capacity to change the 
business-as-usual situation in the forest governance of VPA countries (Hansen et al., 2018). 
Continuous capacity building as roles change is a key factor in the extent to which institutions 
can acquire, improve, and retain the technological innovations and other resources needed to 
implement VPAs (Cashore, 2019; Bollen & Ozinga, 2013; Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 
2018). As an institutional approach, capacity assessments have the potential to improve policy 
actions by providing useful insights into the specific capacity required in all phases of a policy 
process (Willems & Baumert, 2003). Any policy process requires different functions to be 
performed to achieve a particular outcome, but in some cases, national institutions have an 
imbalance in capacities to perform efficiently (Willems & Baumert, 2003). Yet, the application 
of different capacities is of limited use when trying to explain why institutions fail to achieve 
policy goals or why policies fail to deliver (Howlett & Ramesh, 2015). Some scholars argue that 
the introduction of new and multiple regulations and related technologies at the country-level 
often outperforms the resources and capacities of institutional mechanisms required to cope with 
their implementation (Rayner & Howlett, 2009). Other scholars state that the degree to which 
policies may be adopted and applied is a function not only of institutional capacity, but also of 
complicated interrelated country-specific contextual factors, such as political, social, legal, 
structural, and financial factors (Willems & Baumert, 2003). For instance, the structure of the 




chain, the institutional framework, and the capacity of different stakeholders may undermine the 
implementation of VPAs (Bollen & Ozinga, 2013).  
The outputs of VPAs are filtered through the above contextual factors and manifest 
themselves in the governance arena for implementing VPAs, with the potential to create barriers 
or enable an effective legality assurance system (Carodenuto & Cashore, 2018). By taking the 
institutional settings into account, it is possible to offer a more holistic explanation for the 
challenges of VPA processes and their link to critical capacity issues (Minang et al., 2017). 
Studies on institutional capacity are less known, particularly on the institutional capacity of 
developing countries, where they are greatly needed (Cerutti et al., 2013; Cerutti et al., 2014; 
Dang et al., 2016). Furthermore, no study has rigorously explored the potential and existing 
institutional capacities that may leverage VPA promises into progress in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Against this background, the aim of the present study was to: 
1. Analyze the institutional capacity of the VPA process to advance good forest 
governance and implement a functioning TLAS in Cameroon, CAR, Congo, 
Ghana and Liberia.  
2. Provide insights into the challenges of realizing the potential capacity of the VPA 
process in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere.  
This article presents an analytical framework that identifies two main components of 
institutional capacity, namely potential and realized capacities. This capacity distinction allowed 
me not only to assess institutional capacity, but also to ask whether there are common challenges 
to realizing potential capacities regardless of early ratifications and different institutional 
settings. My qualitative exploration approach was modest, considering the methodological 




interactions with focal persons to obtain new insights into progress around VPA implementation, 
as well as to describe capacity aspects of VPA and current challenges. I do not go into a detailed 
assessment of the institutional components in all five African countries because of time and 
resource constraints, but provide a generic overview to inform further research. I do, however, 
explore the different experiences and lessons in the African regional block, and thereby 
contribute to a better understanding of emerging issues in VPA countries. Overall, I used the 
analytical framework to improve our understanding of institutional capacity for advancing good 
forest governance as they influence and are influenced by complicated political-economic and 
historical trajectories. 
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, I present the theoretically derived 
concepts of institutional capacity that I used to inform my analytical framework. I explain the 
methods in Section 3 and present my main findings in section 4. In Section 5, I discuss my 
findings and provide some policy implications. In section 6, I conclude the paper and offer some 
recommendations. I address the limitations of the study in Section 7. 
Theoretical and Analytical Framing: Institutional Capacity for “Good Governance” 
There are several conceptualizations of institutional capacity as a process and a general 
approach to “good governance” (Gisselquist, 2012). Although the concept of “good governance” 
is highly contested in developing countries (Gisselquist, 2012), it has been underlined that such 
governance is contingent on institutional capacity (Hope, 2009). As a result, the practice of 
“good governance” has shifted toward recognizing the critical role of capacity building of 
institutions as increasingly important for delivering policy outcomes (Hope, 2009). Generally, 
the concept of “institutional capacity” refers to the extent to which actors develop and apply 




Capacity for advancing “good governance” relates to a multitude of actors and institutions 
operating at different levels of governance, whose actions and interactions are defined by 
different interests, agendas, and power structures (Fukuyama, 2013; Lemos & Agrawal, 2006; 
Tacconi et al., 2003). At the policy level, however, the discourse about good governance is 
limited to a handful of so-called principles of good governance that usually include transparency, 
accountability, and participation (Cronkleton et al., 2008). Where these principles are lacking, 
governments often fail “to achieve and sustain a climate of good governance” (Hope, 2009, p. 
728). In turn, it means that good governance can be practiced in the environments of institutions 
where capacities, such as human resources capacities, exist (Hope, 2009). If such potential 
capacities are absent, policy actors’ efforts do not lead to their realized capacities for exercising 
transparency, accountability, and participation.  
While the climate of good governance allows policy actors to develop strategies that can 
help implement VPA requirements, assessing the institutional capacity of a VPA requires a 
review of existing theoretical thinking in which potential and realized capacities are envisioned. 
Drawing on Li and Zusman (2006), potential capacity relates to having impressive regulations 
(in this article context, VPAs), while realized capacity refers to how VPAs are translated into 
concrete operational programs, such as TLAS. There are, however, disagreements in the 
literature about the nature of these capacities (Li & Zusman, 2006). On the one hand, Sokolow 
(1979) argues that potential capacity and realized capacity are not related, while Li and Zusman 
(2006) disagree that potential capacity has net positive impacts on realized capacity. Although 
the two groups of capacities are interrelated components of institutional capacity, they are not 
synonymous. Intuitively, a potential capacity may exist in institutions, but actors may not 




of underutilized capacity for institutional uptake. Additionally, few scholars have questioned the 
socioeconomic context as an important determinant of actors’ interactions and potential 
capacities (González & Healey, 2005). Conversely, others posit that the socioeconomic context 
influences institutional capacity (Grindle, 2007; Healey, 2006; Phelps & Tewdwr-Jones, 2000). 
In this article, I argue that potential capacities are likely to be least effective if they do not 
consider the larger complex, dynamic social-political systems in which the VPAs are 
implemented. The main assumption is that VPAs occur in political contexts beyond institutional 
settings (Hirons et al., 2018; Satyal, 2018). 
My theoretical model distinguishes two interrelated capacity aspects, namely potential 
capacity and realized capacity, which appear to represent the basic capacity process underlying 
VPA, and therefore driving their association with the criteria in Table 3.1. In this article, what 
VPA countries may be able to do relates to the realization of their potential capacity. Thus, this 
model provides better analytical traction to determine what is working well, and what kind of 
capacity needs to be improved. I present the analytical framework for assessing the institutional 
capacity of VPAs in Table 3.1. 
Unpacking Criteria and Indicators for Assessing Institutional Capacity for Good Forest 
Governance 
 
To assess how the principles of good governance and TLAS are applied in the five VPA 
countries, I used the good governance framework of the Program on Forests and the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (PROFOR/FAO, 2011). This framework provides 
six key principles of good governance: (a) accountability, (b) effectiveness, (c) efficiency, (d) 
fairness and equity, (f) participation, and (g) transparency. These six principles interweave with 




1. Policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks;  
2. Planning and decision-making processes; and  
3. Implementation, enforcement, and compliance.  
In this paper, I consider the capacity of VPA processes to advance the transparency and 
participation of state and non-state forest sector stakeholders in the VPA countries, as these are 
the prioritized principles that the EU explicitly promotes in the FLEGT Action Plan (Bollen & 
Ozinga, 2013; EU, 2019). More importantly, a lack of transparency and of participation among 
forest sector stakeholders have been identified as some of the most important barriers to 
effectively implement the VPAs (Lesniewska & McDermott, 2014; Corodenuto, 2019).  
The capacity of VPAs to increase transparency refers to ensuring the clarity of decision-
making processes and that state and non-state stakeholders have access to forest-sector 
information at national and local levels. The VPAs require that procedures for regulatory process 
and decisions be open and clear to both state and non-state stakeholders (Othman et al., 2012). 
Transparency also ensures that the VPA process is perceived as legitimate by all concerned 
stakeholders (Kishor & de Rijk, 2014). In this article, I focus primarily on information 
transparency, that is, disclosure mechanisms that provide access to information about forests and 
VPA decisions to relevant state and non-state stakeholders.  
The capacity of a VPA to advance stakeholder participation is considered a key 
normative principle that is embedded in the VPA negotiations and implementation process 
(Lesniewska & McDermott, 2014). “The EU advocates broad stakeholder participation in 
negotiating and implementing a VPA in order to ensure an agreement is credible” (EU FLEGT 




engagement of stakeholders in the VPA processes. In this article, I focus on the existence of 
functioning mechanisms to bring stakeholders to the dialogue platform on the VPA process.  
In this article, I also focus on the extent to which TLAS is developed and applied in the 
five VPA countries. A TLAS forms the core of a VPA. “The VPA annex on the TLAS describes 
how, in practice, a VPA country's legality assurance system will differentiate legal from illegal 
timber and timber products, and how the country will issue FLEGT licenses to legal products” 
(EU FLEGT Facility, 2018b, see Legality Assurance System section). TLAS includes five 
elements: (a) a legality definition; (b) control of the supply chain using a wood tracking system 
(WTS) for monitoring the movement of timber and wood products from the forest or point of 
import to the point of export or sale on the domestic market; (c) verification of the supply chain 
as set out by the WTS; (d) the issuance of FLEGT licenses; and (e) an independent audit of the 
TLAS by a third party (EC, 2007). As these elements in the VPAs are extensive and detailed, I 
examined progress in developing and deploying TLAS, which encompasses a wood tracking 





Table 3.1  
Analytical Framework for Assessing Capacity for Advancing Principles of “Good Forest Governance” and TLAS in the  
VPA Process 
 


























mechanisms in the VPA 
process 
 








Existence of participation mechanisms for 
multi-stakeholder VPA process 
 
Information disclosure mechanisms do not exist 
Information disclosure mechanisms are under development  
Information disclosure mechanisms exist but not functional  
Information disclosure mechanisms accessible to only a few 
stakeholders 
Information disclosure mechanisms are accessible to most 
stakeholders 
 
Participation mechanisms do not exist 
Participation mechanisms are under development 
Participation mechanisms established but not frequently 
applied 
Participation mechanisms well-established but not accessible 
to all forest sector stakeholders  
Participation well established, frequently applied, accessible 
to all forest sector stakeholders  
 
Very low existing/realized capacity 
Low existing/realized capacity 
Medium existing/realized capacity 
High existing/realized capacity 
 
Very high existing/realized 
capacity 
 
Very low existing/realized capacity 
Low existing/realized capacity 
Medium existing/realized capacity 
 
High existing/realized capacity 
 









Timber traceability and 
monitoring system 
 
TLAS developments and deployment 
 
 
No TLAS established  
TLAS under development 
TLAS developed but not operationalized 
TLAS developed and deployed nationwide 
A fully functioning TLAS for issuing FLEGT licenses exists 
Very low existing/realized capacity 
Low existing/realized capacity 
Medium existing/realized capacity 
High existing/realized capacity 







Research Design: Study Area and Methods 
I designed the study as an exploratory multiple case study. A case study is “as an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p. 
13). To understand the complexity of a VPA’s progress, I examined the phenomena of potential 
and realized capacities, and challenges to progress on the VPA process. As shown in Figure 3.1, 
the case study covered Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia, because these are forest-
rich states that have signed, ratified, and started VPA implementation. Accordingly, I used the 
five countries to explore the particularity—that is, the uniqueness—of VPA countries’ potential 
capacities and to illustrate different aspects of institutional challenges. Another equally important 
reason is that these countries, like other tropical forest countries, are the focus for legal and 
sustainable forestry implementation activities because of deforestation and illegal logging 
(Bernstein & Cashore, 2012). Moreover, timber-producing tropical countries were an early target 
for the FLEGT (EC, 2003a). Therefore, the selected countries have different experiences and 





Figure 3.1. Map showing VPA countries in sub-Sharan Africa. (Source: Author Map 
produced using ArcGIS 10.6 suite package and datasets from http://diva-gis.org/). 
 
Drawing on a similar qualitative method used to study institutional effectiveness in the 
context of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) in 
developing countries (Ochieng et al., 2016), a review of official policy documents (see Appendix 
C) related to VPA process was undertaken. This choice of document review allowed me to gain 
insights into the progress of VPA implementation in sub-Saharan Africa, and to analyze the 
institutional capacity of VPA countries and the challenges facing the VPA process. I relied on 
the EU FLEGT Facility (which is hosted at the European Forest Institute) and its website, online 
Briefing Notes, and aide-mémoire, as well as specific VPA countries’ documents and reports. I 
also reviewed and cross-referenced relevant documents from the EU FLEGT Facility and VPA 




Organization (ITTO). These were complemented by meta-analysis of relevant reports by Brack, 
and Léger (2013), Eba’a Atyi (2018), EU (2019), Karsenty (2019), Pepke et al. (2016), 
Vandenhaute, et al. (2014), Tegegne (2016), EC, (2016), Minang et al. (2017), and the New 
York Declaration on Forests (NYDF 2018; 2019). The data for these studies were semi-
structured interviews complemented with a review of scientific and grey literature.  
The desk study and meta-data analysis were complemented by informal interactions 
(between September 2019 and October 2019) with experts directly involved in the VPA 
processes. In this article, focal points are lead policy actors (e.g., government authorities in VPA 
countries) with extensive knowledge based on their position in and experience of a country’s 
VPA process. These interactions generally lasted 20–30 minutes, with questions designed to 
elicit information on progress and key issues that these policy actors could identify as essential 
for improving forest governance. Most of these informal interactions were not recorded because 
of the politically sensitive nature of the VPA process. However, notes were taken during and 
immediately after each interaction. I believe that, together, these studies allowed a better 
understanding of the progress the VPA process had made to date and the main challenges 
hindering the implementation of VPAs. 
Based on the general criteria in my framework to qualitatively analyze the policy 
documents, I used a content analysis approach to investigate the progress of VPAs in the light of 
potential capacities and realized capacity-related challenges. In using the content analysis 
approach, I compiled data on the five VPA countries as review notes, which were used to assess 
each VPA country’s progress in relation to potential capacities and associated challenges. My 
content analysis of the data included EFI FLEGT updates published and available in English. 




results from policy documents, meta-analysis of VPA cases and interaction with focal points to 
address my main research questions. 
Results 
In this section, I present the potential and the existing/realized capacity of the VPA process 
for (a) advancing principles of transparency and participation, as well as implementing functional 
timber verification systems, and (b) the main challenges of realizing potential capacities. Table 3.2 
summarizes the status and progress of the VPA process. I highlight the insights from my 
interactions with focal persons to support the content analysis.  
Table 3.2  
Summary of the Status of the VPA Process in Study Countries  
Country Negotiations  Signing by VPA 
parties 
Ratification FLEGT licensing 










started in 2009 




VPA signed in 2010 
VPA ratified in 2011 
 
 
VPA ratified in 2012 
No FLEGT licensing  
 
 








started in 2008 
 
Negotiations 
started in 2007 
 
Negotiations 
started in 2009 
VPA signed in 2010 
 
 
VPA signed in 2009 
 
 
VPA signed in 2011 
 
VPA ratified in 2013 
 
VPA ratified in 2009 
 
VPA ratified in 2013 
 
No FLEGT licensing  
 
No FLEGT licensing but Ghana 
issued "mock FLEGT licenses" in 
2018 
No FLEGT licensing 
Source: EU FLEGT Facility: http://www.euflegt.efi.int/where-we-work 
 
Potential and Existing/Realized Capacity of the VPA Process  
Table 3.3a presents references to information transparency, stakeholder participation, and 
TLAS in the texts of the VPAs of Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia at the time of the 




mechanisms for information transparency and stakeholder participation, as well as in developing 
and deploying TLAS in the five VPA countries. None of the VPA countries ranked very high for 
advancing transparency and participation. However, there have been promising developments in 
implementing VPA information transparency and participation mechanisms. 
Table 3.3a  
Potential Capacity of VPA Process in Five Study Countries  
Capacity aspect Cameroon CAR Congo Ghana Liberia 
Information 
transparency 
Article 21 and Annex VII 
include 75 types of data or 
information in forest sector 
to be publicly available. 
Article VII references all 
important information on 
the operations associated the 
FLEGT licensing scheme. 
Annex XI includes 
68 types of data –13 
categories for 
dissemination. 
Annex IX, Section 
IIb references civil 
society efforts to 
document 
information and 
make it publicly 
available to the 
FLEGT licensing 
authority and the JIC. 
Annex X includes 
49 types of data – 







No annex but in 
LAS reference to 68 
types of data. 




reference to specific 
documents to be 
made public. Annex 
under development. 
Annex IX includes 




Initiative – two 
categories for 
information disclosure– 
61 types of data – 7 
categories for 
dissemination. Also 
described in LAS. 






Article 16 and Annex III-B 
lay down commitments to 
establish participation 
mechanism to guarantee key 
stakeholders’ involvement 
in the monitoring and 
implementation of the VPA. 
Annex III–B: National 
Monitoring Committee 
includes all interested 
stakeholder, especially 
CSOs. 
Articles 16 and 19 as 
well as Annexes VIII 









Article 16 makes 
commitments to 
consult and involve 
key stakeholders in 
the implementation 
of the agreement. 
As set out in article 
19, a Joint 
Implementation 
Council (JIC) shall 
be established to 
facilitate monitoring 
and review of the 
agreement.  
Article 16 includes 













16-1) and functioning 






Annex VIII outlines the 
control of the supply chain 
to track timber from the 
forest to the point of export. 
Article 9 requires the 
establishment of timber 
legality verification system 
Annex II-A details system 
for verifying the legality 
and derived wood product. 
 
Annex V references 
the establishment and 
management of 
information software 
adapted to the 
traceability 
requirements needed 
to control, verify and 
license legal timber. 
 
Articles 3, 8, and 9 




for verifying that 
timber and derived 
products for export 
have been legally 
produced and that 
only timber verified 
as such is exported 
to the EU.  
 
Article 8 requires 
that Ghana develops 





along the supply 
chain. See also L.I. 
2254 
 
Article 8 includes 
commitments to 
establish a system for 
verifying timber 
legality along the 
supply chain. The 
legality definition is set 
out in Article 2 and in 
Annex II.  





Table 3.3b  
Existing and Realized Capacity of VPA Process in Five Study Countries 
Countries Good forest governance: Transparency and participation 
mechanisms in the VPA process 





Existence of functioning 






Cameroon Medium realized 
capacity 
 






• Developed a dedicated website for 
information sharing, but there is still 
more to do. 
• Established strong participation 
mechanisms which are active.  





Low realized capacity 
 
 





• Developed website to publish 
information but the functioning of the 
mechanisms has been limited. 
• Established participation mechanisms 
but the functioning of the mechanisms 
has been limited.  










• Developed a website and publishes 
information on the website.  
• Established participation mechanisms 
as outlined in the VPA but does not 
function as intended. 
• TLAS developed and preparing for 
deployment. 
Ghana High realized capacity Medium realized capacity High realized 
capacity 
• Developed a public portal for sharing 
information 
• Established stakeholder participation 
mechanisms, and they are working. 
• TLAS (GhLAS) developed, 
piloted/tested but not fully functional 
nationwide. 
 
Liberia Medium realized 
capacity 
Medium realized capacity High realized 
capacity 
• Publish forest-related information on 
FDA’s website 
• Developed mechanisms to engage 
forest sector stakeholders  
• TLAS (LiberTrace) developed and 




My analysis revealed that there is high potential capacity for the establishment of 
mechanisms that make information available to all relevant stakeholders. All five VPAs include 
basic and general transparency measures, outlined in the VPA texts and annexes, listing the 




(Cameroon) types of data. In all countries studied, the dissemination of forest-related information 
is often carried out through portals, websites of national forestry authorities, official reports, and 
multi-stakeholder implementation platforms.  
The realized capacity for sustaining information transparency efforts varies across the 
countries. The existing and realized capacity of Cameroon, Congo, and Liberia was ranked 
medium (see Table 3.3b). Cameroon developed a website (www.apvcameroun) dedicated to 
publishing forest-related information and documents included in the EU–Cameroon VPA. In 
2017, the website provided over 80% of the information that should be publicly available 
(NYDF, 2018). However, the website is now (2019) offline, and in 2018, the information made 
available via the website was either incomplete or lacked consistency. Hence, state and non-state 
actors continue to rely on informal channels to access information. In Congo, the Ministry of 
Forestry publishes financial and other forest-related information, as foreseen in Annex X, on a 
website (apvflegtcongo.info). The website is often offline and often lacks content or suffers from 
periodic technical problems (Forest Watch Report, 2018). Congolese CSOs welcomed the 
adoption of Congo’s transparency code in 2017, which enables them to request specific pieces of 
information on an ad hoc basis to support their monitoring (Forest Watch Report, 2017). 
As set out in transparency annex IX, my analysis reveals that Liberia has a medium 
realized capacity. Liberia adopted the 2010 Freedom of Information Act and since 2017 it has 
been publishing reports with information on taxes collected, production, and market prices on the 
Forestry Development Authority’s (FDA) website (http://www.fda.gov.lr/; Minang et al., 2017). 
However, the functioning of the website suffers from technical issues and lacks regular updates. 
Moreover, the format of the information provided on the website does not suit the needs of 




Initiative and provides broad access to forestry information throughout the production value 
chain (Bollen & Ozinga, 2013). 
Ghana, on the other hand, has a high existing/realized capacity for ensuring transparency 
in accordance with Article 20. The Forestry Commission of Ghana, in collaboration with civil 
society, developed the Transparency Portal to provide the public with access to information 
about, for example, harvest rights, timber rights fees, harvest-related payments, and Social 
Responsibility Agreements (personal communication with a civil society representative, July 30, 
2019; Accra, Ghana). Finally, although CAR developed a centralized database on forests and a 
website (www.apvrca.org), the functioning of the website has been limited due to weak 
capacities for forest monitoring and control, and a lack of capacity and resources (ITTO, 2018). 
Hence, CAR was ranked as having low existing/realized capacity to implement the information 
transparency commitment of the VPA process.  
Stakeholder Participation  
My analysis ranked CAR as having a very low realized capacity to engage 
multi-stakeholders in the VPA process, and Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia as having a 
medium existing capacity for applying participation mechanisms in the VPAs. Cameroon 
established the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC or Comité conjoint de suivi, in French), a Joint 
Implementation Committee (JIC), and a civil society platform. However, these mechanisms (e.g., 
National Monitoring Committee) are behind schedule or suffer from internal representation 
problems. Similarly, as defined in Article 16 and Annex V of the EU–Ghana VPA, Ghana 
established Joint Monitoring and Review Mechanisms (JMRM) and a Multi-Stakeholder 
Implementation Committee (M-SIC), including actions to support a civil society platform to 




less effective as a deliberative mechanism. Liberia also developed a JIC and a National 
Multi-stakeholder Monitoring Committee (NMSMC). In realizing the potential capacity of the 
VPA process, Liberia is the only VPA country to have community representatives on the 
multi-stakeholder committee overseeing the implementation (Satyal, 2018). The functioning of 
the mechanisms, however, has been limited by the change of leadership within the forest 
authority.  
On the other hand, as per Article 15 and Annex IX (5) of the VPA text, Congo set up a 
Joint Implementation Committee (CCM) and a Technical Secretariat (ST). However, the ST has 
not been actively applying the Joint Implementation Committee to engage stakeholders in 
Congo’s VPA process. However, CSOs formed a platform to engage in the VPA process. As in 
other VPA processes, the engagement of private sector actors in the VPA process remains a 
concern. Finally, CAR established participation mechanisms such as a JIC, National Committee 
for Implementation and Monitoring (CNMOS), and a Technical Permanent Secretary (STP) to 
ensure the involvement of various stakeholders in the implementation of the VPA process. 
Moreover, CSOs continue to engage in the VPA process through the GDRNE (Gestion Durable 
des Ressources Naturelles et de l’Environnement) platform, in which a large number of Central 
African NGOs active in the forest sector participate. However, the functioning of these 
participation mechanisms remains limited due to political instability and a lack of human and 
financial capacities (Brack & Léger, 2013; Minang et al., 2017). 
Overall, the VPA process has contributed significantly to the development of 
multi-stakeholder structures and improved the participation of state and non-state forest sector 
stakeholders in all VPA countries, and therefore enabled constructive continuous stakeholder 




Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) 
 Here, I describe the existing realized capacity of the VPA process to design national 
TLASs and to perform wood tracking, as well as to set up institutional structures and procedures, 
such as developing verification protocols and approaches. Table 3.3b summarizes the realized 
capacity of the VPA process to develop and implement a functioning TLAS to ensure that timber 
and timber products comply with the VPA regulatory requirements. None of the VPA processes 
studied was ranked as having a very high realized capacity for developing and deploying TLAS. 
Ghana and Liberia were ranked as having a high realized capacity because the Forestry 
Commission of Ghana developed, tested, and is now close to implementing a Ghanaian legality 
assurance system (GhLAS) nationwide (ITTO, 2018). However, the GhLAS does not contain all 
the datasets and can only be operational when the revised version of the system is taken up 
nationwide (personal communication, August 21, 2019; Accra-Ghana). The main problem of the 
TLAS in Ghana is related to the capacity of the existing system to distinguish between timber 
originating from forest sources recognized by the VPA and other sources of timber without 
recognized timber rights.  
In 2015, Liberia developed and implemented a TLAS (LiberTrace, 
https://libertrace.sgs.com/). However, the computerized LiberTrace is not yet fully operational 
nationwide, leading to the issuance of FLEGT licenses. This is because of the need to revise the 
legality matrix to integrate community forestry, chainsaw harvest operations, and other legal 
reforms identified during the process of defining legality. Moreover, the nationwide 
operationalization of LiberTrace has been limited by a lack of realized capacity and the difficulty 
of harmonizing the different components of the verification systems and validating the data in 




The VPA processes of Cameroon and Congo were ranked as having a medium realized 
capacity. The Cameroon VPA process developed a computerized Forest Information 
Management System (SIGIF, in French) to address both legality and traceability verification. 
Although most TLAS work has been completed, problems related to SIGIF, delays in the 
revision of legal frameworks, and law enforcement hinder the implementation of SIGIF.  
In 2015, Congo developed a TLAS (Système Informatisé de Vérification de la Légalité 
(SIVL)—Computerized System of Legality Verification, in English) and is currently (December 
2019) preparing to deploy it. Capacity building to operate SIVL has started for forestry officials, 
the private sector, and civil society. Finally, TLAS is still under development, and the VPA 
process in CAR was ranked as having a very low realized capacity. 
Key Challenges to VPA Process Implementation  
Table 3.4 presents main challenges hindering the full realization of the VPA process to 
ensure good governance and implement a functioning wood tracking system. I present both 
challenges common to all VPAs and country-specific challenges (Table 3.4).  
 
Table 3.4  
Summary of Challenges to Ensuring Good Forest Governance and TLAS in five VPA Countries 
Countries Key challenges  
Cameroon Political culture, weak legal frameworks, poor alignment of institutional boundaries and lack of institutional 
acknowledgement, state officials deliberate failure to collect and maintain information, insufficient capacities of authorities, 
and limited resources to enforce rules. 
CAR Lack of staff and logistics, civil war, lack of or weak coordination in formal state policies, weak and overlapping legal 
frameworks and political culture. 
Congo 
 
Lack of human resources and logistics, high level of corruption, weak and overlapping legal frameworks, state officials 
deliberate failure to collect and maintain information. 
Ghana Political culture, inadequate and unrealistic laws, non-compliance/poor enforcement, prolonged and bureaucratic process, and 






Lack of human resources and logistics, poor commitments of officials to uphold the rule of law, weak and inconsistent legal 
framework, poor transparency and accountability, lack of forest information. 
Source: Pepke et al. (2016) 
 
Challenges common to the VPAs  
The common important challenges across the VPA countries include political culture, 
weak and inconsistent legal framework, legitimacy factors, inadequate law enforcement, 
inadequate human and financial resources, and a lack of a fully functional data management 
system (Table 3.4). First, the constraints on realized capacity embedded in the political culture of 
Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia have stalled VPA progress to date. This political culture 
in the forestry sector relates to the abuse of authority by powerful elites and corrupt practices by 
government officials (Pepke et al., 2016). Second, in a fragmented governance regime, weak and 
inconsistent legal framework (e.g., conflicts between formal and informal customary laws related 
to tree tenure) and poor coordination among different sectors and agencies of government are 
still a challenge. Moreover, coordination among different programs with potential synergies is 
often absent at the implementation level, because of the vested interests of forestry bureaucrats 
and the lack of resources for coordination (Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018).	Third, forest 
information is poorly disseminated between levels of government because of low political will to 
collect and manage information about TLAS, poor documentation, and a lack of strict adherence 
to the reporting guidelines set out in the VPAs. 
Fourth, despite the progress made in establishing legal, policy, and institutional 
frameworks in all five VPA countries, effective compliance monitoring is still limited because of 
insufficient capacity for law enforcement and weak coordination among national law 




limits effective compliance in the VPA countries (NYDF, 2018). Fifth, the VPA countries lack 
the financial, human, and material resources needed to comprehensively deal with the 
complexity of legality within the forestry sector. The lack of financial resources in the five 
countries, however, results from a combination of overdependence on external funding from 
international donors and internal budgetary constraints (Eba’a Atyi, 2018; EC, 2016). Sixth, and 
last, compounding this problem of incomplete centralized databases is the fact that the VPA 
countries have unreliable power supplies and internet connectivity, which prevents far-reaching 
success regarding the piloting of wood tracking systems and undermines progress (see also 
Gyimah, 2012). These barriers have serious implications for the provision of real-time 
information, data analysis, and decision-making, as well as for reconciliation with consolidated 
figures along the timber supply chain. 
Country-Specific Challenges 
As shown in Table 3.4, there is a plethora of country-specific challenges (Pepke et al., 
2016). The country-specific challenges are presented below: 
• In Cameroon, the key challenges include the vested interests of political and economic 
elites enabled by poor transparency, a lack of cross-sectorial communication, inconsistent 
forestry regulations, and uncoordinated formal national policies (Carodenuto, 2019; 
Carodenuto & Ramcilovic-Suominen, 2014; Cerutti et al., 2013; Korhonen-Kurki et al., 
2016; Tegegne et al., 2017).  
• In CAR, political and military crises pose additional barriers to the implementation of 
VPA requirements. The effects of the political crisis combined with other domestic 
problems have intermittently led to the suspension of the VPA process, which has slowed 




weak and overlapping legal frameworks, corruption, structural difficulties, and 
inadequate funding for the judiciary and other public institutions (Cerutti et al., 2013).  
• In Congo, the main challenges include the culture of corruption, weak and overlapping 
legal frameworks, poor transparency and accountability, and inadequate human resources 
for monitoring compliance (Cerutti et al., 2013; Lescuyer et al., 2011).  
• Ghana faces five major challenges: its political culture, inadequate legal frameworks 
(even though the laws have been reviewed and consolidated, they do not have 
implementation decrees), weak monitoring structure for detecting and sanctioning non-
compliance, bureaucracy, and a lack of forest information about, for example, forest 
taxation (Ameyaw et al., 2016; Minang et al., 2017). In Ghana, my discussions with focal 
persons confirmed the recent second independent joint evaluation of Ghana’s TLAS, 
namely that non-compliances related to the conversion of leases and non-existing forest 
management plans for productive forest reserves have been persistent (personal 
communication, July 23, 2019, Accra-Ghana). This evaluation report further revealed that 
harvesting operations are currently ongoing in forest reserves without valid forest 
management plans. In most of these cases of non-compliance, the forest management 
plan had expired.  
• In Liberia’s forest sector, the three key issues associated with the political culture are 
poor transparency and accountability, a lack of institutional commitments to enforce 
forestry laws, and inconsistent legal frameworks (Pepke et al., 2016).  
Discussion and Emerging Issues 
Here, I distinguish and analyze the capacity trends and dynamics of FLEGT with respect 




approach and accomplishments, but also challenges to VPA countries’ performance during the 
implementation phase.  
 Although Congo, Liberia, and Ghana have made good progress regarding governance 
capacity aspects, the situation is much less satisfactory in Cameroon and CAR. The progress 
made in exercising these principles and addressing the governance challenges lags behind the 
policy statements due to disengagements with the crucial and long-standing conflict issues 
(Forest Watch, 2018), a lack of capacities, and over-reliance on donor support (Hansen et al., 
2018, Obidzinski et al., 2014; Wodschow et al., 2016). In Congo and the CAR, good forest 
governance aspects have not been brought up in the policy discourses. There is therefore a need 
to work on this aspect not only when it comes to the actual implementation, but also to satisfy 
the good forest governance requirements of the VPA process. 
In general, there is a lack of realized capacity for transparency and limited attention is 
paid to VPA process in the five countries. Concerning transparency measures, unlike in Liberia, 
access to information in Ghana is limited to timber statistics and does not include revenue and 
trade flows. In CAR, governance and law enforcement are lacking—a result of civil war (Brack 
& Léger, 2013, Forest Watch Report, 2018). A lack of information transparency is likely to 
result in widespread corruption, which in turn undermines the effective implementation of 
transparency measures (Bollen & Ozinga, 2013; Minang et al., 2017). What is needed are clearly 
defined roles for key actors, which would allow partners to avoid any conflicting expectations 
and positions. Essentially, there is a need to further clarify roles and actions to enforce existing 
legislation on freedom of information in the VPA countries such as Ghana, Congo, and Liberia, 
which may empower non-state actors to demand greater transparency concerning the forest 




information in Cameroon and CAR, a specific VPA legislative framework to support access to 
forest-related information in these countries might be helpful. 
The quality and extent of stakeholder participation is regarded as an important indicator 
of institutional capacity (Wickham et al., 2009). My observations indicate that Ghana, Liberia, 
Cameroon, and Congo have involved different group of stakeholders in the VPA process, and 
especially in the negotiation phase. This resonates with similar findings in Ghana (Beeko & Arts, 
2010), Cameroon (Wodschow et al., 2016), Congo (Tegegne, 2016), and Liberia (Satyal, 2018). 
Yet, I highlight that this literature discusses either participation during the very early stage of 
VPA negotiation (e.g., Beeko & Arts 2010), or participation by the traditional state actors 
(Overdevest & Zeitlin, 2018). FERN (2019), for instance, highlight that there is still limited 
awareness among and direct involvement of local and indigenous communities in the negotiation 
and implementation of the VPAs. Recently studies focusing on stakeholders’ participation in the 
VPA process paint a more complex picture concerning civil society involvement and especially 
local representation (Brusselaers & Buysee 2018; Hansen et al., 2018, Hirons et al., 2018; Satyal, 
2018; Obidzinski et al., 2014; Wodschow et al., 2016).  
Efforts to formalize timber production under the VPA in the VPA countries entail the risk 
of marginalizing or excluding less powerful actors, such as local communities’ domestic timber 
operators and traders (Brusselaers & Buysee 2018; Hirons et al., 2018). I acknowledge that 
participation by different stakeholders in the VPA process is gaining attention in institutional 
arrangements, such as JMRM meetings. Yet those meetings and institutional settings are often 
little more than a formality and they lack political power to move VPA implementation forward, 
resulting in frequent adjustments of the timeframe. Stakeholder participation is, however, still 




planning, quality, and access to forest information, with engagement and information sharing 
limited to political and economic elites in the forestry sector. For instance, I found that the 
existing participation mechanisms (e.g., JIC, M-SIC) not only tend to be technocratic, but also 
remain high-level national affairs without the direct involvement of downward constituents. 
Since the VPA process is technical in nature and dependent on political and cultural 
contexts, VPA countries need to engage in case-to-case based challenges, instead of pursuing 
blueprint models of and schemes for capacity building for active stakeholder participation 
including civil society organizations (CSOs). This approach has in many cases—such as in 
countries with strong authoritarian regimes—meant that the CSOs are brought in and trained by 
the VPA policymakers, resulting in little critical assessment and few demands for accountability. 
Thus, to achieve better participation in the VPA countries requires new strategies (to develop and 
model genuinely participatory approaches to local policymaking) and ‘down-scaling,’ giving due 
attention to the local issues of interest and local actors’ voices. Because it is also questioned 
whether CSOs are adequate representatives of the local communities (Satyal, 2018), novel 
participation schemes—such as direct platforms for local communities emerging from below 
—are needed if the VPA process is to claim and indeed achieve inclusivity, participation, and 
equity. As suggested by Brusselaers and Buysee (2018), governance performance through the 
application of principles of good governance via VPA is far from being transformative in the 
VPA countries. I believe that good governance principles are mere policy statements in the VPA 
documents or incremental instances of participation in terms of JIC or JMRM meetings and 
remain difficult to translate on the ground. Once effectively operational, the VPAs are expected 
to improve the countries’ capacities for “good forest governance” considerations, which in turn 




However, this ultimate goal remains a long way off, and most of the VPA countries have little 
chance of reaching it. 
For the TLAS, none of the VPA countries has met its original timeline for issuing 
FLEGT licenses because of challenges ranging from institutional issues, such as bureaucracy and 
corruption, to more complex infrastructural issues, including the lack of a functional centralized 
database on timber management and systems tailored to country-specific needs. As also reported 
by Hudson and Paul (2011), the FLEGT Action Plan seems to focus more on the capacity 
development of the VPA countries than on the technical aspects. My analysis shows that the 
progress achieved so far in Cameroon, Congo, Liberia, and CAR is still insufficient to permit the 
effective functioning of the TLAS in the near future. This is because of a lack of political will, a 
lack of human or financial resources, a lack of infrastructure, and deliberate delay in the legal 
reforms after the ratification of the VPAs. As noted by Eba’a Atyi (2018), forestry and related 
legislative authorities in Africa have difficulty enacting relevant forestry laws and regulations. 
As a consequence, important administrative decisions required to facilitate implementation 
process cannot be taken. For instance, most actors—including forest administrators—in VPA 
countries have difficulty interpreting and understanding the forestry regulations of their own 
countries, as noted by Assembe-Mvondo (2008). This finding suggests the need for capacity 
building efforts. Such efforts may support the broader transparency and participation agendas of 
FLEGT, REDD+, and the NYDF. 
Reflecting on the discussion so far, it is clear that the progress in the implementation of 
information transparency and stakeholder participation mechanisms, as well as TLAS, points to 
the complexity of the governance contexts as well as a lack of institutional capacity to address 




culture and will, inconsistency of regulatory frameworks, unclear tenure rights) in developing 
countries (Minang et al., 2017). As such, if the net effect of the VPA process is to ensure that 
timber and timber products on the domestic market in a VPA country, or imported into the EU 
from a VPA country, comply with laws of that country, then the complexity of socioeconomic 
and cultural dynamics—which are often afterthoughts in the context of developing countries—
requires special attention from the FLEGT policymakers and the implementers. This is 
important, because the FLEGT–VPA mechanisms are perceived to be “generally conceived prior 
to, and independent of, their application in particular domestic settings, often making them 
ill-suited to the unique circumstances of the forest sectors in which they operate” (Carodenuto & 
Cashore, 2018, p. 1). These perceptions include the claim that the timber legality issue in the 
current situation is overly burdensome, externally crafted (rather than techniques and practices of 
governments in VPA countries), and imposed on developing countries without considering local 
realities (Acheampong & Maryudi, 2020).  
While systematic research is needed to understand how systemic or institutionalized 
bureaucracy, politico-socioeconomic dynamics, and historical contexts all influence the VPA 
process and outcomes, implementers can start addressing these barriers by improving the 
incentives currently being offered under timber legality verification and enhancing society’s 
understanding of legal and sustainable supply chains in developing countries. At a minimum, 
these changes in practice and the emerging issues are considered critical to the effective 
implementation of VPAs leading to FLEGT licensing. I suggest, however, that overcoming the 
challenges of forest governance involves considering not just the complex socioeconomic and 




processes of policy change, such as the technological substance of monitoring global green 
supply chains.  
The complex mix of legality verification technologies (e.g., TLAS, remote sensing, and 
forensic methods) introduced into the governance systems in the global South, present 
opportunities for policy learning that focuses on how targeted interventions might reshape 
climate change governance. I see this as an underexplored research area that could provide 
insight into how strategies of contemporary green supply chains are pursued and reshaped 
through the theoretical lenses of governmentality technological studies. This future research 
should include the institutional capacity–technology interrelations in the forest sector that seem 
to be affected by socioeconomic contexts, institutional factors, and infrastructure problems in 
developing countries. 
Conclusion 
An assessment of institutional capacity in isolation from contextual factors such as socio-
political, economic, and historical trajectories is likely to provide a false sense of existing and 
realized capacity for advancing the principles of good forest governance and ensuring legality in 
the forestry sector. The research underlying this article assessed, through a desk study, a 
meta-analysis of cases, and communication with country VPA focal points, the institutional 
capacities of the VPA process for advancing information transparency and multi-stakeholder 
participation, as well as for developing and implementing TLAS in Cameroon, the Central 
African Republic (CAR), the Republic of the Congo (Congo), Ghana, and Liberia. My findings 
show that the VPA process has potential capacities for advancing progress on good forest 
governance and TLAS. Important progress is, however, constrained by complex political and 




in Ghana, Liberia, and Congo, both progress and realized capacities are more pronounced. While 
there are prospects for making progress in these countries, challenges are posed by such factors 
as weak and inconsistent legal frameworks, insufficient financial resources, and long-term 
conflicts, all of which have slowed down the implementation of VPAs. Furthermore, the VPA 
progress in these countries is impaired by the dependence on external funding sources, as well as 
the lack of greater efforts and genuine commitment by the VPA countries to advance principles 
of “good forest governance” and TLAS.  
Despite different contexts and stages of implementation, there are still important areas for 
improvement within the current practice. In each country, efforts to strengthen transparency and 
accountability should include addressing unequal participation in the VPA process, providing 
incentives to encourage inclusive participation, and making information accessible and available 
to all stakeholders, especially the local communities. Modest investment in regional capacity 
sharing and peer-to-peer policy learning between different countries could have a significant 
effect on their realized capacities. More importantly, the exchange of knowledge via capacity 
platforms would advance the cause of domestic resource mobilization (i.e., progressive timber 
taxation and collaboration with the local financial sectors to lay the groundwork for domestic 
funding). Regarding the political instability, international and national institutions in VPA 
countries should leverage the expertise and resources of the FLEGT VPA in their conflict 
resolution architectures and initiatives.  
My methodological limitations relate to the study’s small sample size (n=5) to 
complement a desk-based review of institutional capacity in five VPA countries. The small 
sample does not allow the generalization of my conclusions. Rather, the study provides case-and 




VPA countries. The distribution of my study sample was highly uneven with focal points mainly 
from Ghana, Cameroon, and Liberia. This has to be considered when generalizing the findings of 
the study and points to a key challenge of comparative forest governance research. In lieu of 
further research, I recommend a more attentive assessment of the capacity needs and gaps of 
FLEGT based on detailed country case study analysis using a mixed methods approach. Special 
attention must be paid to large sample size to substantiate my findings concerning institutional 





Chapter 4: Good Governance Practices in Ghana’s Voluntary Partnership Agreements 




The aim of the European Union Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade Action Plan 
and its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) is to tackle illegal logging and trade in illegal 
timber, improve forest governance, and foster economic growth in the forest sector. This study 
employed a Q methodology to assess areas of consensus and disagreement among forest sector 
stakeholders in Ghana on good forest governance practices as applied to the VPA process. The 
consensus among these stakeholders is that the VPA process has improved the participation of 
civil society in decision making and the establishment of a robust verification system to promote 
transparency and accountability, which are critical for sustainable forest management. However, 
while the shared perspectives among stakeholders highlight the crucial role of the VPAs in 
promoting improved forest governance in Ghana, there are still areas of disagreement or tension 
regarding the issue of accountability, tree tenure, and the participation of local communities in 
the VPA process. The paper concludes by considering the practical implications of the findings 
for effective forest governance practices in developing countries. 
 






In response to global concerns about illegal forest practices and trade in illegal timber, 
the European Union (EU) launched the Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, 
and Trade (FLEGT) 2003 to tackle illegal logging and related trade (European Commission—
EC, 2003a). The FLEGT Action Plan includes both demand- and supply-side measures. The 
demand side prompted the promulgation of legislation, for instance, the 2013 EU Timber 
Regulation requiring EU timber importers to apply due diligence procedures to ensure the legal 
trade in timber and timber products (EU FLEGT Facility, 2020a). A key supply-side measure of 
the Action Plan8 is a Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA), which is a legally binding trade 
agreement between a partner country and the EU (EU FLEGT Facility, 2020a). Central to a VPA 
is the Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS), which must be developed and implemented to 
ensure the legal production of timber in the partner country and to prevent timber from illegal 
sources entering the supply chain (EU FLEGT Facility, 2018b). A FLEGT license issued by a 
partner country is required for each EU-destined shipment of timber products covered by a VPA.  
Fifteen tropical countries are currently (May 2020) at various stages of VPA processes 
(EU FLEGT Facility, 2020b). Only Indonesia has begun issuing FLEGT licenses to verified 
legal timber products exported to the EU. Cameroon, Ghana, Republic of the Congo, Honduras, 
Central African Republic, Liberia, and Vietnam are currently implementing VPAs. Côte d'Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guyana, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand are 
negotiating VPAs with the EU.  
Scholars have reported mixed results on the potential and actual contributions of the VPA 
process to forest governance (Hansen et al., 2018; Overdevest & Zeltin, 2018; Tegegne, Cramm, 
                                               
8 While the FLEGT Action Plan sets out seven measures to tackle illegal logging and trade (see http://www.euflegt.efi.int/es/flegt-




& Brusselen, 2018). For instance, Overdevest and Zeltin (2018) and Cerutti et al. (2020) reported 
positive contributions of the VPA process to the functioning of multi-stakeholder structures, the 
revision of forest laws and regulations, and transparency in the forest sectors of Cameroon, 
Ghana, and Indonesia. Other independent reports concluded that the VPA processes have 
improved governance structures in the forest sector through the reinforcement of public 
institutions, public participation, policy reforms, and forest law enforcement in partner countries 
(EC, 2016). 
In contrast, other studies have been critical of VPAs (see Ansah, 2013; Hansen et al., 
2018; Hirons et al., 2018), suggesting that while there are associated pockets of mixed ‘good 
forest governance’ practices, there remain a number of cases of business-as-usual in the partner 
countries. Ansah (2013), for instance, argued that VPA in Ghana risks reinforcing the status quo, 
due to the disconnection between VPA policy content and practice. Likewise, Hansen et al. 
(2018, p. 75) remarked that: “VPA implementation in Ghana serves to stabilize and reproduce 
the very forest governance regime that it set out to reform—a process that is much less 
‘experimental,’ and much more business as usual.” They showed that the implementation of the 
VPA process has not had the desired outcome in Ghana.  
Given the important role that stakeholders can play in the implementation of the VPAs, 
and the fact that VPA implementation needs to be based on strong empirical evidence, there is a 
need to better understand the extent to which ‘good forest governance principles’ from 
stakeholder perspectives can best be translated into effective practices that address 
environmental problems and improve forest conservation and management outcomes (Kanowski 
et al., 2011). Satyal (2018) has argued that, unfortunately, good forest governance practices as 




governance issues remain under-researched, disputed, or highly contested. For example, little is 
known about the way in which the key stakeholders experience good forest governance at the 
local and national levels in Ghana (Hansen et al., 2018). Hence, the strengthening of the 
connections between scholarly and stakeholder debate could be useful in terms of connecting 
political analysis with democratic spaces (Stevenson, 2015). Against this background, the 
objectives of the present research were to: 
1. Explore the areas of consensus and disagreement among forest sector stakeholders in 
Ghana on good forest governance practices as applied to the VPA process. 
2. Consider the practical implications of my findings for addressing governance 
challenges in the forest sector. 
Identifying areas of consensus and disagreement about VPA-related good governance 
practices among stakeholders allowed me to specify not only the strengths of the policy but also 
areas requiring reforms to ensure better outcomes for forest governance in Ghana.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
approach to the study. Section 3 describes Q methodology and the data collection process. 
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 discusses the results and the emerging issues. Section 6 
concludes the paper with some implications for future research. 
Conceptual Framework 
A great deal of effort has been devoted to identifying mechanisms that will improve 
‘good practices’ in forest conservation and management (Kanowski et al., 2011). These efforts 
have been formally defined as good forest governance practices, and they include “respect for 
the rule of law in forest activities, transparent resource management, participatory rights in 




and [local-level] use and management of forest resources” (New York Declaration on Forests—
hereinafter NYDF, 2019, p. 11). However, the concept of good forest governance remains 
contested and there is disagreement about its practical application especially as it relates to the 
issues of voice and accountability (Gisselquis, 2012; Kaufmann et al., 2010). Others have also 
suggested that the good forest governance criteria are a poor guide for the development and 
implementation of policies (Grindle, 2004), because they are ad hoc, perception-based or 
unrealistic, and ahistorical (Booth, 2011). As such, the criteria for assessing good governance are 
strongly resisted, as they are perceived to be developed and advocated by global elites 
(Gisselquis, 2012).  
Despite these widespread criticisms, scholars have deployed the concept within the forest 
sector to describe the quality of forest governance processes and outcomes based on a number of 
criteria (Ameyaw et al., 2016; Secco et al., 2014). Two of the notable frameworks and criteria 
are those of the Program on Forests/United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(PROFOR/FAO, 2011) and the World Resources Institute Governance of Forest Initiative 
Indicator Framework9 (Davis et al., 2013).  
Based on the PROFOR/FAO framework, I stick to the six key principles of good 
governance: (a) accountability, (b) effectiveness, (c) efficiency, (d) fairness and equity, (e) 
participation, and (f) transparency (see Table 4.1 for details). The six key principles of good 
governance interconnect with three core pillars of forest governance:  
1. Policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks;  
2. Planning and decision-making processes; and  
                                               
9 The World Research Institute Governance of Forest Initiative Indicator Framework outlines five 
principles of good governance (transparency, participation, accountability, coordination, and capacity) that provide 





3. Implementation, enforcement, and compliance.  
The main aim of the pillars of forest governance is to address the barriers to forest governance, 
such as a lack of transparency, accountability, and participation (Larson & Petkova, 2011). In 
this paper, the policy, legal, and institutional regulatory frameworks concern the overarching 
VPA policy content and the nature of the implementation plan. The second pillar concerning 
planning and decision-making process focuses on how VPA policy actors converge around VPA 
process to negotiate, plan, and make important decisions. The pillar regarding implementation, 
enforcement, and compliance is related to how VPA policies and plans are translated into 
concrete operational programs on the ground.  
 
Table 4.1  
Principles of Good Forest Governance  
Principle  Description  
Accountability  Accountability exists when institutional responsibility is clear and there is an 
oversight of actions taken by decision makers, so as to guarantee that 
policymakers take stakeholders’ views into account (PROFOR/FAO, 2011).  
Effectiveness  Effectiveness connotes outcomes of VPA arrangements at a country-level, 
that are case and context specific. This implies that the mechanisms of forest 
governance should produce outcomes that are consistent with the rationale 
and assumptions that underpinned the VPA (PROFOR/FAO, 2011).  
Efficiency  Efficiency relates to how governance actors should work with a minimum of 
waste of resources (forest stock and human and financial resources). To 




capacity in terms of the financial, human, technological, legal, and 
institutional resources required to perform a function (Davis et al., 2013).  
Fairness/equity This principle concerns the recognition of the access and tenure rights of 
local communities; Social Responsibility Agreements10; benefit-sharing 
mechanisms; the meaningful participation of all groups of stakeholders; and 
the presence of dispute-resolution mechanisms (Bollen & Ozinga, 2013).  
Participation  Participation relates to how all interested and affected stakeholders should 
have an opportunity to be heard or to influence VPA decisions that affect the 
forest either directly or through legitimate intermediaries representing their 
interests. That is, having a deliberative process in place (PROFOR/FAO, 
2011). 
Transparency  Transparency is crucial to good forest governance in that it facilitates access 
to information and enables accountable, inclusive, legitimate, and democratic 
practices around forests (NYDF, 2018).  
Sources: Bollen & Ozinga (2013), Davis et al. (2013), PROFOR/FAO (2011) 
The PROFOR/FAO framework was employed to guide my research for three reasons. 
First, it provides comprehensive and actionable principles linked to the specific and well-defined 
pillars of forest governance; that is, it specifies a clear analytical construct for disaggregating and 
identifying specific principles to measure on the ground. It also allows an assessor to evaluate the 
quality of forest governance at each stage, including planning, implementation, enforcement, and 
compliance (Gritten et al., 2018). 
                                               
10 Social Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) with local communities is a legal requirement between local 
communities and logging companies, and a precondition for the grant of timber utilization rights. This is 




Second, the PROFOR/FAO framework takes seriously the issue of legality in a country’s 
forest sector and understands forest governance in the context of a wide range of diverse actors 
with competing and conflicting claims over forests. It has therefore been central to good forest 
governance assessment in some recent studies (PROFOR/FAO, 2011). For example, scholars 
have applied the framework to assess the forest governance context in Indonesia (Situmorang et 
al., 2012), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine (Michel, 
2016), and Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam (Gritten et al., 2018).  
Third, my methodological approach fit well with the PROFOR/FAO framework, because 
it allowed for the analyses of subjectivity in a structured and statistically interpretable way 
(Curry et al., 2013).  
Study Area and Methodology 
Study Area 
This case study area was carried out in the high forest zone (HFZ) in the southern part of 
Ghana (see Figure 4.1). The HFZ covers a third (8.5 million hectares) of the forest land area and 
includes forest reserve, wildlife parks, and off-reserve areas (FAO, 2016). Approximately 1.76 
million hectares (21% of HFZ) are state forest reserve lands. Of this protected area, nearly 
715,000 hectares have been designated industrial timber production areas (FAO, 2016). Logging 
operations take place in these areas as well as in 6.6 million hectares of outside forest reserves 
under the supervision of the Forestry Commission of Ghana (FAO, 2016). The remaining area is 
under strict protection and forest plantations according to defined forest management plans with 
support from the government of Ghana and the international community (FAO, 2016).  
I selected the HFZ as my study area because of the rich timber resources where most of 




management and VPA implementation activities (Carlsen, 2013; Oduro et al., 2014). There are 
considerable variations in ecological conditions and political administrations across the HFZ 
(Gelens et al., 2010). Important forms of ecological variation exist within nine regions (Western, 
Western–North, Ahafo, Brong Ahanfo, Bono East, Ashanti, Central, Eastern, and Greater Accra) 
and political districts that cut across the HFZ. Bono East and Ahanfo regions, for example, 
experience somewhat humid tropical rainforest climate with an annual rainfall of between 1250 
to 1750 mm in the northwest or southwest parts of the region, and drier humid conditions in the 
northeastern part of the region (Gelens et al., 2010). However, many political regions and 
districts do not correspond to a single ecological zone, instead encompassing one or more 
ecological zones. This ecological boundary defines the spatial boundary for assessing 
FLEGT-VPA in Ghana, but the implementation of VPAs and regulatory authority is typically not 





Figure 4.1. Map showing the High Forest Zone of Ghana. (Source: Author, Map produced 






A Q methodology is a hands-on, systematic, and rigorous scientific tool designed to 
reveal subjective perspectives and to provide wide-ranging insights into contentious issues 
(Stevenson, 2015; Tuokuu et al., 2019). To explore areas of consensus and disagreement in 
stakeholder perspectives on the extent to which the VPA process in Ghana has promoted good 
governance in the forestry sector, I applied a Q methodology. The Q methodology was originally 
developed by William Stephenson in 1935 (Stephenson, 1935). The main strength of Q 
methodology is that it allows for the identification of how individuals think about an issue by 
revealing patterns within and across individuals, rather than traditional traits or categories (Barry 
& Proops, 1999). Therefore, Steelman and Maguire (1999) argued that the development of 
effective environmental and sustainable development policy would benefit from making greater 
use of Q methodology, as it would allow for better problem identification and definition, and the 
estimation and specification of policy. In forest governance circles, Q methodology has been 
used to investigate public perspectives on forest-related climate change mitigation strategies in 
Europe (Nijnik, 2005) and to determine preferred forest management directions (Steelman & 
Maguire, 1999). It has also been used to understand stakeholder perspectives of interagency 
collaboration in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem (Epstein et al., 2018). Others like Langston 
et al. (2019), Živojinović and Wolfslehner (2015), Kaufmann (2012), and Rodríguez-Piñeros et 
al. (2011) have also applied Q methodology in forestry-related studies. 
My motivations for understanding stakeholder perspectives on good forest governance 
were threefold. First, a Q method addresses the gap between quantitative and qualitative data by 
providing more systematic and valuable insights into the beliefs of different stakeholders in 




countries remains a concern, because knowledge of how to best translate the principles of good 
governance to improve practices on the ground remains limited (Kanowski et al., 2011). Third, 
the VPA arena of Ghana and other jurisdictions involves multiple stakeholders, for example, 
civil society organizations (CSOs), the scientific community, international partners, 
policymakers and decision makers, and the private timber industry. These stakeholders often 
have competing and conflicting interests, expectations, and positions within domestic settings 
(Carlsen, 2014), yet decision makers need to integrate their concerns into important decisions 
about forests, such as in VPAs. This makes Q methodology a valuable tool for engaging key 
stakeholders and assessing how VPA outcomes are shaped by interactions in formal networks of 
key actors. The implication is that governance research must address all these groups of actors to 
reveal areas of consensus and disagreement to support a deliberative process toward 
advancements in improved on-the-ground practice (EFI, 2013). 
Applying the Q Method to Assess Stakeholder Perspectives on Good Forest Governance in 
VPA 
The Q method involves five broad steps: the development of a concourse of statements, 
Q participants selection, Q sort administration, post-Q sort semi-structured interviews, and Q sort 
analysis and interpretation. 
Development of a Concourse of Statements 
The first step involves developing a concourse of statements (i.e., a Q statement). 
According to McKeown and Thomas (2013), Q statements can be naturalistic (e.g., statements 
derived from interviews and communication with relevant stakeholders) or ready-made (e.g., 
statements derived from literature and existing research), or a combination thereof. From the 




50 statements from the PROFOR/FAO and the World Resources Institute good governance 
frameworks. I adapted the six principles of PROFOR/FAO good governance (i.e., accountability, 
effectiveness, efficiency, fairness and equity, participation, and transparency) in the form of 
statements, from accessible secondary and primary data at the national level (e.g., 2009 
EU-Ghana VPA, Ghana FLEGT VPA Impact Monitoring System—particularly Impact area F: 
Forest Governance, Ghana’s FAO good governance indicators project).  
Given that random sampling is generally inappropriate because Q investigators are 
interested in determining the range of perspectives of a particular community of people 
(Stevenson, 2015), the initial statements derived from the literature were pre-tested with 
stakeholders in the forest sector of Ghana in July 2019. To maximize the validity of the Q 
statements as reflective of current policy discourse around VPA, I purposively selected and 
consulted six relevant stakeholders involved in Ghana’s VPA process to review and reformulate 
the initial Q statements for clarity. As stakeholders actively involved in Ghana’s VPA process, 
they are knowledgeable about the issues and how statements should be phrased or reordered to 
ensure accurate and reliable responses. For example, the interviewees suggested possible clearer 
and context-specific Q statements. Taken together, the development of the Q statements was 
consistent with both ready-made and naturalistic sampling principles, because it covered self-
referenced statements and those from literature (McKeown and Thomas, 2013). Finally, I 
maintained a manageable number of 36 statements (which ensured the comprehensiveness and 
representativeness of the concourse of statements) and corresponding 36 boxes in the normal 
distribution chart (see Figure 4.2). These statements reflect the six principles of good 
governance. The final statements were selected based on the definitions of good governance 




Q statements in considering the 2018 Amended Ghanaian VPA. Appendix D presents the final 
statements under each principle of good governance. As argued by Brown et al., (2015), the ratio 
of the number of statements and participants in a Q study is irrelevant, given that the phenomena 
that are measured in Q are subjective and synthetic compared to R, which are comprised of what 
is objective and analytic. 
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Figure 4.2. An upside-down fixed quasi-normal distribution chart used in the Q study [sorting 
grid] 
 Q Participant Selection  
The statistical population for this Q study comprised multiple stakeholders in Ghana’s 
forest sector. In selecting the participants, I combined a network sampling approach with 
snowball sampling (Bodin & Prell, 2011). This approach was especially important for this Q 




2005). Based on both theoretical and pragmatic considerations, recent Q studies (Epstein et al., 
2018; Nijnik et al., 2018), and time and resource constraints (Bryman, 2004; Previte et al., 2007), 
I purposively selected a tentative sample size of 30 Q participants for this study (see Table 4.2). 
This sample size is sufficiently large “to establish the existence of a factor for purposes of 
comparing one factor with another’ (Brown, 1980, p. 192).  
 
Table 4.2  
List of Q Participants Within Each Stakeholder Group 
Category of respondent Number of Q participants 
Private timber industry 9 
Government forestry agency (national and local) 8 
Civil society organizations  7 
Research and educational institutions 4 






Q Sort Administration  
The next step involves defining the range of distribution of responses. In this research, I 
used a range of -3 to +3 (as shown in Figure 4.2). This represents a seven-point scale and, as 
noted by O’Connor (2013), a range of seven points provides sufficient opportunity for Q 
                                               
11 A FLEGT facilitator is an expert who assesses the institutional and legal landscape with respect to existing mechanisms and 




participants to satisfactorily differentiate themselves in a Q study. The Q sample was 
constructed, and each of the 36 statements was printed on a separate index card to form a set of 
clearly defined Q sort statements. The sorting instructions were explained at the beginning of 
each Q sorting session. In the context of Q methodology, the ranking of the Q statements on a 
quasi-normal distribution chart is called a ‘Q sort’ (Dasgupta & Vira, 2005). Through a desk 
study exercise and face-to-face interaction with Q participants between July and October 2019, 
each participant was handed the 36 index cards and requested to sort the 36 Q statements on the 
scale ranging from -3 to +3. As is common practice in Q methodology, we allowed the 
participants to move the Q cards until they were satisfied or the Q sort best reflected their 
subjective viewpoints. To minimize any potential or unintentional interactions between 
participants via Q sorting, I completely randomized the statements after each sorting exercise.   
Post-Q Sort Semi-Structured Interviews  
As part of the Q sort exercise, semi-structured interview questions (see Appendix E12) 
were used to understand Q participants’ reasons for their choice of answers and to allow them to 
explain in detail what they thought about the topic. I used face-to-face, semi-structured 
interviews because they are suitable for collecting qualitative data about the perceptions of 
stakeholders (Creswell, 2007). These interviews were important, since Q participants often 
recalled VPA discussions that deepened my understanding of VPA good governance practices, 
especially when it comes to the lowest and highest rank orderings in stakeholders’ Q sorts. As 
noted by Onwuegbuzie and Frels (2015), clarifying Q participants’ viewpoints whose pattern 
coefficients are the highest is important, since a pattern of high coefficients indicates a unique 
representative for each extracted factor. On average, participants took approximately 40 minutes 
                                               
12 The semi-structured interview questions used to investigate good forest governance were informed by 




to produce a unique sort and respond to post-Q sort interviews, at places convenient for Q 
participants (e.g., offices and conference rooms), which is typical of recent Q studies (Black et 
al., 2019; Webler et al., 2009). The interviews were audio-recorded with the consent of the 
interviewees. 
Q Sort Analytical Process  
The 36 completed Q sorts were analyzed using R computational software with an R Q 
sort package (R Core Team, 2018, version 3.5.3). I assessed the data using the sequential 
application of correlation (i.e., 30 x 36) and principal component analysis (PCA). Applying the 
steps proposed by Zabala (2014), factors were extracted using PCA with varimax rotation. The 
outcome of the Q sort analysis was the selected three factors, each representing one perspective. 
The factor13 analysis using regular PCA permitted the capture of the different stakeholder 
perspectives and allowed me to structure them in a manner that revealed diverse distinguishing 
common discourses (Stevenson, 2015).  
I transcribed the semi-structured interviews, repeatedly read the transcripts to gain a 
better understanding of their content, and then cross-checked the transcripts with audiotapes and 
field notes to avoid any misinterpretation or misrepresentation of stakeholders’ viewpoints. By 
relying on direct quotations to support the quantitative analysis, I obtained a deeper 
understanding of the topic with empirical evidence that relates to what is known in the current 
literature. The final steps comprised the verification and communication of the results to Q 
participants and other stakeholders involved in Ghana’s VPA process. For the purpose of 
confidentiality, the names and positions of the interviewed stakeholders have been anonymized 
and are only linked to the category of respondents. 
                                               
13 A factor represents Q sorts that define each component, each representing one perspective. A perspective 





My analysis of the viewpoints of forest sector stakeholders in Ghana revealed three 
factors (see Table 4.3): Whilst factor 1 has an eigenvalue of 8.3, factors 2 and 3 have 4.7 and 4.0 
eigenvalues, respectively, in the given Q sample. Sixteen Q participants loaded onto factor 1, 
seven onto factor 2, and five onto factor 3 (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). The three factors captured 
57% (28 + 17 + 16 + 13) of the overall variance (Table 4.3). The comparison between factors 
demonstrates some degree of variance in allocation from which the eigenvalue of the three 
factors becomes more distinctive than similar. Table 4.4 summarizes the factor characteristics: 
the average reliability coefficient, the number of Q sort loadings, the variance in the total dataset, 
as explained by the factors, the composite reliability, and the standard error of the factor scores. 
Table 4.5 indicates the consensus statements for all three factors. These are statements of a factor 
placed at a significantly different location of the Q sort (P < 0.05 level).  
Table 4.3  
Factor Matrix. The Asterisks (*) Indicate the Most Decisive and Defining Individual Q Sort for 










1 0.1901   0.0107   0.8253* 
2 0.3875 0.1776 0.5181* 
3 0.7492* 0.2086 -0.1682 
4 0.3448 0.6410* 0.1135 
5 -0.0911 0.5928* 0.1888 
6 0.8033* 0.2340 0.0985 
7 -0.0684 0.7546* -0.1227 
8 0.7582* 0.1316 0.0093 
9 0.3831 0.6727* 0.0258 




11 0.4371 0.6926* 0.1521 
12 0.6653* 0.0253 0.2604 
13 0.7570* 0.2536 0.2125 
14 0.5367* 0.4924 -0.0816 
15 0.6382* 0.3031 0.3941 
16 0.5561* 0.2506 0.4701 
17 0.1901 0.0107 0.8253* 
18 0.7825* -0.1545 0.3217 
19 0.5687* 0.5357 0.1042 
20 0.7713* 0.2681 0.4245 
21 0.2405 -0.1181   0.6948* 
22 0.6847* -0.0017 0.4741 
23 -0.0229 0.1290 0.3022 
24 0.4852* 0.3393 0.0126 
25 0.4002* 0.1191 0.2632 
26 0.0027 0.2809 0.4734* 
27 0.4465 0.4684 0.2800 
28 0.8028* 0.2356 0.1653 
29 0.3015 0.6831* 0.1468 
30 0.3173 0.6560* 0.3851 
 
Table 4.4  
Statistical summary of Q Method Results 
Factor characteristics of the factor loading Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Average reliability coefficient 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Number of loadings 16 7 5 
Eigenvalues 8.3 4.7 4.0 
Percentage of explained variance 28 16 13 
Composite reliability 0.98 0.97 0.95 
Standard error of factor scores 0.12 0.19 0.22 
 
Table 4.5  










Consensus  Disagreement  
          
1 Existence of platforms for disclosing information to forest sector 
stakeholders in Ghana. 
(2)1.6814  (2)1.52  (-1) -0.75   
2 Methods of disclosing information are adapted to meet the needs of 
different stakeholder groups. 
(1)0.51 (1)0.23 (-3)-1.62   
3 Government forestry officials respond to stakeholders’ requests for 
information in a timely manner. 
(0)0.44 (0)-0.24 (-2)-0.85  X 
4 VPA-related laws and regulations are reformed and passed in timely 
manner. 
(1)0.64 (-3)-1.86 (3)1.92  X 
5 Public disclosure of information as committed in the VPA (2)0.80 (0)-0.11 (2)0.1.05   
6 Robust verification system for tracking the legality of timber. (3)1.68  (3)2.26 (3)1.62 *  
7 Roles and responsibilities of government entities involved in the 
implementation of VPA process, forest laws, and regulations clearly 
defined. 
(1)0.62 (0)-0.14 (-1)-0.68   
8 Clear legal framework for accountability relationships among executive 
agencies at national and local levels.  
(1)0.58 (-1) -0.39 (1) 0.57   
9 Forestry officials are more answerable for the forest management activities 
carried out. 
(2)0.91 (0) -0.30 (-2) -1.60  X 
10 Civil society organizations (CSOs) have clear role in the VPA process, 
including compliance monitoring. 
(2)1.38 (1) 0.83 (2) 1.19 *  
11 Timber industries have the legal right to challenge administrative 
decisions.  
(1)0.65 (1) 0.28 (-3) 1.88   
12 There is clarity in timber legality assessment and verification under VPA 
arrangements. 
(3)2.00 (1) 0.89 (2) 1.56   
13 The VPA process creates space for and supported the participation of 
CSOs in VPA related decision-making. 
(2)1.53 (1) 0.80 (1) 0.83 *  
14 Forest sector stakeholder groups are consulted and participated in the VPA 
process. 
(0)0.37 (-2) -1.50 (2) 1.067  X 
                                               
14 Z-scores are standardized scores that show how Q participants ranked each statement overall among the 
36 statements used in this Q study. Statements with a Z-score greater than 1 and lower than -1) are considered 





15 Local communities have voices in and influence VPA related decision-
making processes and outcomes.  
(-3)-1.99 (-3)-1.67 (-2) -1.38 *  
16 Inputs of stakeholders gathered during VPA-related decision making is 
documented and disclosed to relevant stakeholders. 
(-1)-0.90 (-1) -0.36 (-2) -0.94 *  
17 VPA stakeholder platform representations are transparent. (0)-0.47   (-2) -0.97 (-1) -0.38   
18 Platform with dedicated channels for engaging with and providing 
feedback to stakeholder groups on forest-related issues. 
(-1) -0.66 (-1) -0.51 (0) -0.20 *  
19 Information disclosure mechanism contains comprehensive records of 
legally recognized harvesting rights and related permits. 
(1)0.48 (1) 0.21 (1) 0.45 *  
20 Dispute resolution mechanisms in the forest sector are provided in English 
and other languages spoken by a significant segment of Ghanaians. 
(-3) -1.84 (-1) -0.58 (-2) -1.18  X 
21 The VPA makes explicit mention of Social Responsibility Agreements. (0) 0.17 (1) 0.36 (1) 0.92 *  
22 Local communities perceive participation in VPA processes as fair, 
inclusive, and legitimate. 
(-2) -1.11 (-2) -1.08 (0) -0.25   
23 The VPA process engages the private sector of Ghana.  (-2) -1.07 (-1) -0.80 (0) -0.38   
24 The VPA process provides opportunity for tree tenure rights to be clarified 
and well documented in a centralized system. 
(-1) -0.75 (-1) -0.75 (0) -0.07 *  
25 Forestry laws and regulations reviewed and consolidated under the VPA 
process. 
(-1) -0.56 (0) -0.31 (1) 0.88   
26 There are more valid management plans for the management of forests. (-1) -0.77 (-2) -0.90 (1) 0.36   
27 Legal compliance with forestry policies, laws, and plans is effectively 
monitored.  
(-2) -0.98 (0) -0.34 (-1) -0.69   
28 Improvement in the collection procedures of forest taxes, royalties, and 
forest rents. 
(-1) -0.56 (0) 0.11 (-1) -0.43 *  
29 VPA and REDD+ actors are collaborating to address illegal logging as a 
driver of forest degradation. 
(-2) -0.95 (-1) -0.66 (0) -0.37   
30 There is evidence of better coordination among national and local law 
enforcement agencies.   
(-2) -0.99 (-2) -0.92 (-1) -0.67 *  
31 Instances of noncompliance are promptly addressed.  (-1) -0.74 (0) -0.08 (-1) -0.48 *  
32 The GhLAS, in particular the WTS, is linked with relevant fiscal 
requirements and related forest fees by timber companies. 
(0) 0.19 (2) 1.24 (1) 0.62   
33 VPA strengthens the capacity of forestry organization for mobilizing 
domestic resources (e.g., timber taxes). 
(0) -0.47 (2) 1.28 (0) -0.19   
34 VPA has the potential to reduce corruption associated with the award of 
forest concessions, harvesting and trade of timber.  




35 Less time spent on processing timber records for exports. (0) -0.21 (2) 1.39 (0) 0.36   
36 Efficient reconciliation of official data along timber supply chain.  (1) 0.67 (3) 1.74 (2) 1.61   
Consensus statements (*) are those statements shared by all three factors and are within a spread of one factor 
ranking.  
Values in bold represent distinguishing statements at or below p < 0.05 statistical threshold. A distinguishing 
statement is one that is ‘most different’ from the other statements when they are rank ordered for each idealized Q 
sort (see Previte et al., 2007). 
Areas of disagreement were identified by analyzing the three factor/perspective groups’ z-scores with respect to 
each statement (Zabala, 2014). X-flagging indicates the areas of disagreement held by the three clustered 
perspectives.  
 Characterization and Interpretation of the Factors 
In this subsection, each Q factor is the average perception of Q participants with similar 
perspectives. 
Perspective 1: Accountability and Civil Society Stakeholder Participation in Decision Making  
This perspective explained 28% of the total variance in the Q study. Of the 16 
stakeholders who loaded significantly on this perspective, the strongest loading was associated 
with the private sector (0.8033), followed by civil society (0.7825), and the representative of the 
government forestry agency (0.7582). 
Anchored on the principle of accountability underpinned by a robust legality verification 
for tracking timber along supply chains and strengthened civil society participation, this 
perspective displays strong agreement with the claim that forestry officials are more answerable 
for the forest management activities carried out (+2/0.91). The major reason might be the 
Multi-Stakeholder Implementation Committee (M-SIC), which contributed to the development 
and deployment of a robust legality verification system for tracking timber along supply chains 




1.53). However, of the stakeholders who share this perspective, most of those involved in the 
post-Q sort interview were concerned that although CSOs are willing to participate in the VPA 
process, their capacities to implement important activities are weak. Stakeholders who share this 
perspective also believe that any effort to improve accountability commitments may require that 
VPA-related laws and regulations be reformed and passed in a timely manner (+1/0.64), and also 
implemented for efficient reconciliation of data along supply chains (+1/0.67). These agreements 
highlight substantive reasons for seeing accountability, civil society participation, and policy 
reforms as an effective response mechanism to change the business-as-usual practices in the 
forest sector in Ghana. Lastly, respondents sharing this perspective further expressed the 
disagreement that dispute resolution services are provided in English and other languages spoken 
by a significant segment of local people (-3/-1.84). From this perspective, the use of the English 
language will be a significant communication barrier to genuine participation in dispute 
resolution when Ghana starts the issuance of FLEGT-licensed timber. As one key stakeholder 
said:  
The dispute resolution mechanism for the FLEGT Process in Ghana is through the 
Timber Validation Committee (TVC) established by L.I. 2254, Regulation 32. The 
medium of communication is often English. So, if you are not literate there could be 
challenges in understanding or communicating with the committee. 
However, it must be emphasized that the TVC dispute resolution mechanism is related to the 
anticipated FLEGT licensing and a generic mechanism for the forest sector in Ghana.  
Perspective 2: A Robust Legality Verification for Tracking Timber Along Supply Chains  
Perspective 2 explained 16% of the total variance in this study. Of the stakeholders who 




the private sector (0.7546); other strong loadings were from the international community 
(0.6831) and an official from the government forestry agency (0.6926). 
The prospective immediacy of an electronic verification system and its potential to ensure 
legality and reduce corruption and tax leakages relative to the conventional approach, is the first 
defining aspect of this perspective. An electronic verification system for tracking the legality of 
timber along supply chains (+3/ 2.26) is thus regarded as robust technology and innovative 
practice because of its link with all fiscal requirements (+2/1.24). A key claim is that continued 
improvements in legislative clarity (+1/ 0.89) and legal timber verification technology will allow 
the forest sector to increase its capacity for mobilizing domestic timber and timber taxes 
(+2/1.28) while reducing corruption in association with the awarding of forest concessions and 
the harvesting and trade in legal timber (+2/1.35). In contrast to perspectives 1 and 3, individuals 
espousing this perspective disagreed that VPA-related laws and regulations are reformed and 
passed in a timely manner (-3/-1.86). Again, they believe that a clear legal framework for 
promoting accountability relationships among agencies at national and local levels is not positive 
per se (-1/-0.39). The respondents associated with perspective 2 rejected the notion that all 
potentially affected stakeholders are identified and consulted in Ghana’s VPA process (-2/-1.50). 
Indeed, a civil society organization (CSO) representative noted that ‘although VPA is a 
multi-stakeholder-led process, it is still being led and dominated by government. Local 
communities and operators in the informal sector are not actively engaged and involved in 
Ghana’s VPA process.’  
Perspective 3: Multi-stakeholder Engagement In Forest Governance Reforms  
Perspective 3 represents 13% of the total variance explained in this study and had the 




loading of all factors was provided by the representative of the government forestry agency 
(0.8253), the director of a large timber company in the private sector (0.8253), and the director of 
a CSO. 
This perspective has a strong commitment to regulatory reforms, suggesting that 
VPA-related laws and regulations are reformed in a timely manner (+3/1.92). Contrary to the 
second perspective, this perspective stresses the importance of genuine engagement by forest 
sector stakeholders in the VPA process in Ghana (+2/1.12). As one of the government officials 
said: ‘For example, M-SIC is a multi-stakeholder-led structure, and therefore improves 
consensus-building and helps government take informed decisions.’ Furthermore, the revision of 
forestry laws and regulations (+1/0.88) emerged as an important effect of Ghana’s VPA process. 
The statement loadings on this factor reveal the perspective that there are more valid forest 
management plans (+1/0.37). Furthermore, stakeholder in this group strongly disagreed that state 
forestry officials respond to stakeholders’ requests for information in a timely manner (-3/-0.85) 
and are more answerable for the forest management activities carried out (-2/-1.60). As one 
respondent from the civil society explained: ‘forestry officials at the district level have problems 
associated with access to information since there is a long chain of protocol or bureaucracy in 
place.’ Furthermore, stakeholders associated with perspective 3 expressed disagreement that 
forestry officials are more answerable for the forest management activities carried out (-2/-1.60). 
In short, accountability has not improved significantly. Indeed, respondents belonging to 
perspective 3 strongly disagreed with the claim that methods of disclosing information are 




Consensus and Disagreement  
In this subsection, I provide insights into areas of consensus and disagreement among the 
three distinctive perspectives. 
Areas of Consensus  
Consensus statements are those statements shared by all three factors with similar 
rankings and are within a spread of one factor ranking (see Table 4.5). A total of 12 consensus 
statements emerged from the factor analysis (see Table 4.5). The perspectives maintain positive 
views toward these consensus statements: Robust verification system for tracking the legality of 
timber (6), CSOs have clear role in the VPA process including compliance monitoring (10), the 
VPA process created space for and supported the participation of CSOs in VPA-related decision-
making processes (13), the VPA information disclosure mechanism contains comprehensive 
records of legally recognized harvesting rights and related permits (19), and the VPA makes 
explicit mention of social responsibility agreements (21). For example, statement 19 is generally 
positive and any differences are so insignificant that they are irrelevant (perspective 1:1/0.48; 
perspective 2: 1/0.21; perspective 3: 1/0.45); it is, therefore, not a distinguishing statement.  
Perspectives maintain negative views toward the following consensus statements: Local 
communities have voices in and influenced VPA-related decision-making processes and 
outcomes (15); inputs of stakeholders gathered during VPA-related decision making is 
documented and disclosed to relevant stakeholders (16); platform with dedicated channels for 
engaging with and providing feedback to stakeholder groups on forest-related issues (18); the 
VPA process provides an opportunity for tree tenure rights to be clarified and well documented 
in a centralized system (24); improvement in the collection procedures of forest taxes, royalties, 




enforcement agencies (30); and instances of noncompliance/infractions are promptly addressed 
(31). Overall, this information suggests a feasible pathway for the development and 
implementation of the VPA process that emphasizes areas of consensus. It also illustrates the 
challenges of implementation and the different expectations that the VPA is likely to address in 
the long term.  
Areas of Disagreement  
My analysis revealed five areas of disagreement held by the three clustered perspectives 
(Table 4.5). First, while stakeholders sharing perspective 2 disagree with the claim that VPA-
related laws and regulations are reformed and passed in a timely manner (-3/ -1.86), perspective 
1 (+1/ 0.64) and perspective 3 (+3/ 1.92) seem more satisfied with the VPA-related reform 
processes. Second, inconsistent with the stakeholder-driven paradigm of perspective 2 (-2/-1.50), 
perspective 1 shows a neutral position (0/ 0.37) and 3 displays agreement with the claim that all 
potentially affected stakeholders were identified and consulted during the VPA process (+2/ 
1.11). Third, contrary to those stakeholders sharing perspectives 1 (+1/ 0.51) and 2 (1/ 0.23), 
those sharing perspective 3 (-3/-1.62) are more negative in their evaluation of the methods of 
disclosing information being adapted to meet the needs of different stakeholder groups, and 
forestry officials are more answerable for the forest management activities carried out. Four, 
perspective 1 (2/0.91) believes that forestry officials respond to stakeholder’s requests for 
information in a timely manner, perspective 2 respondents were ambivalent about that (0/-0.30), 
while perspective 3 rejected it (-2/-1.60). All these statements except statement 2 (see Table 4.5) 





Discussion and Emerging Issues 
Areas of Consensus  
A key consensus relates to the technological advancement in timber supply chain 
tracking. The governance value of timber legality verification as a FLEGT licensing rule lies in 
the explicit normative guidance. The legality verification provides an accountable and 
transparent system, catering for legality assurance in both the domestic and the export market. 
For environmental regulations to meet legal and sustainable supply chain requirements, legality 
verification mechanisms must be underpinned by comprehensive records of legally recognized 
harvesting rights, reinforced by the stakeholders’ engagement and institutional and legislative 
clarity. Though often taken for granted until VPA processes began, maintaining updated and 
comprehensive records of harvesting rights and related permits, and monitoring instances of non-
compliance, are among the main governance challenges (Pepke et al., 2017). I argue that legality 
verification mechanisms work well when there are clearly defined processes and systems for 
compliance monitoring, the efficient reconciliation of data, the evaluation of infractions, and the 
reporting of decisions that allow for inputs from civil society and the identification of unexpected 
governance gaps (see also Carodenuto, 2019; Tegegne, 2016). Thus, tools for legal verification 
along the supply chain are as critical as the processes and arrangements, namely how diligently 
policy actors monitor for non-compliance or the existence of systematic processes for collecting 
and analyzing infractions for corrective actions or prosecution.  
Consistent with the findings of Bollen and Ozinga (2013), my finding is indicative of the 
Tier 1 legal reforms—often directly related to legal changes required to set up the Ghana wood 
tracking system and related verification protocols. In fact, more long-term legal reforms, such as 




(statement 24). My analysis revealed negative consensus by Q participants toward tree tenure 
reforms. The Q participants believed that the VPA process does not provide an opportunity for 
tree tenure rights to be clarified and well documented. However, there is considerable evidence 
on policy development processes that contradicts the viewpoint of Q participants on tree tenure 
(Antwi et al. 2018; Lesniewska & McDermott, 2014; MLNR, 2016). Lesniewska and 
McDermott (2014) reported that VPA processes may at least trigger legal and governance 
reforms geared toward tree tenure. In fact, the VPA process, along with other policy 
developments in Ghana (e.g., Ghana’s Cocoa Forest REDD+ Program (GCFRP), has contributed 
to putting tree tenure and benefit sharing reforms on the political agenda and developing them 
into concrete policy proposals with considerable support from both the Forestry Commission and 
CSOs (Antwi et al., 2018; MLNR, 2016). My findings from the factor analysis can be explained 
by the fact that the Q sort prioritizes issues on which the main discourse is focused, rather than 
revealing the subtleties surrounding the Q statements.  
Nonetheless, the ongoing tree tenure registration to differentiate between natural and 
planted trees is a costly and bureaucratic process (Antwi et al., 2018). Also, the proposed 
Framework for Tree Tenure and Benefit Sharing Scheme itself is misaligned with “the realities 
of ownership structures of customary land regimes” (Antwi et al., 2018, p. 12). Without clear and 
secure rights, farmers in Ghana may have limited incentives to ensure legal and sustainable 
forest management. In fact, this could be a major barrier to the effective implementation of forest 
market mechanisms (Maguire, 2013), particularly outside state forest reserves where local 
communities often lack legal evidence or statutory ownership of harvested timber in off-reserves 
(see Hirons et al., 2018; Tegegne, 2016, Tegegne, Cramm, & Brusselen, 2018). Thus, there is an 




underlying socioeconomic and structural dynamics and historical practices, so that local 
communities, farmers, and operators can fully benefit from VPA implementation.  
Additionally, while stakeholder engagement creates strong ownership of and support for 
the VPA process (Tegegne et al., 2014), the stakeholders had a negative viewpoint toward local 
communities’ direct participation in the VPA process in Ghana (see Table 4.4, statement 15). 
The viewpoints of the stakeholders contradict the recent findings by Cerutti et al. (2020): “The 
voices and opinions of many local communities and indigenous people are not only better 
listened to, but also receive more consideration when decisions are adopted and implemented in 
the forests where they live” (p. 9). In the specific case of Ghana, the involvement of CSOs in 
VPA decision making, “appears to assume that such an alliance will also benefit local 
communities” (McDermott et al., 2020; p. 7). As argued by Satyal (2018), CSOs are not 
adequate representatives of local communities in such important policy deliberations. This is 
justified by the fact that stakeholder participation is often driven by pragmatic rather than 
normative reasons, as the VPA process tend to focus on technical issues rather than on 
identifying and consulting all potentially affected stakeholders (see perspective 2). During the 
interviews, most CSOs confirmed this consensus. As one person remarked: “Even though forest-
dependent communities were occasionally consulted during the VPA negotiations through public 
education, these less powerful but important stakeholders are still not given actual decision-
making power in the VPA implementation.” Hence, participation in the VPA process as required 
by Article 16 can be reduced to consultative functions and public education, rather than a 
deliberative process of stakeholder engagement (see also Carodenuto & Cashore, 2018; Tegegne 
et al., 2017). Thus, there is a need for a careful context-specific plan to involve non-experts like 




built the capacity of local communities (Bollen & Ozinga, 2013). This is important, because 
governance-based institutions and their policies to promote participation in policymaking 
processes must “find new ways that allow marginalized voices and priorities to be heard and 
included” (Brown, 2009, p. 46) so that seemingly intractable problems can be better addressed.  
Areas of Disagreement  
My analysis revealed five areas of disagreement across the three clustered perspectives of 
the stakeholders. Of these five areas, two pertained to the principle of transparency (Q statements 
3 and 4), one to participation (Q statement 14), one to fairness/equity (Q statement 20), and one 
to the principle of accountability (Q statement 9). Thus, the findings show contradictory 
perspectives on four principles of good governance among forest sector stakeholders. In contrast 
to perspectives 1 and 2, perspective 3 is more negative in its evaluation of the statement that 
forestry officials are more answerable for the forest management activities carried out. This 
difference may be due to the issue of how policymakers are responsive to their constituencies, 
and the extent to which they can be held accountable for their decisions. A key challenge could 
be that structural factors such as system bureaucracy undermine the communication between 
government officials and stakeholders, who often lack the power and means to obtain forest-
related information. 
 Perspective 3 shows that forestry officials do not respond to stakeholders’ requests for 
information in a timely manner, while perspectives 1 and 2 maintained a neutral position. 
Contrary to the viewpoint of perspective 3, recent studies that used different methods (Adams et 
al., 2020; Cerutti et al., 2020) pointed out that the VPA process in Ghana has resulted in 
improved disclosure of information about forest-related activities (e.g., infractions and 




follow-up action is critical in the VPA process, because without effective and consistent 
mechanisms to hold agencies and policy actors accountable, the business-as-usual cycle may 
continue (see also Hansen et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, while perspectives 1 and 3 generally agree that the VPA process has 
involved considerable consultation with and inclusion of key stakeholders, perspective 2 
disagrees. This area of disagreement is unsurprising yet important, because stakeholder 
consultation and inclusiveness is essential for effective implementation of the VPA process 
(Kleinschmit et al., 2018; Tegegne et al, 2014). What is remarkable is CSOs’ participation in the 
VPA process. In particular, the specific cases of holding the government forestry agencies 
accountable—with notable efforts by better organized CSOs and by means of coherent legal 
frameworks—complement similar findings by Cerutti et al. (2020). Normatively, the 
participation of diverse stakeholders and not just CSOs is simply “the right thing to do,” as it 
ensures robust accountability in the VPA process (Stirling, 2009, p. 208). While CSOs in Ghana 
are instrumental in efforts to strengthen accountability through participation (Satyal, 2018), 
information gathered during my interviews show that limited resources and capacity can 
undermine their ability to fulfil their governance roles.  
Reflections and Limitations  
This present research employed Q methodology to provide new insights into good 
governance practices as applied to the VPA process in Ghana. The results should be interpreted 
with caution, however, as certain limitations must be acknowledged. A first limitation is related 
to using Q statements to address all the issues regarding good forest governance principles in 
detail. To address this limitation, the follow-up interviews during the final stage of the Q sorting 




practices. Second, the explanatory power of the Q statements accounted for only 57% of the 
overall variance. Therefore, it seems fair to say that a large proportion (43%) of the three factors 
remained unexplained. A third methodological limitation relates to the category and number of Q 
participants represented in the P-set. As argued by Black et al. (2019), “the theoretical threshold 
that requires viable factors [to] reach an Eigenvalue greater than 1.0 ultimately restricts the final 
number of possible factor groups” (p. 17). Thus, a larger sample size may have produced more 
distinct perspectives from the factor scores, especially if Q participants had represented different 
stakeholder groups in the forest sector of Ghana that were not engaged in this study (Black et al., 
2019).  
Finally, due to the methodological difference between Q methodology (e.g., the forced-
choice ranking on a quasi-normal distribution) and other mixed-method approaches, I did not 
make a detailed comparison between my findings and those of other studies on the VPA process. 
I did, however, use some of these recent studies (e.g., Adams et al., 2020; Antwi et al., 2018; 
Cerutti et al., 2020; Maryudi et al., 2020; McDermott et al., 2020) as an external validity check 
to provide valuable insights into key contentious issues. This may contribute to a better 
understanding of the disputed issues concerning the effect of the VPA process in Ghana. 
Furthermore, triangulating Q methods with other methods—such as focus group discussions, 
decision-making tools, modelling, and communication sciences—would bring new and 
applicable evidence to bear on good forest governance practices. The results of such triangulated 
methods may have greater potential for extrapolation and generalization. 
Conclusion and Implications for Future Research 
The present research applied a Q method to examine stakeholder perspectives on good 




prominent stakeholder perspectives on good governance in relation to Ghana’s VPA process. 
The three perspectives are founded on the belief that good forest governance in Ghana is 
underpinned by the principles of accountability and civil society participation in decision 
making, strengthened by multi-stakeholder forest governance reforms and enhanced by an 
accountable and transparent timber legality verification system for monitoring supply chain 
commitments. These findings can inform national stakeholders engaged in the VPA process in 
Ghana. 
The Q analysis revealed areas of consensus and disagreement that decision makers and 
policy actors could focus on to provide strategic planning to strengthen legal and sustainable 
forest management. Concerning areas of disagreement, there could be benefits to strengthening 
the active engagement of the different stakeholder groups in genuine deliberation via the Multi-
stakeholder Implementation Committee to better understand these areas of disagreement. 
Outlining such areas could assist authorities to engage the stakeholders in addressing their 
concerns. This may enrich the quality of deliberation and stakeholder engagement by providing 
concrete evidence of validity that key stakeholders can brainstorm. The authorities could also use 
this opportunity to clarify misinformation and continue to advocate for strengthening good 
governance in the forest sector. Likewise, the consensus between differing perspectives may be 
of interest to the authorities. One of the common views that emerged from my analysis is that the 
actual capacity of the legality verification system for tracking timber along supply chains is 
robust. Since timber legality verification has been so contentious (see also Nathan et al., 2014), it 
was reassuring to find a consensus in stakeholder perspectives on legality verification as an 




On a more practical level, the study provides concrete empirical evidence for 
strengthening forest governance and sheds light on the challenges and opportunities for strategic 
implementation. This should lead to a better understanding among the agencies and actors 
responsible for tackling illegal logging, forest degradation and deforestation, and climate change. 
Methodologically, this study provides additional recommendations to scholars of forest policy 
and governance to apply Q methodology. At the same time, practitioners and problem-focused 
scholars in interdisciplinary research could benefit from making greater use of Q methodology. 
Furthermore, while the participatory nature of Q methods supported meaningful multi-actor 
participation for evaluating environmental policy process, my discussions could not benefit 
directly from the views of communities and other unorganized stakeholder groups in the forest 
sector of Ghana. Thus, future research could triangulate with other methods by incorporating 
their views to better inform policy and improve practice on the ground. Finally, I recommend 






Chapter 5: Conclusions 
The European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) 
Action Plan is part of broader international initiatives aimed at solving critical global 
environmental problems that policymakers have consistently advocated for adoption, particularly 
in tropical forest countries. A Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) under the FLEGT 
process is a commitment by partner countries to tackle the complex challenges we face in the 
forest sector, ranging from illegal logging and the related trade, to weak forest governance issues 
such as corruption, with achievements assessed periodically by FLEGT policymakers, 
implementers, and researchers to measure progress. The approach taken in the present research 
was to critically examine FLEGT efficacy from a multi-scalar governance perspective so as to 
address the following under-researched questions, using a case study approach: 
1. How do the New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF) and the United Nations 
Strategic Plan for Forests (UNSPF) interlink with the FLEGT Action Plan at two 
critical policy levels, namely policy objective and policy instrument? 
2. Focusing on priorities set out in the VPAs, what are the potential and realized 
capacities of VPA partner countries for advancing principles of good governance 
and implementation of a Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS) in 
Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Ghana, Liberia, and the Republic of 
the Congo (Congo)?  
3. What are the different stakeholders’ perspectives on good governance as applied 
to VPA in Ghana? 
These research questions were addressed in the previous three chapters. Chapter 1 




policy levels, namely policy objectives and policy instruments. A process-based approach was 
used to review and capture the core attributes of the regimes studied with their policy 
objectives/strategic agendas and policy instruments. The research revealed that FLEGT, NYDF, 
and UNSPF share inherent interlinkages of policy instruments, such as information sharing, 
strategic plans, and financial and capacity support. In general, three types of potential 
contributions to a number of strategic agendas are observed in the three regimes. These potential 
contributions can be direct (FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF contribute finance for forests and good 
forest governance) or indirect (FLEGT makes an indirect contribution to halting forest loss by 
promoting legal timber verification), or there may be no contribution. For example, NYDF does 
not yet play a substantial role in technology transfer in the forest sector, but it is explicitly 
recognized in FLEGT and UNSPF as enhancing sustainable forest management benefits. Thus, 
interlinkages can be found in the policy objectives of the regimes studied, although they target 
different but common cross-cutting strategic agendas for promoting sustainable forest 
management (SFM).  
The only strategic agendas that have been widely recognized in the three regimes as 
underpinning all conservation and forest management are the four cross-cutting strategic 
agendas: good forest governance, finance for forests, climate change mitigation & adaptation, 
and forest loss. This finding could ideally contribute to achieving the common strategic agendas 
on good forest governance and finance for forests in FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF 
simultaneously, through the prioritization of policy instruments, particularly information sharing. 
Information sharing, thus, becomes a key factor for continuous inter-institutional learning as the 
global policy process reveals incoherencies within the current global forest governance 




(CPF) and the provision of appropriate mechanisms to enhance coherence, cooperation, policy 
coordination, and to support informed decision making at the global level and to deliver 
cross-cutting strategic agendas on the ground.	 
On a larger scale in terms of fragmented international regimes, there may be a crucial 
need to address potential barriers or challenges related to the realization of interlinkages, as they 
are relatively new issues at the global policymaking level and landscape level (Tegegne, Cramm, 
& Brusselen, 2018). The question how to manage interlinkages at the landscape level given 
persistent deforestation and forest degradation, cannot be treated simply as a conventional forest 
sector matter without considering its interaction with other sectors. Here, I argue that identifying 
and managing the range of interlinkages between forests and other sector policies, such as 
agriculture and mining, is a necessary step toward promoting SFM. Interlinking the policy goals 
of the three regimes and implementing their policy tools/strategies should be further reflected in 
fiscal capacity, since financial mechanisms are mostly pledges made by some key actors. 
Drawing on a theoretical framework derived from literature on institutional capacity for 
good forest governance, Chapter 3 comparatively analyzed the potential and realized capacities 
of VPA processes for advancing principles of good forest governance and the implementation of 
the TLAS in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia, as well as the 
challenges that hinder the implementation of VPAs. My case study approach included a desk 
study, a meta-analysis of cases, and communication with country VPA focal points to understand 
the complexity of a VPA’s progress. I found that VPA processes do have potential capacities for 
advancing information transparency, multi-stakeholder participation, and TLAS. In fact, the 
VPAs have been largely successful in the negotiation phase, but there are complex political, 




phase in most of the VPA partner countries. Unlike in Ghana, Liberia, and Congo, where 
progress and realized capacities are more pronounced, the realized capacities of VPAs in 
Cameroon and the CAR are limited. 
While there are prospects of progress in these latter countries, such challenges as weak 
and inconsistent legal frameworks, insufficient financial resources, and long-term conflicts have 
slowed down the implementation of VPAs. Furthermore, the VPA progress in these countries is 
impaired by the dependence on external funding sources, as well as the lack of greater efforts 
and genuine commitment by the countries to advance principles of good forest governance and 
TLAS. Despite different contexts and stages of implementation, there are still important areas for 
improvement within the current practice. In each country, efforts to strengthen transparency and 
accountability should include addressing unequal participation in the VPA process, providing 
incentives to encourage inclusive participation, and making information accessible and available 
to all stakeholders, especially the local communities. In sum, FLEGT policymakers and 
implementers need to foster a deliberative mechanism that promotes the benefits of VPA 
processes, engaging all stakeholders. 
In Chapter 4, I discussed the Q methodological approach I used to examine stakeholder 
perspectives on good governance as applied to Ghana’s VPA process. By drawing on the good 
governance framework (PROFOR/FAO, 2011) and VPA policy documents in Ghana, I identified 
and distinguished three prominent stakeholder perspectives on good governance as it relates to 
Ghana’s VPA process. The three perspectives are founded on the belief that good forest 
governance in Ghana’s forest sector is underpinned by the principles of accountability and civil 
society participation in decision making, strengthened by multi-stakeholder engagement in forest 




verification system for monitoring supply chain commitments. These three main perspectives 
accounted for approximately 57% of the total variation in viewpoints, which characterized the 
stakeholder perception about current good governance practices as applied to Ghana’s VPA in 
the lead-up to the FLEGT licensing.  
The three distinct perspectives were further linked to consensus statements. The 
consensus among stakeholders is that a VPA seems to have allowed for the participation of civil 
society in decision making and the establishment of a robust verification system to promote 
transparency and accountability, which are critical for sustainable forest management. 
Additionally, a shared consensus is key in approaching leveraging points to internalize forest 
governance practices as well as foster VPA transformation in Ghana. The shared perspectives 
among stakeholders highlight the crucial role of the VPA in promoting improved forest 
governance in Ghana. However, there were still areas of disagreement or tension with regard to 
issue of accountability and the marginalization of some stakeholders in forest governance. These 
findings can inform the national government of key VPA good practice examples such as 
information transparency, accountability, and stakeholder legitimacy. Engaging with and shaping 
these perspectives is an instrumentally and normatively appropriate governance action to 
advance the VPA process in Ghana. This approach is critical for overcoming realized capacity 
challenges that are currently confronting all five VPA partner countries discussed in Chapter 3 
that are implementing the good forest governance requirements. 
Taken together, my dissertation has highlighted the challenges, including the struggle to 
manage the interlinkages among global-level policy developments (i.e., FLEGT, NYDF, and 
UNSPF) and a lack of capacity for the VPA process. For example, the current limited progress 




and that capacity remains a prerequisite for policy implementation. These findings indicate that 
additional institutional effort will be needed to advance FLEGT globally and to achieve the VPA 
in Africa and beyond. It also requires collective actions by global-level, national-level, and 
local-level institutions to consider the larger forest governance contexts and prioritize concrete 
actions to overcome challenges to policymaking process, especially policy implementation. 
Below, I further identify key contributions and interventions points. 
Theoretical, Methodological, and Policy Implications  
The scholarship on FLEGT has overwhelmingly focused on technical and governance 
aspects, drawing largely from a single institutional analysis theory. However, scant empirical 
research has explored a range of theories to understand FLEGT efficacy from a multi-scale 
perspective. My dissertation contributes to a multiple governance scale approach to FLEGT by 
using two strands of theories—namely policy coherence and institutional capacity for good forest 
governance—to answer some of the most critical questions that have arisen since FLEGT first 
emerged in 2003. Reflecting on the three empirically informed chapters, this dissertation 
complements other multi-scalar scholarly works that examined forest governance across multiple 
scales (Leipold, 2015; Secco et al., 2014). It also contributes to the literature on multi-scalar 
forest governance within the FLEGT context. Thus, it represents part of preliminary efforts to 
examine FLEGT from a multi-scalar governance perspective.  
In Chapter 2, I discussed my research directed toward policy coherence from a policy 
design approach perspective, which allowed me to analyze interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, 
and UNSPF. I argued that a regime that is coherent within the context of my analytical 
framework may turn out to be interlinked with another regime and potentially contribute to 




context for analyzing other international forest regimes. However, indirect and no contributions 
from international forest regimes might be the most challenging to identify at the landscape level 
when national and relevant global experts are not consulted. In Chapter 3, I showed that the 
institutional capacity framework underlines the relevance of conceptualizing institutional 
capacity in terms of potential and realized capacity, which provided useful analytical traction for 
assessing a broader perspective of FLEGT governance. In Chapter 4, I expanded on the 
institutional capacity for advancing good forest governance discussed in Chapter 3. This good 
forest governance conceptual framework contributes to existing literature on institutional 
analysis by operationalizing and communicating the assessment of institutional capacity to 
achieve good forest governance.  
Regarding methodology, my approach presented in Chapters 2 and 3 can be adapted to 
various policy framework analyses, according to the research objectives pursued as well as time 
and resources. In doing so, it is useful to identify strategic and relevant policy documents, 
perform meta-analysis of cases that provide relevant information on the subject matter at hand, 
and complement these sources with experts’ interaction, as was done in the research underlying 
this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I presented the first use of Q methods to better understand 
stakeholder perspectives on good forest governance as applied to the VPA process in Ghana, and 
in FLEGT VPA scholarship. Thus, this dissertation provides an additional recommendation to 
students of forest policy and governance to apply Q methodology. At the same time, practitioners 
and problem-focused scholars in interdisciplinary research could benefit from making greater use 
of Q methodology. Additionally, it may illuminate how key stakeholders define and 
operationalize good forest governance principles within a specific country context. 




important recommendations for policymakers. Chapter 2 underscored the importance of 
managing potential interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and FLEGT in a mutually reinforcing 
manner that best promotes the strategic agendas for SFM. Of particular relevance to both 
policymakers and practitioners is the development of cross-cutting strategic agendas, such as 
finance for forests and good forest governance. It is equally imperative to map out these 
cross-cutting strategic agendas that interest key policy actors in global-level policy processes at 
the national level through inclusive governance approaches (Tegegene et al., 2017). For example, 
such delineation can encourage the key policy actors to pay more attention to the larger 
international financing regimes, in particular the agro–forestry interface, with emphasis on 
sustainable agriculture—which is a prerequisite for achieving zero net deforestation (Humphreys 
et al., 2019). As noted by FAO (2018), policymakers must recognize the need to manage 
interlinkages and trade-offs, and set out concrete measures for the effective alignment of multiple 
global-level forest policy objectives and incentive structures (e.g., alignment or harmonization of 
fulfilled financial pledges). 
Forging interlinkages between global-scale policy developments at both national and 
subnational levels is essential for achieving SFM. For example, a number of mutual benefits will 
accrue to SFM (e.g., effectiveness and efficiency in the forest sector overall) from managing 
interlinkages among FLEGT, NYDF, and UNSPF at both the global and the national level. As 
such, managing interlinkages should be a task for both international organizations at the global 
level and national governments. In addition, sharing the information needed to monitor progress, 
along with making available diverse data useful for the policymaking process, and especially 
policy implementation, is important for all (HLPF, 2017). In fact, this is crucial because little 




agreements at the national level, where implementation occurs (Tegegne et al., 2014; Tegegne et 
al., 2017; Ochieng et al., 2013). For key national actors at the policy and planning level to 
become knowledgeable on how to manage interlinkages of international forest regimes, capacity 
building, inter-institutional learning, inter-sectorial coordination, and information sharing are 
critical. For example, inter-institutional learning could be piggybacking in engaging stakeholders 
and on discussions related to policy and regulatory reviews. These reviews are critical to align 
with new or additional changes related to emerging strategic agendas, such as bio-economy, that 
have occurred since the development of the FLEGT.  
Effective inter-institutional learning requires dialogue and coordinated actions, with a 
focus on achieving cross-cutting strategic agendas for SFM and benefiting from interlinkages, 
rather than on a single global-level policy development. This inter-institutional learning should 
include precise strategic guidelines to support international stakeholder forums on how to work 
with each other to foster national level interlinkages. Overall, secured and renewed political 
commitments are important to enhance the coherent implementation of global and national 
forest-related policies in developing countries. 
With reference to Chapter 3, modest investment in regional capacity sharing and 
peer-to-peer policy learning among countries could have a significant effect on the realized 
capacities for the VPA process in Cameroon, CAR, Congo, Ghana, and Liberia. More 
importantly, the exchange of knowledge via capacity platforms would advance the cause of 
domestic resource mobilization (i.e., progressive timber taxation and collaboration with the local 
financial sectors to lay the groundwork for domestic funding). Regarding political instability, 
international and national institutions in VPA countries should leverage the expertise and 




CSOs in conflict resolution efforts requires special attention.  
It is a challenge to ensure that VPA planning and implementation are both fair and 
inclusive. The current approach to engage local communities and the private timber sector, in 
particular the informal network of operators (e.g., chainsaw operators and small and 
medium-sized timber companies), is seen as inadequate. Consequently, there is an urgent need 
for FLEGT policymakers and implementers to further explore innovative and genuinely 
participatory approaches to local VPA policymaking, and to find new ways to incentivize the 
informal timber sector and local communities to channel their efforts and knowledge to the VPA 
process in the five countries studied. Thus, paying due attention to local issues of interest and 
local actors’ voices matters in forest governance. FLEGT policymakers and implementers are 
also encouraged to find ways to strengthen political will and engage political leaders more 
effectively in the VPA negotiation phase, recognizing that they represent key actors of national 
policy agendas. In all five partner countries studied, systematic public–private partnerships are 
required to address barriers to the sustainable financing of VPA, such as technical capacity and 
budgetary constraints, and to the internalization of TLAS to address illicit logging practices and 
related forest tax invasion or corruption along the timber supply chain. Overall, further 
improvements in the forest governance system is crucial in all partner countries studied. 
In Chapter 4, I strongly recommended that FLEGT policymakers and the implementers 
should pay special attention to three unique perspectives espoused by stakeholders in the VPA 
process to inform future implementation in Ghana’s forest sector. From a context-specific 
perspective, identifying with a common ground (i.e., a shared consensus) can provide leveraging 
points to encourage the VPA multi-stakeholder platforms to build mutual interests and legitimate 




between differing perspectives may be of interest to FLEGT policymakers and lead 
implementers. One of the common views that emerged from this analysis is that the actual 
capacity of the legality verification system for tracking timber along the supply chain is robust. 
Since timber legality verification has been so contentious (see also Nathan et al., 2014), it was 
reassuring to find a consensus in stakeholder perspectives on legality verification as a good 
practice example in Ghana’s VPA process.  
Conversely, I found the areas of disagreement to be key conflicts points within the 
context of the VPA process in Ghana that may present barriers to its transformational agenda. I 
suggest that policymakers and implementers should target these critical areas in order to reduce 
potential conflicts among key stakeholders in Ghana’s VPA process in the lead-up to and the 
aftermath of the FLEGT licensing. Indeed, in the areas of disagreement, it could perhaps be 
beneficial to actively engage the different stakeholder groups in genuine deliberation via the 
Multi-stakeholder Implementation Committee to better understand these disagreements. Once the 
areas of disagreement are outlined, this could assist FLEGT policymakers and implementers to 
engage the stakeholders in addressing their concerns. This may enrich the quality of deliberation 
and stakeholder engagement and consultation by providing contentious issues that key 
stakeholders can brainstorm. Also, the authorities could use this opportunity to clarify 
misinformation and continue to advocate for the implementation of good governance 
requirements. On a more practical level, this dissertation provides concrete empirical evidence 
for strengthening forest governance and sheds light on the challenges of and opportunities for 
strategic implementation. This should lead to a better understanding of incentives for the 
different institutions (agencies and actors) responsible for tackling illegal logging, forest 




Again, regarding methodology, I employed a case study design (Simons, 2009; Yin, 
2003). To gain a better understanding of the interlinkages and contributions of FLEGT, NYDF, 
and UNSPF to SFM discussed in Chapter 1, I initially intended to collect empirical data from 
experts (e.g., the Global Forest Expert Panel). Unfortunately, this effort yielded no positive 
feedback mainly due to challenges related to the inability of experts to complete my online 
survey through emails or phone calls, as well as to resource and time constraints on conducting 
face-to-face interviews. The conceptual challenges related to the research presented in Chapter 2 
arose from a lack of a universally agreed definition of “policy coherence” and an analytical 
framework for analyzing interlinkages. In the absence of scholarly agreement on definitions 
among researchers, methodologies and analytical guides are unlikely to be clear and robust. Even 
though I explored these gaps in the literature and provided groundwork for future multi-policy 
interlinkage analysis, I suggest that future research should build upon my initial analytical 
frameworks and on the innovative ways in which policy coherence relates to institutional 
capacity for good forest governance. My framework further highlights a set of comparison 
elements that researchers often overlook when analyzing interlinkages at the global level and 
how global level governance influences national-level policies, and vice versa. Such an approach 
suggests two future research directions: What determines the effectiveness of strategies for 
managing interlinkages, and when are such strategies desirable? 
To assess the institutional capacity of the VPA process and the implementation 
challenges, I selected five partner country cases (Chapter 3) out of eight in sub-Saharan Africa 
and out a total of 15 partner countries. Future research on institutional capacity could thus be 
conducted in the three other partner countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in partner countries 




analysis in Chapter 3 covered only two (transparency and participation). To that end, future 
research is needed to investigate the potential and realized capacity of VPA processes for 
advancing the other four principles of good governance. One of the most important 
methodological limitations highlighted in my analysis of institutional capacity for the VPA 
process, is that it is possible that these developments do not appear in policy documents and 
countries’ annual progress reports, or that countries implementing the VPA may have advanced 
beyond the secondary data we reviewed, which could affect the findings and conclusions 
presented in Chapter 3. 
I employed Q methodology to examine stakeholder perspectives on good forest 
governance practices as applied to Ghana’s VPA. While this case study is representative of the 
frontrunning of VPA partner countries in Africa, as argued in Chapter 4, an assessment of other 
partner countries that includes the participation of and representation from local communities 
could yield valuable insights into how a large sample size affects stakeholder viewpoints 
regarding good governance practices in the forest sector. Besides, future research should include 
current and future challenges and opportunities related to the introduction of mixed forest 
monitoring technologies (e.g., TLAS) into the forest governance systems in the global South. In 
these future studies, both internal and external factors as well as global-level policy goals should 
be analyzed to provide a more comprehensive account of the positive and negative effects of 
forestry technology in the long term. Finally, global forestry research should be more geared 
toward multi-scalar governance assessment using Q methodology in different policy settings. 
This multi-scalar approach should be used to analyze comparatively large studies that can serve 
as a solid basis to develop a better understanding of the “theory of change” in the context of the 




address the deeply rooted causes of illegal logging, especially the politico-economic context and 
the historical trajectories, power relations, and power struggles of actors in the VPA process. For 
instance, an in-depth assessment of the power relations between the actors involved in the VPA 
process may allow us to better understand the interests of and incentives and disincentives for 
different actors in the VPA process.  
This concluding chapter has summarized the key research findings and policy 
implications, highlighting the need to: 
1. Increase awareness of the interlinkages among the regimes studied (i.e., FLEGT, 
NYDF, and UNSPF) through inter-institutional learning, informational sharing, 
and inter-sectorial coordination, and promote the benefits of interlinkages to 
policymakers and beyond;  
2. Recognize the importance of policy interactions and their effects at the landscape 
level, better align global level policies and policy instruments, address 
outstanding governance reforms, and continue technical support and capacity 
building;  
3. Strengthen the financial and governance capacities, and invest in transforming the 
informal timber sector to unlock neglected FLEGT opportunities and improve the 
forest sector employment and livelihoods prospects; and 
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Forest loss Loss of tree cover. 
Climate change mitigation & 
adaptation 
Mitigation concerns the role that forests play in reducing greenhouse gas emissions or increasing 
the capacity of carbon sinks through reforestation, while adaptation refers to the role that forests 
play in lowering the risks posed by the consequences of climatic changes (van Dam, 2019; NYDF, 
2019). 
Forest biodiversity  Forest biodiversity include trees, plants, micro-organisms and the genetic diversity (van Dam, 
2019).  
Finance for forests Finance for forests refers to all possible financial sources that benefit the forest sector (Humphreys 
et al. 2019). This includes finance that is aligned with a clear and stated objective of the 
conservation, protection, and sustainable forest management initiative (NYDF, 2019). 
Good forest governance A concept that includes, but is not limited to, “respect for the rule of law in forest activities, 
transparent resource management, participatory rights in decision-making, equitable and secure 
land tenure, the control of corruption, and local levels of use and management” (NYDF, 2019, 
p.11). Good forest governance is a necessary condition for forest protection, conservation, and 
sustainable forest use (NYDF, 2018). 
Forest technology transfer The transfer and application of tools, techniques, methods, and systems (e.g., wood tracking 








Appendix B: Inventory of FLEGT Action Plan, NYDF, and UNSPF 
The European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan 
Type of development Action Plan 
Year of establishment 2003 
Key policy objective(s) FLEGT Action Plan aims to reduce illegal logging by strengthening sustainable and 
legal forest management, improving governance, and promoting trade in legally 
produced timber. 
 
Key policy instrument(s) Timber legality assurance system, information transparency annex, environmental 
and social safeguards, independent audit, multi-stakeholder structures.  
 
EU Regulation No. 2173/2005 and EU Regulation No. 995/2010 for the control of 
the entry of timber to the EU from countries that entered into bilateral FLEGT VPA 
with the EU. Other policy instruments include information sharing and financial and 
technical capacity building.  
 
 
Relevance to SFM By supporting VPA countries in tackling illegal logging and the related trade, VPAs 
can improve the policy and institutional factors surrounding legal production and 
consumption of timber. Support country-level legal, policy, and institutional 
framework for forest management and forest sector economic growth. 
 
Strategic agenda(s) Good forest governance, finance for forests, independent compliance scheme. 
Source(s) EC, 2003a, EC 2020; Tegegne, 2016; Tegegne, Cramm & Brusselen, 2018; van 
Dam, 2019 
New York Declaration on Forests (NYDF)  
Type of development Declaration15: The NYDF is a non-legally binding declaration that arose out of a 
political dialogue among a broad coalition of governments, companies, civil society, 
and indigenous peoples’ organizations. 
Year of establishment 2014 
Key policy objective(s) The NYDF provides endorsers, who now number over 200, of an ambitious 
declaration detailing ten goals that provide them with global targets to protect and 
end natural forest loss by 2030.  
Goal 1: Halt loss of natural forests 
Goal 2: Efforts to address deforestation in agriculture supply chain 
Goal 3: Reduce deforestation derived from other economic sectors 
Goal 4: Support alternatives to deforestation driven by basic needs 
Goal 5: Restore degraded landscapes and forestlands  
Goal 6: Include ambitious, quantitative forest conservation and restoration targets 
for 2030 in the post-2015 global development framework, as part of the new 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
Goal 7: Reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation as part of a 
post-2020 global climate agreement 
Goal 8: Mobilize finance for forests 
Goal 9: Reward successful emission reductions 
Goal 10: Improve forest governance 
 
Key policy instrument(s) Voluntary instruments, e.g., political commitments and pledges, information 
sharing, codes of conduct and guidelines for providing information and reporting, 
and financial resources to support governments, companies, civil society, and 
indigenous peoples’ organizations.  
Relevance to SFM By committing to the ten goals of the NYDF, endorsers have agreed to work toward 
halving tropical deforestation by 2020 and ending it by 2030. 
Strategic agenda(s)  Climate change, biodiversity conservation, finance for forests, and good forest 
governance  
Source(s) van Dam, 2019; UN, 2014a; NYDF, 2018; 2019 
United Strategic Plan for Forests 2017-2030 (UNSPF 2017-2030) 
                                               
15A declaration (non-legally binding instrument) that is usually, but not always, used by NYDF parties to declare political ambitions 




Type of development Resolution16 - The UN strategic plan for forests 2017-2030 provides a global 
framework for action at all levels to sustainably manage all types of forests and trees 
outside forests, and to halt deforestation and forest degradation. 
Year of establishment 2017 
Key policy objective(s) The strategic plan provides a framework for forest-related contributions to the 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and other 
international forest-related instruments, processes, commitments, and goals. The six 
global forest goals as defined in the UNSPF 2017-2030 include: 
Goal 1: Reverse the loss of forest cover worldwide through SFM, including 
protection, restoration, afforestation, and reforestation, and increase efforts to 
prevent forest degradation and contribute to the global effort to address climate 
change; 
Goal 2: Enhance forest-based economic, social, and environmental benefits, 
including by improving the livelihoods of forest-dependent people; 
Goal 3: Increase significantly the area of protected forests worldwide and other 
areas of sustainably managed forests, as well as the proportion of forest products 
from sustainably managed forests; 
Goal 4: Mobilize significantly increased, new and additional financial resources 
from all sources for the implementation of SFM and strengthen scientific and 
technical cooperation and partnerships; 
Goal 5: Promote governance frameworks to implement SFM, including through the 
UN Forest Instrument, and enhance the contribution of forests to the 2030 Agenda;  
Goal 6: Enhance cooperation, coordination, coherence, and synergies on forest-
related issues at all levels, including within the UN system and across CPF member 
organizations, as well as across sectors and relevant stakeholders. 
 
Key policy instrument(s) Funding, information and education, forest-carbon offsetting, reporting, capacity 
and technological transfer.  
Relevance to SFM The UN strategic plan for forests represent an international forest policy agenda. At 
the heart of the UNSPF are six Global Forest Goals and 26 associated targets to be 
achieved by 2030. 
 
Strategic agenda(s)  Good forest governance, climate change, biodiversity conservation, finance for 
forests, sustainable bio-economy 














                                               
16A UN resolution is a formal text or statement adopted by a UN body. A UN General Assembly resolution is also known as “recommendations” 





Appendix C: FLEGT VPA related documents per country reviewed 
 





from Joint Implementation 
Committee  
EFI EU FLEGT Facility 
Highlight and Insights 
Cameroon 2013–16 
 
EU–Cameroon, 2011 Aide-mémoire 











from 1st–4th JIC 
 
2017; 2018 
    
- 
 
Republic of the Congo 
(Congo) 
 
2016 EU–Congo, 2010, 2014 
negotiations 
Aide-mémoire 








EU–Ghana, 2008; 2009 
 
Aide-mémoire 



















Appendix D: Sample Q Sort Guide 
Name of interviewee  
Gender (Male or Female)  
Name and category of organization (e.g. 
government, CSO, Private sector, etc.) 
 
Email address  
Telephone number  
Number of years involved in VPA Process  
 
For each Q statement, you are kindly asked to: (a) sort the following Q statements (cards) into 
their relative important groupings (from -3 least agreed good governance practice as applied to 
VPA to +3 most agreed good governance practice as applied to VPA) in Ghana. Any additional 
comments or reasons for the ranking are very important and welcome.  
 Principles of Good forest Governance and their corresponding Q statements 
 
Principle  Q statements  
Accountability  S#7: Roles and responsibilities of government entities involved in the implementation of VPA process, forest 
laws, and regulations clearly defined. 
S#8: Clear legal framework for accountability relationships among executive agencies at national and local 
levels. 
S#9: Forestry officials are more answerable for the forest management activities carried out. 
S#10: Civil Society Organizations (CSO) have clear role in VPA process, including compliance monitoring. 
#16: Inputs of stakeholders gathered during VPA-related decision-making is documented and disclosed to 
relevant stakeholders. 
 
Effectiveness  S#26: There are more valid management plans for management of forests. 
S#27: Legal compliance with forestry policies, laws, and plans is effectively monitored. 
S#29: VPA and REDD+ actors are collaborating to address illegal logging as a driver of forest degradation. 
S#30: There is evidence of better coordination among national and local law enforcement agencies.  
S#31: Instances of noncompliance/infractions are promptly addressed.  
S#32: The GhLAS, in particular the WTS, is linked with relevant fiscal requirements and related forest fees by 
timber companies. 
 
Efficiency  S#6: Robust verification system for tracking legality of timber. 
S#28: Improvement in the collection procedures of forest taxes, royalties, and forest rents. 
S#33: VPA strengthens the capacity of forestry organization for mobilizing domestic resources (e.g., timber 
taxes). 
S#34: VPA has the potential to reduce corruption associated with the award of forest concessions, harvesting 
and trade of timber. 
S#35: Less time spent for processing timber records for exports. 
S#36: Efficient reconciliation of official data along timber supply chain. 
 
Fairness/equity S#11: Timber industries have the legal right to challenge administrative decisions.  
S#17: VPA stakeholder platform representations are transparent. 
S#20 Dispute resolution mechanisms in the forest sector are provided in English and other languages spoken by 
significant segment of Ghanaians. 
S#21: VPA makes explicit mention of Social Responsibility Agreements. 
S#22: Local communities perceive participation in VPA processes as fair, inclusive, and legitimate. 
S#24: The VPA process provides opportunity for tree tenure rights to be clarified and well-documented in a 
centralized system. 
 





S#14: Forest sector stakeholder groups are consulted and participated in the VPA process. 
S#15: Local communities have voices in and influence VPA related decision-making processes and outcomes. 
S#18: Platform with dedicated channels for engaging with and providing feedback to stakeholder groups on 
forest-related issues. 
S#23: The VPA process engages the private sector of Ghana. 
 
Transparency  S#3: Government forestry officials respond to stakeholders’ request for information in a timely manner. 
S#1: Existence of platforms for disclosing information to forest sector stakeholders in Ghana. 
S#2: Methods of disclosing information are adapted to meet the needs of different stakeholder groups. 
S#4: VPA-related laws and regulations are reformed and passed in timely manner. 
S#5: Public disclosure of information as committed in the VPA. 
S#12: There is clarity in timber legality assessment and verification under VPA arrangements. 
S#19 Information disclosure mechanism contains comprehensive records of legally recognized harvesting rights 
and related permits. 






Appendix E: Example of a Post-Q sort interview 
The purpose of these thematic research areas is to understand good governance performance and 
barriers to the implementation of good governance requirements or the VPA process in Ghana. I 
personally seek your consent to audio-record the interview and take notes. Please comment on 
the following aspects of VPA in Ghana based on your opinions and experiences. 
1. Transparency and accountability 
a. What VPA information/decisions are communicated to you? If no information is 
disclosed to you, can you explain why? 
b. To what extent should VPA information be made public? 
c. What are the systems and processes that are put in place to hold the Forestry 
Commission and VPA structures to account, how frequently are they used and 
how effective are they, and why? 
d. What mechanisms require downward accountability as well as upward 
accountability? In which of these pathways is there evidence of accountability? 
2. Participation, fairness, and equity 
a. What mechanisms are available to enable multi-stakeholders to participate in and 
influence VPA decisions and outcomes? 
b. What is the basis of VPA representation at negotiation and implementation levels? 
c. Why does VPA representation change between levels, and with what 
implications?  
d. Have the interests of all stakeholders been sought and considered during the VPA 
negotiation process and during the implementation?  




a. What are the challenges (weaknesses and threats) associated with implementing 
the governance requirements of Ghana’s VPA? In other words, what hinders or 
enables implementation of VPA requirements? 
b. What opportunities or strengths exist for enabling more effective VPA process? 
c. How is the Forestry Commission of Ghana adapting to VPA structures as a result 
of the FLEGT policy? 
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